Japan and the Shaping of Post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia : Japanese Diplomacy and the Cambodian Conflict, 1978–1993

Japan and the Shaping of

Post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia

The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the consequent outbreak of

the Cambodian conflict brought Southeast Asia into instability and deteriorated

relations between Vietnam and the subsequently established Vietnam-backed

government in Cambodia on the one hand and the Association of Southeast

Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries on the other. As a result of the conflict, the

Soviet Union established a foothold in Southeast Asia while China, through its

support of the anti-Vietnam Cambodian resistance, improved relations with

Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand. Japan’s Fukuda Doctrine – its

declared priorities of promoting cooperative and friendly relations between

Communist Indochinese nations and non-Communist ASEAN countries –

became increasingly at odds with Japan’s role as a member of the Free World in

the broader Cold War confrontation. Tokyo had to steer a path between Wash￾ington’s hard-line policy of isolating Vietnam and its own desire to prevent

regional destabilization.

Against this background, this book addresses the following questions: what

was Japan’s response to the challenges to its objectives and interests in South￾east Asia and to the Fukuda Doctrine? What role did Japan play for the settle￾ment of the conflict in Cambodia? How did Japan’s diplomacy on the

Cambodian problem affect the Japanese role in the region? It argues that Japan’s

contribution was more active than has widely been recognized.

Andrea Pressello is Assistant Professor at the National Graduate Institute for

Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan.

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Japan and the Shaping of

Post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia

Japanese Diplomacy and the

Cambodian Conflict, 1978–1993

Andrea Pressello

Politics in Asia series

Japan and the Shaping of

Post-Vietnam War

Southeast Asia

Japanese Diplomacy and the

Cambodian Conflict, 1978–1993

Andrea Pressello

First published 2018

by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge

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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2018 Andrea Pressello

The right of Andrea Pressello to be identified as author of this work has

been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the

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All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Names: Pressello, Andrea, author.

Title: Japan and the shaping of post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia :

Japanese

diplomacy and the Cambodian conflict, 1978–1993 / Andrea Pressello.

Description: New York : Routledge, 2018. | Series: Politics in Asia series |

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2017011433| ISBN 9781138200234 (hardback) |

ISBN 9781315514932 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Japan–Foreign relations–Southeast Asia. | Southeast

Asia–Foreign relations–Japan. | Cambodian-Vietnamese Conflict,

1977–1991–Peace.

Classification: LCC DS525.9.J3 P74 2018 | DDC 959.604/2–dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017011433

ISBN: 978-1-138-20023-4 (hbk)

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Typeset in Galliard

by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents

Acknowledgments vi

Introduction: regional conflict, Cold War, and Japan’s

Southeast Asia policy 1

1 Southeast Asia in Japan’s postwar foreign policy,

1950s–1960s 8

2 US “exit” and Japanese “entry”: post-Vietnam War

Southeast Asia and the Fukuda Doctrine, 1969–1977 44

3 The Cambodian conflict and the polarization of

Southeast Asia: Japan’s response, 1978–1980 91

4 New Cold War and Japan’s pursuit of its regional agenda,

1981–1982 131

5 The unfolding of Japan’s “twin-track” diplomacy in

Southeast Asia, 1983–1984 157

6 Changing Cold War environment and the intensification

of Japan’s peace diplomacy, 1985–1988 183

7 The Cambodian peace process and the shaping of

post-Cold War Southeast Asia: Japan’s role, 1989–1993 215

Conclusion 245

Index 255

Acknowledgments

This book draws largely from the research I carried out as a doctoral student in

the Security and International Studies Program at the National Graduate Insti￾tute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo. I am highly grateful to Professors

Iwama Yoko, Michishita Narushige, Miyagi Taizō, and Nobori Amiko for their

valuable guidance and comments on my research. My gratitude goes also to the

anonymous reviewers for their useful inputs and suggestions. Professor Sudō

Sueo’s comments on part of my research at the 2011 Annual Convention of the

Japan Association of International Relations have also been important for the

realization of this work. Finally, I am indebted to the several diplomats, officials,

politicians, and scholars who, both in Japan and overseas, have patiently

answered my questions and shared their experiences and inspiring insights

with me. I am solely responsible for the analyses and any factual errors of this

book.

