In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 4 pptx

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moral duty to respect the hunted animal” (P. Taylor, Unpublished 2).

(“Inherent worth” is also discussed in chapters 1 and 2.)

Taylor ascribes inherent worth to each entity that has “a good of

their own,” to all those myriad entities that “can be made better or

worse off ” (Respect 56, 75). For Taylor, having a good of one’s own

makes an entity worthy of moral consideration, and moral consid￾eration carries duties for moral agents (Respect 75). If an entity has

inherent worth, then that being is worthy of moral consideration

from moral agents. For Taylor, inherent worth indicates that moral

agents have a prima facie duty to promote or preserve that entity’s

good as an end in itself—for the sake of that entity (Respect 75).

b. Teleology

Taylor’s theory ascribes inherent worth to wild teleological entities.

“Everything that is alive at this moment is the result of ancestors

who displayed brilliant artifices to reproduce against nearly impos￾sible odds” (Sagoff 15). While Western humans have excellent odds

of finding enough food and avoiding predators, this is not the case

for all creatures. Biological beings have a variety of needs; survival

depends on how well they cope with their environment (Broom 90).

In its simplest definition, teleology guides organisms to fulfill bio￾logical needs so that they/we might succeed at the daunting task of

survival (G. Williams 136).

Ernest Nagel describes teleology as that which distinguishes “liv￾ing from inanimate things,” and which specifically refers to “the

apparently purposive character of living organisms” (276). He divides

teleological statements into two types. First are goal ascriptions, which

“state some outcome or goal toward which certain activities of an

organism or of its parts are directed” (E. Nagel 277). For instance,

the goal of pecking in woodpeckers is to find grubs. This form of

teleology is “guided by a program” and “dependent on the existence

of some endpoint or goal” (Mayr 48). Second are function ascrip￾tions, which “make evident one role some item plays in a given sys￾tem” (E. Nagel 315). This includes for example, “the heart that is

built to pump the blood through the body, the kidneys that are built

to eliminate the byproducts of protein metabolism, the intestinal tract

that performs digestion and makes nutritional material available to

the body,” and teeth that chew food and send the food down to the

digestive tract (Mayr 49). Characteristic language of teleology includes

function, purpose, goal, and behaviors intended to “bring about” a

certain end (Mayr 39).

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Ernst Mayr discusses two other forms of teleology that apply to

inanimate matter. First is a process “in which a definite end is reached

strictly as a consequence of physical laws” (49). Gravity carries a

baseball to the earth as dependably as it carries water to the seas.

Laws of gravitation and thermodynamics frequently govern the unfold￾ing of events on planet earth. “The entire process of cosmic evolu￾tion, from the first big bang to the present time” is a direct result

of physical laws such as these (Mayr 49).

Finally, Mayr discusses a cosmic teleology, a form of teleology that

Aristotle attributed to the cosmos as a whole. He did not under￾stand evolution, yet as he studied life and the world around him he

concluded that chance was not a viable explanation for what he wit￾nessed. The world, he thought, must be guided by purpose. Christians

seized on this Aristotelian concept, attributing the ultimate purpose

to God. Mayr notes that this cosmic teleology is rejected by mod￾ern science “without reservation. There is not and never was any

program on the basis of which either cosmic or biological evolution

has occurred” (50). Cosmic teleology is now understood to be the

result of “selection forces generated by competition among individ￾uals and species and by the colonization of new adaptive zones”

(Mayr 50).

Taylor’s teleology, consistent with thoughts of most other con￾temporary thinkers, does not include inanimate forces. Taylor’s moral

theory protects “any wild creature just in virtue of its being a mem￾ber of a biotic community of a natural ecosystem” (Respect 79). Such

teleological beings are not to be treated as a means to an end, but

as ends in themselves with a value independent of any utility ascribed

by human beings (Respect 57). While “animals may not actually be

valued by humans as highly as other humans [are valued]... this

does not mean that animals do not have the same inherent [worth]

as humans” (“Inherent” 17). In Taylor’s view the spotted sandpiper

and the spotted hyena, the spider wasp and the spider crab all have

inherent worth.

For Taylor, teleology entails both internal functioning and exter￾nal activities, both of which constantly work to maintain an organ￾ism’s existence (Respect 121). Teleological entities have “interests”

because they have a good that can be thwarted: “We have each a

good of our own, and each of us, human and non-human alike, can

be helped or hindered in the realization of that good” (P. Taylor,

“In Defense” 238). Like human beings,

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other organisms are teleological centers of life. The constant tendency

of their behavior and internal processes is patterned around the real￾ization of their good. Although the content of our good and the means

by which we pursue it may be vastly different from theirs, the teleo￾logical order exemplified both in our lives and in theirs signifies a fun￾damental reality common to all of us. (P. Taylor, Respect 157)

Teleological entities pursue the realization of their interests, and

Taylor asserts that to harm the good of a teleological entity thwarts

interests and denies inherent worth (P. Taylor, Respect 71–72). Each

living thing endeavors to maintain its existence. In this ongoing strug￾gle for survival, the unique capacities of each teleological being jus￾tify “the ascription of inherent worth to life in general” (“Inherent”

259–60). The essence of goal and function ascriptions—the essence

of teleology—is survival. “The only thing that anything in nature is

designed to accomplish is its own success” (G. Williams 156). Teleo￾logical entities strive to persist genetically.

c. Equal Moral Consideration

Entities that have inherent worth are all equally deserving of moral

consideration (P. Taylor, Respect 79). Anymals that have a good of

their own, from the rhinoceros auklet to the elephant shrew, have

moral standing. This moral standing carries corresponding duties for

moral agents.

