Masters of Illusion American Leadership in the Media Age Phần 6 pot

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256 Vortexes of Danger

Meanwhile, and equally important, the American government is going

to have to decide how to respond to China’s growing arsenal of ballistic

missiles. In the 1960s, when Presidents Kennedy and Johnson faced such a

decision, the Soviet Union’s ballistic missiles were a unique and unprece￾dented threat to the United States. Even today, only Russian missiles present

a similar threat. China, however, may soon acquire a similar strategic nuclear

capability, and we are going to have to decide what to do about it.

Most of us thought the risk of global nuclear war had disappeared with the

end of the Cold War. Of course, we recognized the risk of nuclear terrorism,

but we thought that global nuclear war could never happen because the

United States is, and seems likely to remain, the world’s only conventional

military superpower. Will we confront more Able Archers in the future? Will

other American presidents be confronted with nuclear brinksmanship over

Taiwan, or the collateral risks of nuclear exchange stemming from hostilities

among other nuclear states? Unfortunately, the answer most likely is “yes.”

The reality is that the end of the Cold War has not ended the risk of nuclear

war, and that what was at one time a snake with one head is now a hydra￾headed monster. We had planned at first for a general reduction in the risk

of nuclear war, but this hasn’t happened and we are now attempting to rely

on the old methods of balance of forces and mutual assured destruction.

But there is no possible balance among the many nations now building

nuclear strength, and there is no formula like MAD on which we can rely

to avoid war – though our leaders may wish to try. In today’s situation, we

can only strive unceasingly to eliminate nuclear weapons, while trying to

protect ourselves if arms control falls apart.

Both courses involve significant and considerable risk. We could find

ourselves eliminating our own nuclear arsenals on the promise that others

will do the same, when in fact our potential adversaries have deceived us.

Deception about arms reduction happened on a large scale before World

War II, and could happen again. Further, governments could disarm, while

terrorists do not. The risks do not make a persuasive argument against arms

control efforts, but do constitute reasons to conducting them very carefully.

This illustrates exactly why we need to dominate every inch of space – so

that our satellites can see both underground and evaluate enemy satellites’

technical capabilities. The quickest way to shut a country down is to destroy

its satellites! China is most likely developing a strategy to do this. Destroying

enemy satellites would be a good preemptive tactic, where one is required.

We must recognize that nuclear arms remain attractive to many govern￾ments in today’s world. They are often cheaper than conventional forces to

acquire and maintain. For states that aspire to be major powers – especially

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Russia and China – nuclear weapons are available, affordable, and credible

counters to American power.18 They are not likely to give them up. Hence,

there are significant limitations on what may be achieved by disarmament

in the nuclear arena.

Defense against nuclear attack has its risks as well. We may be unable to

build an effective defense, and may delude ourselves into a false security.

This could lead us into aggressive behavior that could bring on war. These

risks again are no argument against efforts to build a missile defense, but

constitute an argument to be very careful about being sure that it will work.

We return to this topic when we discuss the important role of national

missile defense in ensuring the Strategic Independence of the United States

in Chapter 14.

THE DYNAMICS OF WORLD DISORDER

Suddenly and without warning, in the past decades, growth in Europe, Russia

and Japan began to decelerate, all converging asymptotically toward zero.

China alone marched to its own drummer. For a time these recuperating

states continued to close the gap, but by the nineties the tide turned, with

America pulling ahead of Europe, Russia and Japan, despite their widely

vaunted liberalizations. For proponents of convergence this was merely the

pause that refreshed. Time however hasn’t validated the surmise.

Masters of Illusion need to be resolute on this point because contem￾porary patterns of reconfiguring global wealth and power are promoting

both high- and low-intensity conflicts by shifting perceptions of capabili￾ties, vulnerabilities, national interest, rights, prerogatives, and redressable

grievances. China’s rapid economic, technological and military moderniza￾tions challenge established relations in Asia, including vital American inter￾ests in Japan, Taiwan and the sea-lanes of the Pacific. It is easy to see how

Beijing’s leaders might conclude with the passing years that Japan could be

intimidated and enticed into surrendering its claims to the Senkoku Islands

and surrounding petroleum rich seabeds. Similar tactics could be applied

in other seabed territorial disputes off the coast of Indonesia, and America

could be cowed into accepting an invasion of Taiwan. The reactions of Japan,

Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the United States however might not fol￾low Beijing’s script, and could heighten tensions. China’s rivals in the Asia

Pacific region could dig in their heels, enhancing their offensive and defen￾sive capabilities, forming economic and military anti-Chinese alliances, and

engaging in brinksmanship. The struggle for shrinking petroleum supplies

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258 Vortexes of Danger

could be particularly combustible, as it was in the years preceding the Second

World War II.

China’s ascendance and Japan’s relative decline don’t necessitate Amer￾ican embroilment in an Asian Pacific cold or hot war, but they do raise

risks that won’t be countervailed by balloting and globalized markets. The

turbulence caused by the reconfiguration of global wealth and power given

systemic realities are likely to outweigh latent forces of enlightened demo￾cratic free enterprise.

