In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 3 pps

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lives of many people in jeopardy. Regan’s discussion of “innocent

threats” deals with situations where moral patients harm moral agents,

but he offers no indication that dangerous but innocent moral agents

might not also be killed to protect moral agents and moral patients.

People are often ignorant of the damage they do, but humans, more

than any other animal, endanger life. To eliminate every other species

when they pose an innocent threat, but not to eliminate humans in

comparable situations, would be inconsistent and speciesist.

The vast majority of Western hunters kill for recreation. They kill

because they consider hunting a worthwhile and enjoyable way to

spend time and because they (or someone they know) eats dead any￾mals. Few acknowledge (or even consider) that killing anymals for

food is completely unnecessary for their survival, and that such “sport”

causes tremendous hardship and harm to other living beings. (In

fact, hunters usually assert that they do their victims a favor !) Thus

hunters needlessly endanger and destroy thousands of anymals every

year, and may be said to do so innocently (out of ignorance). Regan’s

“innocent threats” clause justifies the killing of rabid foxes that might

bite (out of fear or in self-defense). Consistency requires that his the￾ory also permit the killing of ignorant—and therefore “innocent”—

human beings who habitually and unnecessarily slaughter innocent

anymals. To eliminate other species when they pose an innocent threat,

but not to eliminate humans in comparable situations, is inconsistent.

b. Loss of Innocence

Regan asserts that those who have lost innocence through unjust actions

“have no grounds to complain if we override their right not to be

harmed and spare the victims of their past injustice” (Case 323).

Injustices borne by some grant these beleaguered individuals privi￾leges above those who perpetrate such injustices.

He asserts, “Those who forge, as well as those who perpetuate

injustice are not on the same moral footing as their innocent victims”

(Case 323). Morality requires us to take into consideration “past injus￾tices some have had to bear” (Case 323). “Those who are parties to

such injustice lose the protection the miniride and worse-off principles

provide and have no just grounds to complain if we override their

right not to be harmed and spare the victims of their past injustice”

(Case 323). This assertion has yet more counterintuitive implications.

As noted, Regan posits a lifeboat with four humans and one dog

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vying for space. If one being must go overboard, Regan concludes

that the dog ought always and perpetually to go overboard. This

assertion is not consistent with Regan’s Rights View with regard to

loss of innocence. If consistently applied, how would Regan’s view

on “loss of innocence” affect these hapless sea-bound citizens?

Regan notes that “animal agriculture, as we know it, is unjust”

(Case 394). He writes, “Those who support current animal agriculture

by purchasing meat have a moral obligation to stop doing so” (Case

394). He also notes that any hardship the anymal industries suffer

due to a lack of economic support from conscientious objectors is

irrelevant because “their voluntary participation in that business sig￾nals that they waive the right not to be made worse off if the busi￾ness fails” (Case 394). In other words, the injustice of their acts toward

cattle and pigs, chickens and turkeys, removes them from equal moral

footing with others who are comparatively innocent. Similarly, those

who continue to buy the bodies of slaughtered anymals in prefer￾ence to eating rice with vegetables lose their equal moral footing by

willfully choosing to exploit and destroy others.

It is reasonable to assume that Regan would make a similar asser￾tion about any common yet unnecessary human exploitation of any￾mals, from attending circuses to buying cosmetics tested on anymals.

All human beings engaged in these practices, who support these mar￾kets, harm innocent victims exploited by these markets. People who

engage in such acts have a moral obligation to change behavior that

does not respect these subjects-of-a-life. Such consumers jeopardize

their innocence.

Determining “loss of innocence” in Regan’s Rights View requires

scrutiny to discover whether or not individuals have willfully exploited

others and gained through such choices. Indeed, according to Regan,

those who capitalize on anymal agriculture have gained from harm￾ful exploitation (Case 394). Those who support these industries and

perpetuate such injustices are also guilty. Flesh and dairy–eaters,

leather and fur–wearers, and those who have used other subjects-of￾a-life for science projects—as well as any and all individuals who

support these actions—have jeopardized their otherwise equal right

not to be harmed. If even one of the humans on the lifeboat has

been eating bits of bodies, bodies that once shared equal inherent

value and the equal right not to be harmed in Regan’s Rights View,

then the dog will certainly not be first overboard. On the contrary,

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loss of innocence for at least one of the four lifeboat-clinging humans

is almost certain. As it turns out, the dog is the least likely to be

thrown overboard.

Furthermore, Regan clearly asserts that anymals are always innocent

moral patients. Consequently, dogs (birds, cats, snakes, and any other

anymal) cannot ever jeopardize their chance for a spot on the lifeboat

by loss of innocence. Meanwhile, powerful, exploitative humans are

almost always guilty of treating anymals as if they did not have equal

inherent value—thereby forfeiting a place on the raft to their inno￾cent victims—other animals. In any and all scenarios, humans are

likely to have jeopardized their innocence in relation to—and with

regard to—other species, while anymals always remain inherently

innocent. Contrary to Regan’s conclusion, if those on a lifeboat are

chucked overboard one by one, preserving those who have not

suffered a “loss of innocence,” the survivor will almost surely be the dog.

c. Obligation to Defend

Regan states that moral agents have an obligation to defend a sub￾ject-of-a-life when such an individual’s equal right not to be harmed

is violated. He writes that the onus of justification for harm done is

always on one who brings about that harm. Unless or until we are

shown how such harm is justified, we are rationally entitled to believe,

and morally required to act, against such actions. Regan asserts that

those who violate the rights of others are liable to sanction, and we

are all morally obligated to participate in this process.

