Masters of Illusion American Leadership in the Media Age Phần 8 potx

P1: FCW

0521857449c16 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 6, 2006 7:18

370 Leading Toward Peace

The counsel about coming American weakness and European strength is

unconvincing for reasons set out earlier in this book. For the present, Europe

lacks the economic and military strength and the political cohesion neces￾sary to suck others into its way of doing things, although it doesn’t lack the

self-assurance to try. But in the longer run, should the European Union

become increasingly like a nation-state, building cohesion and military

strength, then it may well attempt to dictate the structure of global poli￾tics, as it did during the centuries of European imperialism.

The transatlantic trap invites America to deny some of the most evident

risks in the world today. Denial isn’t responsible statesmanship. America

must openly confront nuclear proliferation, the Crescent of Fire, the widen￾ing gap between rich and poor nations, Russia’s dangerous unpredictability,

and China’s rapid emergence as a military challenge – not simply presume

that these sources of danger are going to disappear of their own accord in

the way that harmonism and convergence do.

In a situation of long-term and dramatic economic divergence between

nations and regions, in which the United States is widening the gap between

its economic and military strength and that of the rest of the developed

world, the strategy of the weak is to show the United States that there is

no politically acceptable way for it to exercise its superiority. All talk of

the sanctity of international law, the legitimacy of the United Nations, and

the moral imperative of multilateralism is simply the implementation of a

strategy of this sort.

The European approach to world problems is generally either a stern

rebuke for bad behavior or an offer of incentives for better behavior. For

example, a senior human rights envoy of the European Union to Rus￾sia issued what the Financial Times called “a stern rebuke over judicial

standards” to Russia on September 30, 2004.16 It’s hard to believe the Rus￾sians were much affected by a stern rebuke. Quite the contrary, private

discussions with Russian officials indicate that this sort of thing provides

the Russians with chuckler. In response, they adopt the role of the wounded

innocent (“certainly we do nothing to be criticized for”), but laugh about

the matter in private. How can the Europeans who do this sort of thing

seriously expect anything but ridicule?

As for incentives for better behavior, the European approach is on display

in the controversy over the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Initially, the

Europeans offered incentives to the Iranians to cease their program; the Ira￾nians took the incentives and continued with their program. The Europeans

protested, so the Iranians demanded more incentives.17

P1: FCW

0521857449c16 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 6, 2006 7:18

The Transatlantic Trap 371

Neither terrorists, insurrectionists, rogue states, the Russians, nor the

Chinese will pay any attention to this sort of moral suasion at all (although

they’ll accept any money the Europeans offer, without abiding by the agree￾ments, of course), so it is dangerous for us to do so.

ALL THE WAY VIA MULTILATERALISM TO A

WORLD GOVERNMENT

There is now much support in Europe and on the American left for multi￾lateral decision making – a form of world government. Is the UN a tolerable

vehicle for this? The UN wasn’t put together for this, but it’s all we have.

If we are to contemplate full multilateral decision making – that is, world

government – then we must redesign the UN or design something else.

Immediately at the end of World War II, President Harry Truman spoke

at the founding of the United Nations: “We all have to recognize – no matter

how great our strength – that we must deny ourselves the license to do always

as we please.”18 Revisiting this speech a writer forThe Economist complained,

“The contrast with the attitude of most subsequent American governments,

and especially the current one [the George W. Bush Administration] could

not be more stark.”19 Yet The Economist ignored two factors: Truman’s

careful qualification of his endorsement of multilateralism – “to do always as

we please.” The United States does not and should not always act as it pleases,

including now. But when it is a matter of national defense, the country must

act, even if it is not supported by other countries whose agendas are quite

different. In addition, there is now a long history of foolishness and futility

in the United Nations against which Americans must weigh our support for

multilateralism.

The confusion that characterizes European thought about the United

Nations continues unabated. For example, “Why ...should Russia with a

GDP smaller than the Netherlands have a permanent seat (in the United

Nation’s Security Council) rather than Japan ...?” ask the editors of The

Economist, quite seriously.20 The answer is very simple – Russia is a fully

armed nuclear power covering almost one-seventh of the landmass of the

globe and should therefore be on the Security Council. The size of GDP

is immaterial when the question is Russian participation in world affairs.

The major point is that asking the question reveals both European myopia

(they just ignore the nuclear power of Russia) and the European confusion of

consumer economics with military power – they are not always synonymous.

The United Nations Security Council is about war and peace, it shouldn’t be

P1: FCW

0521857449c16 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 6, 2006 7:18

372 Leading Toward Peace

another world trade organization. The confusion is of consumer economies

with military strength, and of the present with the future (Russia is about

to fully modernize its forces while Japan has not yet chosen its course in the

future).

Ifwe retain the United Nations in a significant role, then we must shift our

position to one of multilateralism generally, for otherwise we are asserting

both independence and dependence and there are certain to be different

expectations of us by our allies, and when we disappoint them, there is

certain to be a major controversy with our allies and more harm than would

otherwise be done. Disappointed expectations embitter people and create

tension and conflict. They are a sure trap to fall into, and are the result of

our not having sufficiently adjusted our policy for the end of the Cold War.

