The Retreat of Reason Part 5 potx

196 Rationality and Temporal Neutrality

It might be wondered how I can censure such temporal biases as cognitively irrational

when I have disowned the possibility of a critique of the irrationality of para-cognitive

attitudes that extends beyond a critique of the irrationality of their cognitive bases. For

there is in fact, and so it is not irrational to think that there is, some difference between two

events which happen at numerically distinct times, and it is at least conceivable that for

some subjects this difference suffices to make a difference in respect of their attitudes to

the events. This must be conceded, but it could still be true that, given how we actually

seem to be, it is very improbable that we would respond differently to purely temporal dif￾ferences. The reason for this may well have to do with these differences being purely rela￾tional and not ones of ‘quality’.

Although such recognitions of mere differences in timing by themselves conceivably

could be the bases of temporal partiality, I shall maintain that this is in fact not so with

respect to our partiality. If such differences in timing by themselves were the root of our

temporal partiality, we should expect this partiality to rear its head not only when one

considers one’s own life, but to an equal extent when one considers the lives of others, for

these are no less subject to time. But, as will transpire, this is not so. (Compare: in the

foregoing chapter, we noted that the P-bias is a bias not towards the present, but towards

what each of us perceives of it.) The ground for this partiality lies in a mechanism that is

at work primarily when each of us views our own existence unravel through time. I hope

to make it credible that this mechanism is inimical to rational deliberation. This is why

I shall condemn our temporal biases as being cognitively irrational. It follows that if we

are rationalists, we shall be rationally required to be temporally neutral, but that will not

be so if we are prudentialists (or satisfactionalists of any other sort).

Two Temporal Biases

To be a bit more specific about our temporal partiality, there are two forms of it, or two

temporal biases, the cognitive rationality of which I shall examine in particular. The first

bias can be explained by the following example. Suppose that you face the option of hav￾ing a smaller sensory pleasure in a minute or a somewhat greater one in an hour—for

example of being served a smaller portion of ice-cream in a minute or a somewhat larger

one in an hour (note that the option concerns experiences that you will have yourself ).

Suppose further that you have reason to believe neither that your desire for the pleasure

will be stronger at one time than at the other nor that it is less probable that you will have

the opportunity to enjoy the pleasure if you postpone it. In situations like this it often

happens that subjects show a definite preference for having the smaller pleasure sooner.

Apparently, they prefer to receive sooner something that will give them smaller pleasure

than to receive later something that will give them a somewhat greater pleasure simply

for the reason that they will enjoy the former sooner. Parfit calls such a preference a bias

towards the near (future) (1984: 124). As a shorthand term, I shall use ‘the N-bias’.

An objector might point out that in actual fact if one delays the enjoyment of the pleas￾ure, it will normally be somewhat less probable that it will come to be: the risk that

The Notion of a Temporal Bias 197

something will prevent the pleasure from materializing will be slightly greater. This is

true, and it is admittedly very hard to devise a realistic example in which one can be quite

sure that there is no distorting factor, such as a difference in probability. Nonetheless, it is

implausible to put down the whole effect to the operation of such factors. The preference

in favour of having one pleasure in a minute rather than another in an hour may be quite

marked, while the risk that one will lose the pleasure by postponing it may be only mar￾ginally greater. Moreover, it has been found that if the source of the pleasure is actually

perceived by the subject, the desire to have it sooner grows in strength,¹ though the (sub￾jective) probability of its coming into the subject’s possession could scarcely be held to be

affected by this fact. I take it then to be clear that the preference to have a pleasure sooner

cannot be fully accounted for in terms of some rational estimate of probability. At least

partially, it is somehow occasioned by the mere thought of this pleasure occurring at a

time that is closer to one’s present. We do spontaneously exhibit a bias towards the near.

The question I intend to discuss in the next chapter is whether it is cognitively irrational

to be subject to the N-bias. I shall contend that this bias indeed is irrational. My strategy

will be to reach this conclusion by trying to construe the N-bias as the upshot of repres￾entional mechanisms of the sort studied in the context of weakness of will in Part II. In

Chapter 16 I shall let another temporal bias, the bias towards the future, the F-bias—that is,

our tendency to be more concerned about what happens in the future than in the past—

undergo a similar treatment.

What the N-bias and F-bias have in common is that they are both tendencies to adopt

different attitudes to things simply for the reason that they stand in different temporal

relations to one’s present. The N-bias and F-bias thereby represent forms of a temporal

partiality that (though, as we shall soon see, somewhat misleadingly) could be called per￾spectival because they crucially depend on the subject’s viewing things from a certain

point in time, the present. In the case of the N-bias, one state of affairs is preferred to

another because it will materialize at a time that is closer to one’s present—a time index￾ically identified—than is the time at which another will be realized. And in the case of the

F-bias, something affects one more because, in relation to one’s present, it is in the future

rather than in the past.