Though Regan does not discuss where this duty begins or ends,

or the difficulty of determining exactly when such rights are vio￾lated, he offers clear guidelines for action:

A slave-trader does not do what is right by supplying his client with

a promised slave, and he has no valid moral duty to do so, despite

his promising. . . . [P]romises made in the name of the perpetuation of

this institution are morally null and void. The same is true regarding

society’s ‘contract’ with science and the supposed duty of scientists to

carry out their end of the agreement by harming some animals so that

others, both humans and animals, might benefit. This “contract” has

no moral validity, according to the Rights View, because it fails to

treat lab animals with the respect they are due. . . . [S]cience that

routinely harms animals in pursuit of its goals is morally corrupt,

because unjust at its core, something that no appeal to the “contract”

between society and science can alter. (Case 390)

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Regan’s obligation to defend is clear on two counts:

• Every moral agent is obligated to liberate subjects-of-a-life.

• Moral agents are justified in breaching accepted moral standards

and laws in the process of liberating subjects-of-a-life from unjust

practices.

According to Regan a moral agent is obligated to break contracts and

ignore laws in order to fight against the meat industry, or to thwart

the use of anymals in science. Regan also indicates that people are

justified in forcing change on those who harm others: “If Heather

violates the rights of those she cooks and eats when she cooks and

eats them, then she has no grounds to complain that we violate her

rights by stopping her” (Case 334). We are permitted to violate

Heather’s rights in order to prevent her from eating the flesh of

other subjects-of-a-life.

Regan is unclear where these moral obligations begin and end,

or how far they might carry one along the path of civil disobedi￾ence. Consequently, the possibilities are somewhat daunting. Are we

obligated to unchain our neighbor’s dog? Must we forcefully liberate

battery hens . . . or free-range hens? Does morality require us to engage

in guerrilla tactics to set loose laboratory and zoo anymals? Beyond

major lifestyle changes, is political activism enough, or must we step

in on behalf of every black Angus bull and Barbary ape, every pink

river dolphin and rock wallaby, every buff-faced pigmy parrot and

tabby cat whose rights are violated?

Perhaps Regan accepts all of these obligations. If he does not, he

risks inconsistency; if he does, he invites chaos. The latter is philo￾sophically acceptable; the former is not.

d. Special Considerations

Regan asserts that “the moral bonds between family members and

friends [are] a special consideration that justifiably can override the

otherwise binding application of the miniride and worse-off principles”

(Case 316). Through these “special considerations,” Regan justifies

protecting a familiar and preferred human at the greater expense of

a stranger simply because “it is those closest to us whom we stand

to help or harm most, and they, us” (Case 316). Regan argues that

“the relationships between friends and loved ones are special” (Case

317) and therefore impartiality cannot be expected—impartiality is

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not preferred. Without this “special considerations” clause, Regan

writes, one might be required to “spare the stranger at the expense

of our loved one. And that is counterintuitive” (Case 315).

Regan specifically protects basic rights from being toppled for “spe￾cial considerations.” While no subject-of-a-life can be denied a right

to life, based on Regan’s special considerations clause, they can be

denied access to goods or opportunities due to personal relations.

Consequently, Regan’s special interest clause threatens impartial appli￾cation of the Rights View.

Yet Regan’s special consideration clause seems to feed into the

hand of self-interest:

[L]ove relations are relations of self-interest, though deep ones. It is

important to you that you choose that man or that woman, as friend,

lover, spouse; that you are the parent of that child; and so for many

other such cases . . .—you care for them more. If moral relations are

generated essentially by rational agents promoting their own well￾considered, long-run interests, these cases make sense. (Narveson, “On

a Case” 36)

Self-interest is often at odds with morality. Clauses providing for spe￾cial considerations have frequently been used in just such a self-inter￾ested manner—most infamously to defend racism, sexism, and

speciesism. Feelings of attachment are often stronger between fam￾ily members—and between human beings—than they are between

strangers—or between species (Orlans 20). If we allow special con￾siderations, as Regan does, human beings are apt to be granted spe￾cial considerations over and above anymals (Rollin 43)... and perhaps

certain powerful individuals will gain special moral status over other

human beings:

If it is permissible to have special regard for family or neighbours, why

not one’s fellow species-members? The problem with this way of think￾ing is that there are lots of groups to which one naturally belongs,

and these group-memberships are not always (if they are ever) morally

significant. The progression from family to neighbour to species passes

through other boundaries on the way—through the boundary of race,

for example. (Rachels, Created 184)

How will Regan define “friend” and “family” in order to prevent

racists and bigots from seeking advantages for those nearest and

dearest? It does not logically follow that natural feelings, just because

we have them, ought to be the basis of moral obligation. Regan’s