This book is derived in part from articles published in Japanese Studies on

March 31, 2014 (available online: www.tandfonline.com/ http://dx.doi.org/

10.1080/10371397.2014.886506), in Japan Forum on July 1, 2013 (available

online: www.tandfonline.com/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09555803.2013.8

02368), and in Asian Studies Review on March 5, 2013 (available online: www.

tandfonline.com/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2012.760531).

In this book, Japanese names are written according to the Japanese system of

first indicating the last name and then the given name. The only exceptions are

in the footnotes. The sources in Japanese language used in this book have been

translated in English by the author.

Introduction

Regional conflict, Cold War, and Japan’s

Southeast Asia policy

The objective of this book is to clarify Japan’s role in the shaping of the post￾Vietnam War order in Southeast Asia by examining its diplomacy on the Cam￾bodian conflict (1978–1993), the main source of regional instability in those

years. In the period after World War II, the Japanese considered Southeast Asia1

to be important in the process of rebuilding their economy and international

role. The fact that Japan did not have diplomatic relations with the People’s

Republic of China until the early 1970s and had a difficult relationship with the

Korean Peninsula increased the importance of Southeast Asian countries for the

Japanese. This region’s natural resources and markets were deemed attractive in

Japan. When Tokyo began to provide official development assistance (ODA), a

large part of it – as well as increasingly of Japanese trade and investments – went

to Southeast Asia. During the 1970s, a growingly confident Japan, whose

economy had by then become the second largest in the Free World, looked at

Southeast Asia also as instrumental to enhance its international role by acting as

a sort of “representative” of this region in the developed world. The fact that

vital sea routes, through which oil from the Middle East was shipped to

resource-scant Japan, were located in proximity of Southeast Asian waters

further increased the strategic importance of this region, especially in the after￾math of the first oil shock of 1973. Realizing peace and stability in Southeast

Asia became, therefore, one of the important issues for Japan’s foreign policy.

However, the fluid regional environment during the 1970s complicated the

realization of such an objective. The end of the war in Vietnam brought signi￾ficant changes in Southeast Asia. A division was consolidated between the non￾communist countries of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) on

the one hand – which, during the 1970s, included Indonesia, Malaysia, the

Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand – and, on the other, the Indochinese com￾munist regimes of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. After the rather traumatic

experience of its participation in the Vietnamese conflict, the United States

reduced its involvement and military presence in the region. This created room

for the Soviet Union and China to increase their influence in Southeast Asia, a

scenario that the Japanese expected to have adverse implications for Southeast

Asia’s stability and for Tokyo’s interests in that region. With one of the driving

forces being the objective of stopping such a scenario from materializing, Japan

2 Introduction

intensified efforts to promote development in Southeast Asia and cooperative

and friendly relations between Indochinese and ASEAN countries; this was

expected to strengthen their resilience and make them less vulnerable to exter￾nal sources of destabilization. These objectives were central in the policy toward

Southeast Asia that Japan formulated during the 1970s. One of its major articu￾lations was contained in the speech that Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo delivered

in Manila in August 1977, which became known as the Fukuda Doctrine. He

made clear that Japan had no ambition to become a military power, and that it

desired positive relations with Southeast Asian nations based on mutual trust

and understanding. The third pillar of the speech enunciated Japan’s commit￾ment to help realize peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia by supporting the

development of the ASEAN countries and the establishment of peaceful and

cooperative relations between them and the communist states of Indochina.

The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the consequent outbreak

of the Cambodian conflict brought Southeast Asia back into instability and

deteriorated relations between Vietnam (and the newly established Vietnam￾backed government in Cambodia) and ASEAN countries. As a result of the con￾flict, the Soviet Union established a foothold in Southeast Asia by obtaining

access to Vietnamese military bases. China supported the communist Khmer

Rouge (the largest among the anti-Vietnam Cambodian resistance groups) and

their leader, Pol Pot. It especially improved relations with Thailand, the country

most exposed to the effects of the Cambodian conflict and through whose ter￾ritory Chinese aid was allegedly provided to the Khmer Rouge. The Soviet

Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 significantly heightened the Cold War

tension, marking the beginning of the so-called New Cold War. In Southeast

Asia, the result was the deepening of divisions between, on the one hand, coun￾tries that opposed the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia – includ￾ing the United States, China, and the ASEAN nations – and, on the other hand,

the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The Cambodian conflict and the invasion of

Afghanistan complicated Japan’s implementation of the Fukuda Doctrine in that

they enlarged the division between ASEAN and Indochinese countries – espe￾cially Vietnam – and, at the same time, created an incongruity between the doc￾trine’s third pillar and Japan’s role as a member of the Free World in the broader

Cold War confrontation. Against this background, this book addresses the fol￾lowing questions: what was Japan’s response to these challenges to its objectives

and interests in Southeast Asia and to the Fukuda Doctrine? What role did

Japan play for the settlement of the conflict in Cambodia? How did Japan’s

diplomacy on the Cambodian problem affect the Japanese role in the region?

A case of passive diplomacy?

It is argued in the literature that, as a result of the Cambodian conflict and of

the New Cold War, Japan – in line with its being a member of the Free World –

gave up the pursuit of the Fukuda Doctrine and of bridging efforts between the

ASEAN countries and Indochina. Therefore, the argument goes, Japan put on

Introduction 3

hold its active diplomacy and its search for a larger political role in the region

until the late 1980s, when the waning of the Cold War created the conditions

for a Japanese involvement in the Cambodian peace process after 1989. In his

important work, Wakatsuki Hidekazu argues that after the Soviets invaded

Afghanistan, Japan abandoned its Southeast Asia policy based on the Fukuda

Doctrine, which had become inoperable following the outbreak of the Cambo￾dian conflict.2

With Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao leaving office in late 1979,

with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and with the Iran hostage crisis, Prime

Minister Ōhira Masayoshi’s policy toward Vietnam changed and became firmer.3

Despite initial attempts to maintain in existence the Fukuda Doctrine, the argu￾ment goes, during 1980, Japan eventually took a firm stance as “a member of

the West,” especially under Prime Minister Ōhira and Foreign Minister Itō. In

this context, the third principle of the Fukuda Doctrine became inoperable, and

the age of Japan’s omnidirectional foreign policy ended.4

Hence, Wakatsuki

points out that, from that moment, Japan concentrated on its status as a

“member of the West” and, especially under Foreign Minister Itō, actively

backed ASEAN and China’s hostile stance against Vietnam, leading to the dete￾rioration of Tokyo’s Southeast Asia policy and to the shelving of the Fukuda

Doctrine’s third principle.5

Consequently, Japan abandoned the policy of main￾taining a “dialogue pipe” with Vietnam, strongly criticized Hanoi, and sup￾ported the Khmer Rouge’s hold on the Cambodian seat at the United Nations

(UN).6

Thus, by shifting to a firm posture as a “member of the West,” Japan

gave up attempts to pursue an independent political role based on preserving a

free hand in its diplomacy.7

In the words of international relations scholar Sudō

Sueo, by 1980, “Japan’s Southeast Asian policy, which had been centered on

aid to Vietnam, had lost its direction,” as the outbreak of the Cambodian con￾flict “resulted in the termination of Tokyo’s pursuit of a political role” and in

