Masters of Illusion American Leadership in the Media Age Phần 5 pptx

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Geopolitical Aspirations of the Nations 199

campaign funds. A respected former federal judge was selected to investi￾gate the matter, and accepted the position, but the investigation was never

funded.

There are continuing reports of Chinese efforts to obtain licenses for

export from America to China of parts of supercomputers, presumably to

be used at some point for missile targeting.

Meanwhile, the Chinese are moving ahead rapidly in computer hardware

manufacturing. “Huawei’s [a Chinese created and owned router manufac￾turer for telecoms, like Cisco] rapid expansion has brought it plaudits from

China’s top leaders, who are eager for the country to establish itself as a

high-technology power and not just a factory floor for the world.”40

WILL CHINA BE AN ENEMY?

It would be a great tragedy if America and China stumbled into an armed

conflict. Today the Chinese are at long last making significant economic

progress and there is at least some greater degree of personal freedom than

before. To see all this lost would be extremely unfortunate. At the start of

this chapter, we quoted Henry Kissinger to the point that China need not be

America’s enemy – that such a result is not foreordained. Then we discussed

the trends in Chinese politics and economics and concluded that they point

to a high likelihood of enmity between the two powers as Chinese strength

grows. Now we turn to the issue of overt conflict – how might it occur?

Essentially the Chinese are likely to view America as strong but lacking

the will to use force with a will to win, if losses are imposed on America.

They may consider us unlikely to use force to support an ally, but willing to

use force to support our economic interest. In this case, their strategy at this

stage is clear: to acquiescence in trade agreements that embody America’s

major economic aims; and to press us to hard choices in the geopolitical

realm.

The pressing has already started.

Today in the Far East there is unceasing elbowing between China and the

United States. Hardly a day goes by that some Chinese civilian or military

official does not warn the United States and its allies about their supposed

hostility toward China, and hardly a day passes without a response from the

American military or civilian leadership. In 2001, for example, the Secre￾taries of State and Defense of the United States invited Japan, South Korea,

the Philippines, and Australia to join in a more formal military alliance;

and China quickly warned the four Asian countries not to toe the American

line. China then began the largest military maneuvers in its history, directly

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200 The Reconfiguration of National Wealth and Power

opposite Taiwan. A defector from the Chinese embassy in Australia reported

knowing of a thousand Chinese spies in Australia.

China conducts tests of long-range ballistic missiles frequently. It recently

fired from a submarine a missile believed to have a range of about six thou￾sand miles, which could reach U.S. territory from the western Pacific. The

system isn’t yet operational, but may be in a few years. It marks a major

advance of China’s strategic weaponry.41

In Asia and Australia papers follow the almost daily elbowing of the

Americans and the Chinese – statements by the civilian governments, or

by military leadership, directed at the other and at other countries; the

Americans proposing new security discussions and arrangements by China’s

neighbors; China warning those so contacted not to follow the American

line. The America media rarely report such matters, since they do not fit

in with the general story – the development of trade between America and

China, the loss of American jobs to China, and the increasing liberalization

(it is said) of Chinese politics. The elbowing between China and America

can be followed in specialized reporting services both in print and online),

however.

The Chinese interest in Taiwan goes beyond nationalism, though it is

nationalism that excites the Chinese public. In fact, Taiwan is today one of

the world’s most strategic spots, equivalent to what Gibraltar used to be.

This is because Taiwan sits astride the sea routes by which Japan receives

almost all its raw materials, including oil from the Middle East and coal

and iron ore from Australia. Whoever controls Taiwan has a stranglehold

on Japan’s economy, and were China to obtain that, the balance of world

power would shift. This the United States cannot permit.

The current great game in east Asia (including, for example, the elbowing

between China and the United States over the Straits of Malacca, and the

public relations furor in east Asia about Japan’s prime minister visiting war

cemeteries) is in large part about who has a solid grip on Japan’s throat.

But, we might ask, why does that matter? Japan isn’t armed. Why is China

so interested?

The broad answer is power. Strangleholds can be used for a spectrum of

goals from influence, to intimidation and extortion. The Chinese Commu￾nist leadership may not have thought the matter through, and it might not

have an endgame in mind, but the party will test the possibilities.

Taiwan is a key to strategic power. It’s like a huge unsinkable airfield, army

base and missile station which overlooks the connection between the South

China Sea and the Sea of Japan – through which much of Japan’s trade,

including especially its oil, must pass. So it’s the key to domination of Japan.

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Geopolitical Aspirations of the Nations 201

Even with Chinese missiles that can reach over Formosa to the ocean beyond,

Formosa in other hands than those of the Chinese communist government,

provides a base from which the missiles can be shot down or their bases

destroyed. It follows that Formosa may be the single most important strategic

spot in the world today. Hence the rivalry between China and America over it.

In February 2005, the United States and Japan signed an agreement assert￾ing that Taiwan and the Taiwan straits were a mutual concern between both

countries. China expressed displeasure at the agreement but met with Japan

in April 2005 to discuss Taiwan.

China and the United States might at any moment stumble into a con￾frontation over Taiwan. China is arming for this by building nuclear-armed

missiles able to reach the United States. Already China has some twenty-five

such missiles operational, and Chinese military officials have threatened to

use them to hit American cities.

Major General Zhu Chenghu of China spoke at a function for foreign jour￾nalists organized by the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry on July 14, 2005.