This is the core of what’s happening now over Iraq. The argument is

being made that it was the attitude of the American government – allegedly

unilateralist and arrogant – that undercut and made ineffective the efforts

of the United Nations to disarm Iraq. “... the entire process of trying to

avert a war through inspections and negotiations was undercut by the mil￾itary buildup,” wrote Richard C. Holbrooke, American ambassador to the

United Nations in the Clinton Administration, “that the United States said

was necessary to force Iraq to comply – a buildup that some officials later

argued could not be reversed without the United States losing face. ‘In ret￾rospect, the military buildup and the diplomacy were out of sync with each

other.’ ... ‘The policies were executed in a provocative way that alienated

our friends.’”21

Asbeguiling on the surface as multilateralism is the notion of international

law. “In a lawless society the only natural right is superior might.”22 We can

do better than that, goes the argument. Rather than force as an arbiter of

controversy, there would instead by a rule of law. That’s how a modern

democracy works, and so should the world. It’s a compelling vision.

The core of the matter is that other nations have learned how to use the

United Nations to handcuff the United States procedurally and moralisti￾cally. They claim to do this in support of justice and other such verities.

More often, they do it in support of their own interests.23 Multilateralism

and international law used this way are a sham, and hold that we should

be bound to them is to believe that we should sacrifice our security for an

idealist fiction.

It is a mistaken notion that diplomacy is a win-win process; and that overt

conflict is only win-lose. This confuses characteristics of means with charac￾teristics of results. Diplomacy is often lose-lose when needed actions do not

occur (as today, for example, in the continued diplomatic ineffectiveness

P1: FCW

0521857449c16 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 6, 2006 7:18

The Transatlantic Trap 373

in stopping nuclear proliferation) and overt conflict can be win-win when

an evil is eradicated. The American Civil War, for example, was an overt

conflict that put an end to a great evil, slavery, which the southern states

couldn’t end for themselves; in this way it was win-win. The same is true of

World War II, which put an end to Nazism, which ultimately benefited both

Germany and its enemies.

Similarly, it’s an illusion to think that diplomacy is an expression of

harmony; it often is not; it’s frequently a form which conflict takes. Just

as individuals can be in conflict who are not actually at blows, so nations are

sometimes in conflict even when there is not war between them. Diplomacy

can, when it is successful, preserve the peace; but a war can reestablish peace.

They are both, in that sense, a road to peace. The advantage of diplomacy

is that it is not war, and can sometimes avoid war. But the absence of war is

not the absence of conflict; and in diplomacy conflict often simmers until

war breaks out.

Hence, it’s also an illusion to think that diplomacy is somehow different

than conflict; it’s different from war, but it’s often simply another form of

rivalry between nations. It’s a mistake, therefore, to think that diplomacy

provides win-win solutions, while war is always a win-lose. More often, both

diplomacy and war are lose-lose for the parties engaged. Diplomacy can be

a means of problem solving with an attempt to reach win-win solutions,

but it need not be. And war can sometimes create an environment in which

problem-solving takes over. But it is an error to associate diplomacy with

problem-solving in all cases – it isn’t that.

“Politics is war by other means,” wrote Will and Ariel Durant in their

study of world history.24 The politics of the United Nations is no different.

MULTILATERALISM AS AN END

For some, multilateralism has become an end in itself – that is, a device, a

method, has become an objective itself.

Some seem to celebrate multilateralism explicitly for failing to serve Amer￾icas interests. In this concept, multilateralism is a device by which America

champions principles and norms that serve to bind itself, and this seems to

them only fair, because, in this view, the United States would play by the rules

it asked others to accept. This, it seems, is fair, and so the rules of the game

become as important as the game itself, of which sight is lost. The game is

the national security of the United States, reacting at this moment to the

most serious loss of life from a foreign attack on its own soil in more than

one hundred and fifty years. But of this sight has been lost. “Cooperation

P1: FCW

0521857449c16 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 6, 2006 7:18

374 Leading Toward Peace

was contingent on the United States itself playing by the rules,” wrote Lisa

Martin implying that France didn’t cooperate with us in suppressing terror

because we didn’t play by the rules of multilateralism.25

This is a complete reversal of the actual causality. Rather, we rejected

multilateralism because France didn’t cooperate in combating terror, but

pursued private and hidden agendas instead.

The error is to look no deeper than methods in determining the objective

of our policy. Multilateralism, like unilateralism, is only a device to other

ends a device that may or may not be valuable depending on what it can

accomplish to the larger ends. What does multilateralism really mean in

today’s environment? It means not acting without the imprimatur of the

United Nations – which is only obtained by the support of China, Russia, and

France. It means subordinating our own interests to theirs. Multinationalists

support this. In making multilateralism an objective, its supporters risk

straying into a shadowy zone in which they have become a fifth column for

Americas rivals serving the interests of our rivals while pretending that they

are serving America.

Multinationalists seem to glory in the notion that America should now

make sacrifices to return to multilateralism. It will take time and resources

to rebuild the U.S. reputation for multilateralism. It will require making

concessions and accepting compromises on a wide range of issues. Thus,

to get others to support us, we must give them what they want at cost to

ourselves. The baby of American interests is here thrown to the multilateralist

wolves, our interests are sacrificed to other nations, some of which are often

hostile, and some of which are disguised as our allies, but who are allies

only on a situational basis and are as often our rivals and antagonists as our

friends and supporters.

“To argue that the United States should always work through the UN is to

argue that China, Russia, or France should have a veto over our use of military

force,” wrote Stanley Michalak. “Neither the Clinton administration nor any

previous administration accepted that position. Nor will any administration

in the future, or any other member of the Security Council, do so. Were

Taiwan to declare its independence, the last thing China would do is ask UN

Security Council for permission to use military force.”26

Amitai Etzioni noted that “Many champions of the United Nations

... treat the organization as if it were already some kind of democratic

world government. Hence, they attribute enormous importance to whether

the United Nations approves of a course of action. ... They confuse what

the United Nations one day can be with the way it is...”27 We are less hope￾ful. There is no reason to believe that the United Nations can be effectively