the failure of “the policy of urging coexistence.”8

Under Prime Minister Ōhira

and Foreign Minister Itō, Japan shifted toward a foreign policy as a “member of

the West,” thereby abandoning its independent diplomacy and dialogue with

Vietnam.9

Sudō claims that, despite Foreign Ministers Sonoda Sunao and Abe

Shintarō’s proposals on the Cambodian problem, respectively, in 1981 and

1984, Japan supported the ASEAN’s anti-Vietnam stance by suspending aid and

aligning with “a policy of isolating Vietnam in every possible way [which] has

been formulated as an implicit ‘consensus’ among ASEAN, China, the United

States and Japan.” Hence, “politically, Japan’s role in promoting a solution to

the Kampuchean issue has been minimal, going little beyond the promise of

aiding the post-settlement reconstruction of the Indochinese states.”10

As a result of the tendency in the literature to consider Japan’s pursuit of the

Fukuda Doctrine as having ended by around 1980 and, accordingly, to regard

the Japanese diplomacy on the Cambodian problem as passive, previous studies

claim that Japan’s active contribution to peace efforts in Cambodia began only

several years later, when Japan restarted actively pursuing the Fukuda Doctrine

and playing a political role to stabilize and integrate Southeast Asia. Indeed,

Japan’s initial involvement in efforts to settle the Cambodian conflict has been

4 Introduction

traced to the late 1980s,11 when Japan departed from the passive diplomacy

efforts12 with respect to Cambodia that it had followed since the conflict began

and that were limited to supporting the ASEAN stance.13 On this, Tomoda Seki

argues that, between 1979 and 1988, “Japan pursued no independent peace

initiatives, simply conforming to the Cambodian policy of the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations.”14 It was only in the period 1988–1990 that “Japan

began to formulate its own peace initiative toward Cambodia,” abandoning its

line of “strict conformity” with ASEAN’s stance. In particular, the Cambodian

peace process from the late 1980s “was the first occasion on which Japan clearly

and deliberately attempted to play a political role in Asian affairs.”15 For

Tomoda, facilitated by international political changes that created more favor￾able conditions for a settlement of the conflict, beginning in 1988, “Japan aban￾doned its policy of rigid conformity to the ASEAN position and began to search

for an independent solution.” This marked one response to international pres￾sure on Japan to shoulder more of the burden of world affairs.16 Other scholars

contend that “[t]he initial Japanese interest in the Cambodian settlement was

made public in August 1988 when the Japanese government invited Prince Sih￾anouk to Tokyo and at the Paris International Conference in the summer of

1989.”17 Along similar lines, Hirata Keiko maintains that the Fukuda Doctrine

“withered in the 1980s due to US pressure on Japan to curtail contacts with

Vietnam in the midst of heightened Cold War tension.” Therefore, it was only

in August 1988 when it invited Sihanouk to Tokyo that Japan first indicated its

interest in the Cambodian peace process.18 Takeda Yasuhiro claims that it was

after Prime Minister Takeshita’s announcement in May 1988 of the Inter￾national Cooperation Initiative (which proclaimed Japan’s willingness to con￾tribute more to the world including to conflict resolution) that “Japan

embarked on direct engagement in the Cambodian peace process […].”19 To

sum up, a recurrent argument in the literature is that Japan’s active involvement

in efforts to end the Cambodian conflict and, thereby, to play a political role in

the region, only began in the late 1980s when the peace process eventually

materialized.

Reinterpreting Japan’s Southeast Asia diplomacy after the

Vietnam War

Drawing from declassified documents (including newly released ones), inter￾views, and other primary sources, this book suggests a different interpretation of

historical facts and argues that, despite the heightening of regional and global

tension after 1979, Japan continued to pursue its agenda in Southeast Asia. It

did so even though some aspects of its diplomacy were at odds with the US

stance, hence showing determination to pursue a more independent foreign

policy in the region. On the one hand, Japan acted as a member of the Free

World by applying sanctions against the Soviet Union for its intervention in

Afghanistan, providing strategic economic aid, and condemning the Vietnamese

invasion of Cambodia. On the other hand, the Japanese continued to engage

Introduction 5

with Soviet-backed Vietnam in an effort to reduce the distance between ASEAN

countries and Hanoi on the Cambodian conflict and, ultimately, to resume

regional peace and stability. In other words, the Japanese strove to pursue their

regional policy within the framework of the Fukuda Doctrine rather than by

adopting a diplomacy merely aligned to the US Cold War strategy. By shedding

light on these aspects of Japanese diplomacy especially in the period of the New

Cold War – on which little has been previously written considering that, when

discussing Japan’s role on the Cambodian problem, the recurrent focus in the

literature is on Tokyo’s role in the peace process after 1989 – this book also

suggests a new interpretation of Japan’s diplomatic role in the Cambodian

problem. In contrast to claims in the literature that Japan became involved in

efforts to settle the Cambodian conflict only when the peace process began

in the late 1980s, this book demonstrates that Japan’s role to resume peace in

Cambodia and stability in the whole of Southeast Asia actually began when the

conflict broke out at the end of the 1970s. In fact, one of the central arguments

of this book is that Japan’s active involvement in the peace process after 1989

represented the culmination of a decade-long diplomatic endeavor rather than

simply the result of a reaction to external circumstances such as, for example,

the more favorable international environment.