America also could be reluctantly drawn into territorial tussles between

China and Russia. Regardless of the positive tone of recent Sino-Soviet

relations, as China discovers its new found powers it could lay claim to vast

tracks of Siberia and the Russian Far East which were under its sway during

the Yuan dynasty. These lands have enormous natural resource reserves,

and are only sparsely populated. The Kremlin has powerful nuclear forces

targeted on the Sino-Russian border, but their effectiveness is being degraded

by illegal Chinese settlement some claim abetted by complicit Russian border

guards selling forged citizenship papers.It has been alleged that there already

are millions of Chinese “Russian” immigrants in Siberia and Primoriya,

and that the situation will worsen as Russia’s population diminishes from

143 million today to 80 million in 2050, as Soviet era residents return to

Moscow and Saint Petersburg, and more of the 120 million Chinese along the

Sino-Russian border infiltrate. Moreover, this demographic asymmetry is

exacerbated by gapping disparities in GDPs and living standards. Although

Japan, China’s other regional rival will remain a great economic power

during the next half century, Russia won’t. Starting from a humble level

in 1989, per capita Chinese GDP will soon eclipse Russia’s, and its GDP

could surpass it by a factor of twenty by 2050, allowing Beijing to modernize

its armed forces beyond Russia’s means, and to build a credible nuclear

deterrent that will reduce the credibility of Moscow’s border defense. The

Kremlin is aware of the problem, and is in denial, continuing to perceive

itself as the superior power in command, hoping that China will be self￾restrained.

Russia’s unfavorable position in the reconfiguration of global wealth and

power also may prove destabilizing along its western and southern borders.

The Kremlin’s addiction to economic-favoritism and martial police state

authoritarianism is a constant source of friction with America and the EU.

Both not only periodically chide Russia for its tsarist-like vices, but com￾pete for influence in the former Soviet Republics known as the near abroad,

including Central Asia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan. The

EU has talked about discussing Ukrainian membership, and America the

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The Next Big Wars 259

possibility of the near abroad joining NATO. Moscow has responded by alter￾natively declaring its version of the Monroe doctrine for the near abroad,

and acknowledging these states’ autonomy, while harboring ambitions for

their formal reincorporation into the Russian Federation, superceding the

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) political, economic and mili￾tary alliance. The stakes from the Kremlin’s viewpoint are high. Central Asia

has enormous reserves of petroleum and natural gas, while the Ukraine

provides important access to the Black Sea. Both are also geostrategic assets.

Defection from Moscow’s orbit could bring China, Turkey, and NATO to its

southern and western flanks, as has already occurred in the Baltics, and in

the Ukrainian case thwart ambitions for projecting forces into the Middle

East, if and when the oil sheikdoms collapse, precipitating a great power

free for all. Russia’s economic and military weakness compels Moscow to

bide its time until the full spectrum military modernization program com￾mencing in 2006 comes up to speed in 2010. Putin chose to turn the other

cheek at Vladimir Yushchenko’s EU leaning antics November-December

2004, but hasn’t accepted Ukrainian defection. As Russia reemerges as

a military superpower 2010–2050, the Kremlin is apt to be more tena￾cious, creating the possibility of a war no one wants, but like World War I

could happen.

What Our Leaders Should Do

The threats we face are not commensurate with each other. One sort of

threat is to the lives of thousands or tens of thousands of our citizens;

another is to the lives of tens of millions or even hundreds of millions of

us. They are both terrible, but they are not of equal size. This is a horrible

calculus. The moralist in us wishes to say that the death of one person is

as important as the death of many. But this is an illusion itself. It confuses

our sense of proportion and our decisions. It leads to thinking in which

we are prepared to sacrifice millions of people to save a few. In the current

situation, it causes us to focus our attention on the risk of terrorist attacks

while ignoring the risk of nuclear exchanges. Terrorist attacks would kill

thousands; nuclear exchanges would kill tens or hundreds of millions. The

worst conceivable terrorist attack would be a small fraction of the horror

of a nuclear exchange. Islamic fundamentalism threatens us with terrorist

attacks; Russia with nuclear exchange, and China is racing to be able to do

the same. To allow ourselves to neglect the danger of great power nuclear

war in preference for a focus on terrorism is one of the most serious errors

into which we could fall.

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Effective leadership of America in these times requires that this crucial

sense of priorities and proportion not be lost. A war with another great

power is the most significant danger we face and it must not be placed on a

back burner because of a much less significant threat now.

In no way does this attempt to clarify our priorities mean that we should

ignore the smaller threats now to focus on the larger. It means instead that

we must not lose sight of greater dangers as we focus on eliminating smaller

ones. We must undertake a strong response to terrorism and do all we can

to stamp it out. But we must not take our eye off the bigger threats that

lie just beyond the horizon, despite the fact that we have become unwisely

complacent about them.

Yet, ask our leadership today what is the most important threat which

Americans face, and they will almost uniformly reply, terrorist attack. This

sudden confusion of proportion, and thus priorities, and the lack of good

judgment that results, is a great danger to us.

The developments among the great powers are an unprecedented chal￾lenge to American presidential leadership. The current administration is

able to draft a coherent shift of our national defense strategy; and it

is able to take decisive action, as in Iraq. These are major strengths.

But it seems unable to explain to the American people convincingly the

necessity for its new doctrine and its course of action; it has allowed

domestic affairs to get completely out of control, diverting national atten￾tion and energy away foreign affairs just when it is most needed;19 it’s

unable to generate sufficient confidence in its ability to lead the nation

in these times; and it’s allowing itself to be drawn into damaging and

unnecessary controversies with our erstwhile allies. In effect, the end

of the Cold War is now permitting the allies of that conflict to sepa￾rate and regroup; and we in America, the leader of the coalition that

was successful in the cold war, are unable to glimpse the world beyond

the old coalitions. To our disadvantage, European leadership has seized

upon America as a useful rival around which European solidarity can be

built.

American defense analysis is surprisingly unsophisticated about the

threats we face, possibly because a focus on military capabilities of poten￾tial adversaries is too narrow a focus – economic capabilities now and

in the future and geopolitical objectives are crucial to longer-term threat

assessments. “Who might ... future threats be? [Defense Department] ana￾lysts predicted they would include warlords, tribal chiefs, drug traffickers,

international criminal cartels, terrorists, and cyber-bandits...”20 General