In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 2 pot

40 chapter one

a particular case is engaged to be married to a man who is on trial

for theft, justice is at risk. Vested interests, emotional attachment,

and close affinity threaten impartiality. When one is in charge of

making decisions that affect others, an emotional attachment to only

one (or a portion) of those affected puts justice at risk. This is not to

suggest that emotional attachment or close affinity are vices—rather,

they are virtues. In contrast, complete emotional detachment is a

vice, as evidenced by psychopaths, who are a danger to animals

(including humans). Emotional attachment need not cause bias in all

situations, though such an effect is highly likely.

Human beings, who create moral guidelines for human interactions

with anymals, have vested interests, including an emotional attach￾ment to themselves and to others of their kind. Human beings have

a particular relationship with the human species over and against all

other species, and are likely to have a vested interest in human life.

It is not possible for Homo sapiens to move outside of this position of

bias—it is inherent. However, in the interest of promoting justice,

we must strive to be impartial in spite of our vested interests and

personal connections. Since we are inherently biased, we must be

wary of human assessments of other species, especially assessments

that elevate our own ethical standing. We must critically examine

the means we use to reach conclusions and regard moral assessments

that favor humans as inherently suspicious.

There are scores of examples of biased assessments of other species.

Our first attempt to teach chimpanzees to speak is an example.

Scientists concluded that chimps did not have linguistic ability, that

they lacked the cognitive mechanisms necessary for all but the most

basic forms of communication. Noted scholars concluded that speech

is the exclusive realm of human beings, a defining characteristic

shared by no other animal—and an important element in assessing

moral status. It has since been discovered that chimps lack the phys￾iology for verbal speech, but communicate effectively—beyond basic

communication—via sign language. We are now finding that any￾mals, such as whales, apes, dolphins, and vervet monkeys, have com￾plex forms of communication (M. S. Dawkins 23–24, Warren 53).

[Vervet] monkeys are able to pick up subtleties in their grunts that

completely escape the human ear. To a human, a grunt is a grunt is

a grunt. It takes technological aids in the form of tape recorders and

sound spectrograph to show that, as far as the monkeys are concerned,

methods and terms 41

there is far more to it than that. . . . We still do not fully understand

what it is that the monkeys are responding to or exactly how they

manage to detect the differences between the grunts. But do it they

clearly do, and they leave their human observers slightly baffled.

(M. S. Dawkins 23–24)

Human investigations into anymal language appear to have carried

an unspoken motive: “For a variety of economic, religious, or other

ideological reasons, it has been important to many people to insist

on an unbridgeable gulf between humans and animals, and language

has seemed the most promising instrument for achieving this” (Dupre

331). Few contemporary ethicists consider language a necessary con￾dition for moral standing; such an assessment is now broadly rec￾ognized as a form of humanocentrism (Orlans 150).

Similar to human investigations into language, human understandings

of pain, intelligence, communication, thought, community, learning

ability, and ethics necessarily stem from a narrow perspective, one

gained from an inner understanding of these attributes as parts of our

lives. Rene Descartes (1596–1650) is perhaps the best-known example

of a human being incapable of fairly assessing anymals. He concluded

that other species could neither think nor feel (Descartes 115). Sadly,

while Descartes is a particularly flagrant example, he has not proven

to be an exception to the rule: humans have concocted a plethora

of tests to assess the intelligence, ethical tendencies, and sensitivities

of anymals, with the hope and expectation of further exemplifying

the special and preferable nature of human beings. Ongoing “scientific”

assessments of anymals say more about the nature of science—and

about human nature—than they do about anymals.

Valuing one species over another is not consistent with scientific

information. Darwin provides no hierarchy in the evolutionary con￾tinuum, no progression toward perfection, yet even in this “scientific”

age, long after Darwin’s discoveries, people continue to believe that

human beings are the most “advanced.” Concurrently, we believe

that we are the most worthy of moral consideration. But why should

we believe that we are radically different from anymals? All animals

exhibit adaptive behavior and have similar central nervous systems—

we are all sentient. Animals, both Scandinavians and cocker spaniels,

exhibit emotional responses and associate with one another in close￾knit groups. If anymals fall short of our expectation, then we should

avow that people do, too.

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[A]ny reason we have to doubt the existence of the minds of animals

also gives us reason to doubt the existence of the minds of other

humans. We are faced with a choice between attributing mental states

to animals and solipsism or skepticism concerning other minds gener￾ally. As most of us are quite ready to accept that other human beings

have minds, then we should accept that animals too have minds.

The brains of all multicellular animals, including human beings, are

made of the same matter. The fundamental characteristics of neurons

and synapses are roughly the same. . . . [T]he brains of small whales,

dolphins and porpoises are close in size to those of human beings, both

absolutely and in relation to size of body.

. . . the general truth that animal brains are anatomically similar

to our own must be accepted. And this gives us reason for believ￾ing that the mental events that take place ‘within’ them are in some

degree similar to those which occur in our own brains. (Crisp, “Evolution”

310–12)

More specifically, Dawkins argues that “we now know that these

three attributes—complexity, thinking and minding about the world—

are also present in other species. The conclusion that they, too, are

consciously aware is therefore compelling” (M. S. Dawkins 177).