Taylor asserts that because of teleology, because organisms “grow,

respond to stimuli, reproduce, resist dying, assimilate, and use materials

from their environment” in order to survive, we ought to respect their

efforts and their lives (Scoville 121). There is a measure of equality

in biological beings—all have adapted successfully and are able to

survive in their particular environment (Gunn, “Traditional” 151). Taylor

acknowledges this equality, and this remarkable endeavor that we are

all engaged in, and requires human beings to regard “every entity

which has a good of its own as possessing inherent worth—the same

inherent worth, since none is superior to another” (Respect 155).

4. Moral Agents and Moral Patients

In Taylor’s work, as in Regan’s, moral agents can be held morally

accountable. In contrast, moral patients are not morally accountable;

they cannot do right, nor can they do wrong. Also as in Regan’s

Rights View, Taylor considers most humans to be moral agents,

while anymals (and some humans) are moral patients—though he

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admits he cannot be certain about the moral status of anymals (Respect

14). Taylor’s definition of a moral agent includes

the ability to form judgments about right and wrong; the ability to

engage in moral deliberation, that is to consider and weigh moral rea￾sons for and against various courses of conduct open to choice; the

ability to make decisions on the basis of those reasons; the ability to

exercise the necessary resolve and willpower to carry out those deci￾sions; and the capacity to hold oneself answerable to others for fail￾ing to carry them out. (Respect 14)

5. Rights

Taylor introduces and discusses various types of rights in his theory

of Respect for Nature.

a. Legal Rights

Taylor notes that nonhuman entities have legal rights in the Western

world. He defines legal rights as entitlements established by law. He

cites the Endangered Species Act and also laws that prohibit recre￾ational killing of “game” anymals in certain places at certain times,

as proof that both plants and anymals have legal rights (Respect 223).

He notes that legal rights are distinct from moral rights.

b. Moral Rights

Taylor does not ascribe moral rights to anymals. He argues that

moral rights, in contrast to legal rights, can only be ascribed to “per￾sons.” For Taylor, a “person” is an entity that has interests and pur￾poses, preferences and plans, a sense of personal identity over time,

and makes autonomous choices or valuations (Respect 33–36). Addi￾tionally, “persons” have self-respect, can exercise or enjoy rights, and

hold others to account (Respect 246, 251). Taylor also asserts that

“persons” are autonomous, rational beings who choose their own

value system and direct their own lives on the basis of their value

system (P. Taylor, Respect 36). Taylor does not find that anymals (or

plants) fulfill the necessary set of criteria for “personhood,” and so

he grants only human beings this status, a status that, in Taylor’s

view, carries moral rights.

In Taylor’s theory, bearers of moral rights “are acknowledged to

have supreme authority over those conditions of their lives which are

essential to preserving their personhood” (“Inherent” 26). Furthermore,

for Taylor, moral rights require that one be a member of a community

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of moral agents. Anymals do not have such supreme authority in

Taylor’s view; he does not recognize them as “persons,” or as bear￾ers of moral rights.

c. Human Rights

Taylor describes human rights as rooted in “human ethics based on

respect for persons.” Taylor views human rights as central to the

structure and function of societies (Respect 234). “The principle of

respect for persons is built into the very structure of the moral com￾munity and serves as the ultimate ground of the rules of duty within

the domain of human ethics... [and] serves as the foundation for

universal human rights” (P. Taylor, Respect 39).

Taylor writes that human rights belong “to all persons in virtue

of their personhood. . . . Thus they are universal (belonging to every

person) and equal (the same for all persons)” (“Inherent” 25). Basic

human rights

consist in a set of guaranteed opportunities and permissions which

make it possible for one to (choose to) maintain oneself as a living

organism and to seek those ends of interest that make up the central

values of one’s self-determined conception of a meaningful life. Thus

our basic rights set boundaries of inviolability, as it were, around the

core of our existence. (“Inherent” 25)

Taylor lists several human rights:

• Physical security: the right to subsistence and security, including

the “physical necessities of biological survival,” the right not to be

killed, and the right of physical safety (Respect 235).

• Liberty: the right to liberty entails “freedom from positive external

constraints upon the pursuit of one’s permissible interests” (Respect

237). “Permissible” means those interests that do not infringe on

the rights of others, or break a valid moral rule, including “the right

to take effective steps to realize the goals we have set for ourselves,

without hindrances or obstacles placed in our way by others”; we

are “at liberty to pursue our good as we see fit,” but not necessarily

to have our good realized (Respect 237–39).

• Autonomy: the right to autonomy includes the right to self-deter￾mination, which allows individuals to lead their own lives, “based

on goals they set for themselves and values they have chosen for

themselves. . . . [T]hey are accordingly self-directed and self-gov￾erned beings” (Respect 239).