Sources and structure

As mentioned above, this book, in which events are examined with an historical

approach, is based mainly on primary sources. Among them, declassified docu￾ments (including from Japanese, American, and Australian archives) have largely

been used. Other primary sources, such as oral histories, memoirs, speeches,

statements, and other official documents, as well as interviews conducted by the

author with relevant individuals involved in the matters discussed in this volume,

have also been used. In addition to sources related to Japanese prime ministers

and other decision-makers and actors in Japan and abroad, particular attention

has been given to archival materials from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(hereafter MOFA) – several of which have been obtained by the author through

the Information Disclosure Law. This reflects the central role played by MOFA –

and, within it, particularly by the traditionally independent-minded Asia Affairs

Bureau (hereafter Asia Bureau) and its various sections such as the First South￾east Asia Division, the Regional Policy Division, etc. – in Japanese policymaking

on Southeast Asia in the period under examination. The large role played by

MOFA can be explained also by considering that, for large parts of the period

discussed in this book, the interest of the Japanese political community in the

Southeast Asian developments remained relatively limited.20 Such interest

increased with Japan’s involvement in the Cambodian peace process from the

late 1980s and, in particular, with the participation of the Japanese Self-Defense

Forces in the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia in 1992–1993.

The volume is organized in a chronological way. The first chapter provides

an overview of Japan’s policy toward Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s.

6 Introduction

This is a necessary background to have a better understanding of the origins of

Japan’s approach, objectives, and issues in relation to this region. The second

chapter discusses the process that, during the 1970s, led to the formulation of

Japan’s new approach toward the region and to the Fukuda Doctrine. Chapters

3, 4, and 5 examine how, between the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s,

Japan responded to the challenges to Southeast Asia’s stability brought by the

Cambodian conflict and the heightening of Cold War tension. The significant

changes to the international environment stimulated by the new Soviet course

under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev and their impact on the Southeast

Asia situations and on Japan’s regional diplomacy are discussed in Chapter 6.

Finally, the period between 1989 and the early 1990s, characterized by the end

of the Cold War and the materialization of the Cambodian peace process, is

examined in the last chapter, followed by a section with concluding remarks.

Notes

1 In this study, the term Southeast Asia refers to the region including what are the

current member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),

namely, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Sin￾gapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

2 Hidekazu Wakatsuki, “Zenhōi Gaikō” no jidai: reisen henyōki no Nihon to Ajia

1971–80nen (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 2006), 296, 305, 307. See also: Yoshi￾hide Soeya, “Vietnam in Japan’s Regional Policy,” in Vietnam Joins the World, James W.

Morley and Masashi Nishihara eds., (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 181–182.

3 Wakatsuki, “Zenhōi Gaikō” no jidai, 283.

4 Ibid., 307.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 334. On similar lines, Soeya Yoshihide pointed out that, with the Vietnamese

invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese attack against Vietnam in 1979, “the founda￾tions of Japan’s omnidirectional diplomacy and the Fukuda Doctrine were destroyed.”

Following the invasion of Afghanistan, “the Fukuda Doctrine became inoperable”

because the international opposition to the Moscow–Hanoi alliance became “unequi￾vocal.” Soeya, “Vietnam in Japan’s Regional Policy,” 181–182.

7 Wakatsuki, “Zenhōi Gaikō” no jidai, 339.

8 Sueo Sudō, “The road to becoming a regional leader: Japanese attempts in Southeast

Asia, 1975–1980,” Pacific Affairs, 61:1 (Spring 1988): 27, 46, 49. See also: Sueo

Sudō, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy

(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), 205.

9 Wakatsuki, “Zenhōi Gaikō” no jidai, 334, 338–339.

10 Sueo Sudō, “From Fukuda to Takeshita. A decade of Japan–ASEAN relations,” Con￾temporary Southeast Asia 10(2), (September 1988): 119, 137.