Contemporary science reveals that human beings are not distinct

from anymals in any morally relevant way, leading to the important

and inescapable conclusion that “behavioral and emotional kinship

with nonhuman animals” indicates “moral kinship as well” (Bekoff 360).

Methods of assessing cognition and cognitive abilities lack depend￾ability even among human beings. It is difficult to grasp how people

might come to understand the diverse abilities and interests, psy￾chological tendencies, and mental capabilities of even one other human.

How much more difficult, then, is it for them to understand and

appreciate the minds and feelings of anymals? The epistemological

difficulties inherent in human assessments of anymals must remain

at the center of any discussion of other species and ought to tem￾per any conclusions we reach. Because we have proven partial, and

because we remain inherently partial to our own species, human

studies of anymals cannot reasonably be assumed to be adequately

grounded to justify moral conclusions.

The force and prevalence of speciesism among humans is fore￾shadowed by the history of human partiality across the categories of

race, sex, age, and sexual orientation. The assumption that all human

beings have moral standing is a recent development. Romans “did

not include in their moral community criminals, captives, foreigners,

or nonhumans” (Marshal 80). When Europeans arrived in North

methods and terms 43

America, they destroyed most of the inhabitants. Only recently has

the United States legally granted African Americans equal moral

consideration. Around the world, women have been (and are) denied

equal moral consideration alongside men. In light of a demonstrated

human tendency for those in power to be partial and unjust in assess￾ing the moral standing of other human beings (particularly when the

assessor has a vested interest), disparaging assessments of anymals is

not surprising.

Another example of human partiality and hubris relates directly

to ethics. Humans have long assumed that only the human animal

has a system of ethics. In spite of modern science and the similarities

that we now know to exist among species, many still assume, without

reference to empirical evidence, that only human beings are ethical

animals. Since ethics is the subject of this book, we should consider

whether or not ethics is exclusively the domain of human beings, or

whether it is a more broad and biological phenomenon of the animal

world (including humans).

A minimal definition of ethics entails a system of behavioral norms

that generate expectations of behavior and punish deviance. Anymals

appear to comply with social expectations and to suffer social punish￾ments for infringements. For instance, the vampire bat displays “ani￾mal decision-making... what looks like a system of morality based

on the principle of reciprocation of favours given in the past, cou￾pled with sanctions against those that do not live up to their oblig￾ations” (M. S. Dawkins 57). Based on observations, the same might

be true of nonhuman primates, canines, equines, felines, insects, and

perhaps a host of lesser observed anymals (“Inside”).

In the likely event that ethical systems are not exclusively human,

two interesting possibilities arise:

• Ethics, including human ethics, might be genetically encoded.

• Human ethics are but one of many ethical systems in the animal

world.

If the first point is true, then what is esteemed as human ethics may

be merely biology in action. E. O. Wilson argues that “moral senti￾ments” might be better described as “moral instincts.” If we are to

understand “deep springs of ethical behavior,” he argues that we

must consider the “development of moral sentiments as products of

the interactions of genes and the environment” (64). This argument

makes moral behavior a genetic predisposition resulting from natural

44 chapter one

selection, rather than a metaphysical truth to be discovered (E. O.

Wilson 58–59). E. O. Wilson concludes that ethics are “far more a

product of autonomous evolution than has hitherto been conceded”

(70). While it might prove difficult to explain all of human ethics

through biological analysis, Wilson’s perspective heightens awareness

of human beings as animals, not so very different from anymals. If

ethics have a biological component, it would not be surprising that

our morality is partial, favoring us and our own.

Evolution suggests that if human beings are moral animals by nature,

as has been supposed, other species are also likely to be genetically

wired with an ethical code, or with a tendency to have moral standards

that permit groups of individuals to function and prosper in commu￾nities. If this is the case, if other species have and practice their own

forms of morality, philosophers working in ethics have a much broader

field to explore than has generally been assumed. Human morality is

specifically the endeavor of human beings, but since anymals are also

ethical agents in their communities, it is important that we strive to

move outside of our narrow, human perspective of ethics to compre￾hend a larger moral sphere. Like the judge with a vested interest,

we cannot maintain impartiality, or adequately assess ethical principles

and ethical theories, unless we are able to envisage morality from

something of an “outsider’s” viewpoint. (This does not indicate that

other animals, as moral agents in their own communities, are respon￾sible for righting the wrongs that human beings cause. We are the

animals causing untold suffering and death to other species. We are

the animals who have an ethic that speaks of the importance of con￾sistency and fail to deliver. We need to critically examine our morality

and how we behave, and then change our actions to coincide with

ideals like consistency, justice, and compassion.)

Do genetically encoded morals justify speciesism? History suggests

that morality changes over time, and this may be related to evolu￾tion. Our ongoing effort to foster a more inclusive morality indicates

that partiality need not be a permanent part of our genetic code for

moral behavior. If it were, then racism, sexism, ageism, and het￾erosexism would be equally biological, and we could not expect to

make any moral progress toward a more impartial ethic. History

reveals that this is not the case.

Inherent difficulties, epistemological and personal, indicate that

sound ethical theories are not likely to stem from common human

assumptions or standard human comparisons of themselves with any-