In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 5 pptx

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Taylor’s position is inconsistent. He insists that rights are not

“derived from or... equivalent to assertions about duties” because

in such a case “the question of whether moral agents respect the

rights of others becomes identical with the question of whether they

live up to their duties” (“Inherent” 24). Rights, he insists, are more

than this. Given Taylor’s direct parallels, how can he logically assert

that his environmental ethic can supplant anymal and plant rights,

while denying their efficacy as a replacement for human rights?

Taylor’s theory demonstrates that respect for nature is not a replace￾ment for moral rights. Taylor begins chapter six: “In this final chap￾ter I consider the moral dilemmas that arise when human rights and

values conflict with the good of non-humans” (Respect 256). Can the

simple “good” of all other entities compete fairly with the multitude

of comprehensive “rights” Taylor protects for human animals? Taylor’s

theory demonstrates that it cannot. There is bound to be “tension

between claiming that all living beings have equal inherent worth

and only granting rights to humans” (Lombardi 257). Indeed, most

of the difficulties of internal conflict in Taylor’s theory stem from

his tendency to favor human beings, most prominently displayed in

his affirmation of human rights and concurrent dismissal of anymal

rights. Taylor “cannot bring himself to completely renounce... spe￾cial respect for persons and sometimes speaks of ‘both systems of

ethics’—respect for persons and respect for nature—as if he were

juggling two independent principles” (Callicott, “Case” 107).

Taylor’s acceptance of rights exclusively for Homo sapiens harms

the internal consistency and protectionist qualities of his theory. Most

flagrantly, Taylor offers an environmental ethic to protect “wild”

entities, inclusive of the most civilized and “unnatural” of species

(humans), yet excluding billions of domestic “pets,” “laboratory” any￾mals, and “food” anymals that live severely truncated, deprived, and

often painful lives. Taylor’s theory allows masses of teleological enti￾ties to live and die as property and profit for exploitative industries

that degrade the land with a multitude of chemicals and tons of

waste. Yet Taylor protects these industries, rather than the lives of

the individuals or the environment, allowing people to maintain their

integrity as the type of beings that we are—in this case, greedy,

exploitative, and cruel beings.

Taylor fails to fulfill his own standards for an ethical system; his

humanocentric tendencies prevent him from applying his environ￾mental principles in a disinterested fashion.

paul taylor: bio-protectionism 209

i. Justification

Taylor’s work favors humans in ways that sometimes lead to philo￾sophic inconsistencies, and one might suspect that these special human

privileges are intended to make his theory more palatable: Taylor

guarantees

that we human beings... can go on living the lives to which we have

grown accustomed. He tries to make things come out right—so that

we can eat vegetables, build wooden houses, and generally get on with

our human projects . . .—by means of an elaborate set of hedges enabling

us consumptively to use our fellow entities within the limits of his

extremely broad egalitarian theory. (Callicott, “Case” 108)

Taylor offers a theory that is more likely to be considered accept￾able by granting people more freedom and power. Though Taylor

admits that his theory is difficult to realize, he asserts that respect

for nature, based on “equal inherent worth of every living thing,”

demonstrates that “biotic egalitarianism . . . does not reduce to absur￾dity” but can be fruitfully implemented (Respect 306).

There is value in presenting a moral theory that is appealing and

applicable, one that seems to offer realistic answers to pressing con￾temporary problems. Yet Taylor’s human leanings prove disastrous,

and in any case, one cannot please everyone. At least one of Taylor’s

readers concluded that “the clearest and most decisive refutation of

the principle of respect for life is that one cannot live according to

it, nor is there any indication in nature that we were intended to”

(Goodpaster, “On Being” 324). Even with Taylor’s extensive human

bias, it is almost certain that many people would be unwilling to

adopt Taylor’s theory of Respect for Nature (Spitler 256).

Moral theory, including protectionist moral theory, ought not to

bend to the preferences of the masses. People have too often treasured

the freedom of human expansion, flourishing civilization, and increased

profit at the expense of other living entities—even at the expense of

less powerful human beings. In the United States, in the mid-eighteenth

century, settlers were free to hunt Native Americans for sport and

profit; those who brought in the head of a Native American were

paid bounty money by the federal government (“Ishi”). In the south￾ern United States slave owners were free to profit economically from

slaves, whom they could sell or kill at their whim. Our interest in

freedom and personal gain has sometimes had an appalling effect

on other individuals—human and nonhuman. Power and freedom

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are much sought, but they are often not worth the price paid (Fein￾berg, Social 7).

Just as moral theory was brought to bear on those who exploited

Africans and natives for profit in the United States, sound and con￾sistent moral theory must be brought to bear on those who profit

from destroying the natural world or from the lives of anymals.

Conclusion

Taylor’s theory is both broader than most protectionist theories

(including plants) and narrower (excluding anymals that are not “nat￾ural” or “wild”). Taylor’s work entails theoretical problems and incon￾sistencies, such as his tendency to make exceptions in his theory for

the sake of human interests. Nonetheless, Taylor’s theory of Respect

for Nature offers a fascinating and inspirational protectionist ethic

for wildlife, and for the natural world. He offers a much-needed the￾oretical bridge where environmentalists and protectionists might meet

on common ground.

PART THREE

PROTECTIONIST THEOLOGY