11 Seki Tomoda, “Japan’s search for a political role in Asia: the Cambodian peace settle￾ment,” Japan Review of International Affairs (Spring, 1992): 46–47; Soeya,

“Vietnam in Japan’s Regional Policy,” 187; Yasuhiro Takeda, “Japan’s role in the

Cambodian peace process: diplomacy, manpower, and finance,” Asian Survey, 38(6)

(1998): 554.

12 Yukio Imagawa, Cambodia and Japan, trans. S. M. Mahiwo, ed. M. R. Espinas

(Quezon City: ReadySet Corporation, 2008), 63.

13 Tomoda, “Japan’s search for a political role,” 44, 46; Masaharu Kōno, Heiwa kōsaku:

Tai Kanbojia gaikō no shōgen (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1999), 24.

14 Tomoda, “Japan’s search for a political role,” 44.

Introduction 7

15 Ibid., 43.

16 Ibid., 46.

17 Soeya, “Vietnam in Japan’s Regional Policy,” 187.

18 Keiko Hirata, “Reaction and action: analyzing Japan’s relations with the Socialist

Republic of Vietnam,” in Japan and East Asian regionalism, Javed S. Maswood, ed.

(London, New York: Routledge, 2001), 107–108, 113.

19 Takeda, “Japan’s role in the Cambodian peace process,” 554.

20 A research conducted by the author on the number of sessions in the Japanese Diet

(Lower House, Upper House, and joint sessions) in which, between 1979 and 1993,

the Cambodian situation was discussed, has revealed that, in the three years between

1979 and 1981 (corresponding to the initial phases of the conflict and of the refugee

crisis) there were respectively 44, 62, and 64 sessions in which the Cambodian

problem was discussed. After that, the number halved. From 1988, the number

started to grow again, with 45 sessions, and the peak was in 1993 (the year in which

two Japanese citizens involved in the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia were

killed and in which the first post-conflict free elections were held in Cambodia), when

the number of sessions reached 192. The research has been carried out through the

database of the National Diet Library of Japan available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp.

1 Southeast Asia in Japan’s

postwar foreign policy,

1950s–1960s

Japan’s postwar economic recovery and Southeast Asia: the

Yoshida administration

In November 1954, Yoshida Shigeru, who served as Japanese prime minister

from 1946 to 1947 and again from 1948 to 1954, wrote that “Japan’s own

existence […] depends on the economic development of, and the maintenance

of stability in, the Southeast Asian countries.”1

Why did the Japanese prime

minister put so much emphasis on the importance of this region for Japan?

Before this question is addressed in the following sections, it is necessary to

briefly mention the role of Japan in Southeast Asia during the Pacific War. One

of the factors that escalated tension between Japan and the United States and

that led to the outbreak of war between them in December 1941, was Japan’s

decision to move southward in order to ensure access to oil reserves in the

Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia). After Japan’s occupation of the whole of

French Indochina in the summer of 1941, the United States, which was the

main supplier of oil to Japan, joined hands with Britain and the Netherlands to

impose a total oil embargo on Japan. Gaining access to Southeast Asian oil and

raw materials, which were crucial for the continuation of Japan’s industrial pro￾duction in support of the Japanese war effort, became a main and vital goal for

Imperial Japan. However, an expansion into Southeast Asia meant war, in the

first place, with the United States and Britain. As the Japanese carried out the

Pearl Harbor attack on the United States on December 7, 1941, they rapidly

took control of Southeast Asian territories. Two observations can be made

about Japan’s military invasion of this region during the Pacific War. First, it

shows the strategic value that Southeast Asia had for Japan. Second, the legacy

of the suffering and damages provoked in this region by the Japanese military

was to affect Japan’s postwar relations with Southeast Asia as well as Tokyo’s

diplomatic posture and policies, resulting in the Japanese adoption of an often￾cautious approach when dealing with the region. After the end of the Pacific

War, Southeast Asia re-emerged in Japanese and American planning for Japan’s

recovery. The victory of Maoist forces in China led, in 1949, to the formation

of the People’s Republic of China. In the context of the intensification of the

Cold War confrontation in Asia, the establishment of a communist regime in