Some Strange Temporal Biases

It is possible to imagine a temporal partiality that is non-perspectival or absolute.

Consider somebody who cares equally about all the parts of her life, with one exception:

she is indifferent to what happens to her on Tuesdays. For instance, she would prefer

having pain on a Tuesday to having pain on any other day, even though it would be much

more severe if it were felt on a Tuesday. Such a preference is not perspectival, for the fact

that certain days are Tuesdays does not depend on their having a particular relation to

what is currently one’s present.

¹ See e.g. the experiments reported by Brandt (1979: 62).

This is a modification of an example Parfit provides (1984: 123–4). He describes some￾body who is indifferent to what happens to him on future Tuesdays. This man “cares

equally about all the parts of his future”, with one exception: “he never cares about pos￾sible pains and pleasures on a future Tuesday”. “Throughout every Tuesday he cares in

the normal way about what is happening to him.” For this reason his attitude is not purely

absolute. It has a perspectival element in that he cares about what happens to him on

Tuesdays when they are present, but not when they are still future in relation to the pre￾sent. Parfit presents this case to persuade us that an attitude can be intrinsically irrational,

that is, can possess an irrationality which is not derivative from any irrationality in respect

of the beliefs on which it rests. Thus, he assumes that his individual’s attitude is not due to

any false or superstitious beliefs about Tuesdays, or about anything else.

I think it is instructive to compare this “Future-Tuesday-Indifference” to a “Future￾Tuesday-Incredulity”. Consider someone who has normally inductive beliefs about what

will happen to him in the future will be like, except when it happens on future Tuesdays.

For instance, he believes that were he in the future to put his finger in a naked flame, he

will feel intense pain, except if he were to do it on Tuesdays. He is not spontaneously

inclined to believe anything about what he will feel on Tuesdays. So, he does not suspend

his belief about what he will feel on future Tuesdays because he has any peculiar beliefs

about the significance of a day being a Tuesday, or anything else.

Is this absence of belief irrational? Not if the mechanism of spontaneous induction is

just a natural fact about us, and Humeans are right that we are not rationally justified in

forming beliefs in accordance with it. If we do not have reason to form inductive beliefs

that we shall feel pain if we put our finger in a naked flame on other days, we are not

irrational if we fail to have this belief about future Tuesdays, even if we see no relevant

difference between this day and other days. Similarly, I claim, if we have no reason to feel

the spontaneous concern we normally feel for ourselves in the future (it would beg the

question to assume that there is such a reason), but this is just a natural fact about us. We

would then not be irrational, or defy reason, if we failed to exhibit this tendency as

regards future Tuesdays, though we see no relevant difference between Tuesdays and

other days.

Parfit himself points out that “there is a large class of desires which cannot be irra￾tional”, a class which includes, for instance, desires concerned with sensations that are

pleasant or painful/unpleasant. As regards the “strong desire not to hear the sound of

squeaking chalk” that many people have, he writes: “This desire is odd, since these

people do not mind hearing other squeaks that are very similar in timbre and pitch. But

this desire is not irrational” (1984: 123). It is not irrational, although there is nothing to

justify our dislike of the sound of squeaking chalk, but not of similar sounds. It is just

the way nature has designed us. It is in this class of attitudes that I would like to put the

Future-Tuesday-Indifference: a very odd, but not irrational attitude. I do not see why this

class could not in theory include attitudes whose objects are not felt sensations.

There is an indisputable difference in the content of one’s thought when one thinks

that one will experience a certain pain on a future Tuesday rather than on a present

Tuesday or on any other future weekday. Conceivably, somebody could be so wired up by

198 Rationality and Temporal Neutrality

The Notion of a Temporal Bias 199

nature that this combination of the features of being in the future and being a Tuesday so

to speak eclipses his concern about a pain he would otherwise be concerned about,

though each feature on its own would not do so.

So described, the Future-Tuesday-Indifference would be, as Parfit puts it, “a bare fact”

about its subject. In this respect, it seems just like the dislike of squeaking chalk, but not

of similar squeaks, for this too seems a bare fact. There is nothing to justify either atti￾tude. Just as we have no reason to dislike the squeaking of chalk when we do not dislike

similar squeaks, the imagined man has no reason—not even a bad one—to be indifferent

towards pains he will feel on future Tuesdays, for, ex hypothesi, he has no eccentric beliefs

about the significance of a day being a future Tuesday. Both attitudes are just quirks of

nature. But if there is this resemblance between them, and since Parfit agrees to exempt

the dislike of squeaking chalk from the charge of being irrational, I do not see why we

should not also exempt the Future-Tuesday-Indifference from this charge.

To be sure, if we were to come across an instance of this Future-Tuesday-Indifference,

we would be strongly inclined to brand it as irrational. I think the reason for this is that we

would be strongly inclined to surmise that it is not ultimately intrinsic, like the dislike of

squeaking chalk, but based on some strange and irrational belief about future Tuesdays.