During the function Zhu said: “We ...will prepare ourselves for the destruc￾tion of all of the [Chinese] cities east of Xian. Of course, the Americans

will also have to expect that hundreds... of cities will be destroyed by the

Chinese.” Zhu has previously said that China has the capability to attack the

United States with long-range missiles. The general is a professor and dean

in China’s National Defense University Strategic Defense Institute which

is under the direct leadership of the CCP’s Central Military Committee.

The American House of Representatives called for his dismissal, but the

Chinese Communist Party did not reject Zhu’s speech nor dismiss him and

a spokesperson from the Foreign Affairs Ministry said Zhu’s speech was his

own personal opinion. This spokesperson declined to comment on whether

or not the speech represented the government’s view.

“Although General Zhu emphasized that what he said was his own opin￾ion, a Pentagon official, speaking to a reporter at the Washington Times,

said that Chinese generals normally express only official positions and that

Zhu’s comments represent the views of senior Chinese military officers.

‘These comments are a signal to all of Asia that China does not fear US

forces,’ this official said. Professor Tang Ben of the Claremont Institute’s

Asian Studies Center published an article in Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao on

July 20, in which he asserted that what General Zhu alluded to was actu￾ally Beijing’s strategy to deal with current world circumstances, even though

Beijing labeled his remarks as “personal opinion.” Professor Tang wrote that

people aware of the CCP’s diplomatic history would know that Zhu’s speech

was purposely arranged by Beijing and not written by him.”42

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202 The Reconfiguration of National Wealth and Power

A likely scenario that would lead to a very tough decision for the United

States goes as follows:

China asserts sovereignty over Taiwan and a determination to occupy the

island. Nationalist fervor rises to a boil in China.

The United States says no.

China asserts a determination to attack and occupy the island.

The United States replies, “We’ll stop you.”

China replies, “If you intervene against our invasion, we’ll take out your

west coast cities with nuclear missiles.”

The United States then replies in accordance with the Mutual Assured

Destruction Doctrine of the Cold War, “Then we’ll take out all your

cities.” Stability during the Cold War between the United States and the

USSR rested on the near certainty that neither side would risk destruction

to upset the status quo. This was deterrence.

But now there is a difference. For, unlike Russia, China is likely to reply,

“We’ll risk that. We don’t think the American government and/or the

American people will trade Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle even

for all our cities.”

Faced with this challenge, the United States is likely to back down. China

then invades Taiwan, occupies it, and whole strategic position in Far East

is altered against the United States and U.S. allies in favor of China.

It’s to avoid this result that the United States seeks to build a missile defense

shield.

This is classic big power politics, and it can happen even in today’s world:

China, in pursuit of national unification, or under the cover of nationalism,

seeking to obtain Taiwan and thereby strategic control of the connection

of north Pacific to south, and thereby the lifeline of Japan; the Americans

determined to prevent this; the Japanese becoming very nervous about seeing

their fate possibly pass from the control of the Americans to that of China.

To defend Taiwan, the United States must be able to intervene against a

Chinese invasion, and to do so must be able to protect U.S. cities from

Chinese attack. Against China, unlike against the Soviet Union before 1991,

or Russia today, deterrence alone, the threat of mutual assured destruction,

is not at all certain to work. Hence the need for a new American defense

strategy with which to urge the Chinese toward peaceful integration into

the world community.

But not all American commentators see it that way. Instead, some limit

themselves to urging restraint on the Chinese. Working within the public

culture, there is a complete failure to see the broader (or systems) aspect

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Geopolitical Aspirations of the Nations 203

(the interrelationships) of the Formosa situation. “To lock in today’s fragile

status quo, Taipei should forgo full independence and Beijing should stop

threatening to use force.”43 Yes, that is all to the good, but largely off the

point. China has strategic motives for wanting direct control of Taiwan that

goes much beyond national reunification – to get better control of the sea

lanes from the middle east to Japan; and to remove what it must consider

an American arrow aimed at its heart. These motives cannot be satisfied by

better relations within today’s status quo.

John Mearsheimer has studied the emerging rivalry between America

and China and comes to a very different conclusion. “American policy,” he

writes, “has sought to integrate China into the world economy and facilitate

its rapid economic development, so that it becomes wealthy ... and content

with its present position in the international system. This... policy ... is

misguided. ...wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggres￾sive state ...” In consequence, “a policy of engagement [by the United States

with China] is doomed to fail. ... China and the United States are des￾tined to be adversaries.” Instead of engagement and support for Chinese

growth, the United States should “do what it can to slow the rise of

China.”44

We think this an unnecessary conclusion at this time, and therefore too

risky a policy. America should continue to seek China’s integration into

the world community through engagement via trade, investment, cultural

exchanges – that is, through a policy of positive engagement. But America

must also adopt a defense policy that has two objectives:

to protect our country if the effort at peaceful engagement fails; and
to persuade the Chinese that there is little or no gain from military aggres￾sion against us or our allies.

MAD is not a viable way to do so. Strategic Independence , including a

national missile shield is.

The American government has been reluctant to reveal the strategic pur￾pose of the missile shield, and has so bungled the matter that it sometimes

seems to urge the Chinese to faster construction of missiles able to hit our

cities. This is the perverse result of dishonesty about our objectives combined

with the topsy-turvy logic of MAD.

The best American policy with respect to China is a vigorous effort to

persuade it to further integration into the world economic community,

coupled with a strong defensive posture to persuade China against military

adventures.