For it is so unlike other ultimately intrinsic attitudes to which we are acquainted (these

having simple objects like present sensations). But suppose we were to become con￾vinced that no apparent reasons were in the offing; then I think we would be more

inclined to regard his indifference as psychologically incomprehensible or unintelligible

than as irrational. Although it seems incomprehensible that anyone should be indifferent

to what happens to him on future Tuesdays when he is concerned about what happens to

him on all days, even Tuesdays, when they are present and on all other weekdays when

they are future, we would have to accept that nature has so designed this man that this

peculiar combination of features turns off his concern. Hence, were this strange intrinsic

indifference to occur, there seems as little reason to brand it as (intrinsically) irrational as

there is in the case of the dislike of squeaking chalk.

Like the Future-Tuesday-Incredulity, the Future-Tuesday-Indifference is likely to be

bad in general for the subject. These tendencies may lead subjects to prefer what is in

fact greater pains on future Tuesdays to smaller pains on other days, and this is some￾thing that they will regret when it is Tuesday and the pains are felt. Thus, the subjects

may have reasons to try to rid themselves of these tendencies, but this is not to say that

they are tendencies to form attitudes that are intrinsically (cognitively) irrational. There

may be special circumstances in which they are advantageous for the subjects. Suppose,

for example, that the subject who is indifferent to pains on future Tuesdays faces the

choice of undergoing a painful operation on a Tuesday rather than on some other day.

Then the choice to be operated upon on a Tuesday will leave him in a trouble-free

instead of an anxious mood until the day of the operation arrives, and so may be the

better choice (even if the operation will be a bit more painful). The point is essentially

the same as one that Parfit makes earlier on, namely that the existence of an ineradic￾able desire, even if it is not rational, may “indirectly” provide one with a reason for

choice and action (1984: 120–1).

I think the Future-Tuesday-Indifference is properly classified as ‘ineradicable’. For, as

we have seen, this indifference cannot be based on any irrational beliefs, because its irra￾tionality would then not be intrinsic, but would instead be derived from the irrationality

of the beliefs. If it is not belief-based, however, one is as little able to rid oneself of this

indifference by ridding oneself of any irrational beliefs, as one is able to rid oneself of the

dislike of squeaking chalk by eliminating any beliefs. These attitudes seem equally

‘ineradicable’.

In conclusion, we have found no attitude that is intrinsically irrational. If the Future￾Tuesday-Indifference is conceived as ultimately intrinsic, it seems indistinguishable from

attitudes which are admittedly not irrational, but rather psychologically odd. I see no

need, then, to go back on my resolution to do without intrinsically irrational desires.

Moreover, I shall leave aside temporal biases that are, partially or wholly, absolute, since it

is unrealistic to think that anyone is the victim of anything like them. My concern here

will be with purely perspectival temporal biases that undoubtedly occur. By being tem￾porally neutral I mean, as already stated, being free of all sorts of temporal partiality.

Some writers, for example Parfit, have taken temporal neutrality to cover something

wider than merely the absence of such biases. They have characterized subjects as having

a temporally neutral attitude when they have the prudentialist goal of wanting to fulfil

the desires of their entire lives in proportion to their strength and co-satisfiability, irre￾spective of whether they are past, present, or future. This goes beyond temporal neutral￾ity as I conceive it, for it forbids something that temporal neutrality in my conception

allows, namely that one gratifies a present desire rather than a stronger future one,

because one judges the orientation or content of the latter to be base, depraved, etc.

The more far-reaching doctrine—that entails temporal neutrality, but is not entailed

by it—is about the inter-temporal maximization of one’s own fulfilment. It will be discussed

in Part IV in connection with personal neutrality and the importance of a desire belong￾ing to oneself. (I shall conclude that it is not rationally required.) The reason for this order

of exposition is that, when one tries to vindicate the claim that it is (cognitively) irrational

to refuse to fulfil one of one’s stronger future desire because one now evaluates its con￾tent negatively, one may do this by arguing that it shares the most important property

with one’s present desires, to wit, the property of belonging to oneself.

Perspectival Biases and the Nature of Time

Turning now to the perspectival temporal biases, the N-bias and the F-bias, my claim that

they are cognitively irrational will appeal to representational distortions caused by beliefs

about the timing of events occurring to oneself. There is nothing irrational in these tem￾poral beliefs themselves, I maintain, as they correspond to something in our temporal

experience (to the effect, e.g. that one event is further in the future). It is not impossible

that these temporal biases turn out to be irrational, though the beliefs underlying them

make no irrational claims about time. For if these temporal claims were sufficient to

explain the biases, it would be mysterious why the biases pop up only as regards events

200 Rationality and Temporal Neutrality