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World Economic Outlook

October 2008

Financial Stress, Downturns, and Recoveries

International Monetary Fund

W o r l d E c o n o m i c a n d F i n a n c i a l S u r v e y s

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iii

Contents

Assumptions and Conventions ix

Preface xi

Foreword xii

Executive Summary xv

Chapter 1. Global Prospects and Policies

Global Economy under Stress 1

Financial System in Crisis 6

Deepening Housing Corrections 10

Overstretched Commodity Markets 15

Have Macroeconomic Policies Been Too Loose? 21

Prospects for a Turnaround 23

Policy Challenges for the Global Economy 35

Appendix 1.1. Assessing and Communicating Risks to the Global Outlook 41

References 46

Chapter 2. Country and Regional Perspectives

United States and Canada: Prognosis for the Downturn 49

Western Europe: Struggling with Multiple Shocks 51

Advanced Asia: Responding to External Shocks 59

Emerging Asia: Balancing Risks to Growth and Price Stability 63

Latin America and the Caribbean: Navigating a More Perilous Environment 66

Emerging Europe: Prospects for a Soft Landing 68

Commonwealth of Independent States: Managing the Commodity Price Boom 71

Sub-Saharan Africa: A Test of Policy Frameworks 74

Middle East: Overheating Still a Concern 77

References 80

Chapter 3. Is Inflation Back? Commodity Prices and Inflation

Surging Commodity Prices: Origins and Prospects 84

Commodity Price Shocks and Inflation 99

Monetary Policy Responses to Commodity Price Shocks 109

Summary and Conclusions 116

Appendix 3.1. Recent Commodity Market Developments 118

Appendix 3.2. Accounting for Food Price Increases, 2006–08 122

Appendix 3.3 Estimating Inflationary Effects of Commodity Price Shocks 124

References 126

contents

iv

Chapter 4. Financial Stress and Economic Downturns

Identifying Episodes of Financial Stress 131

Financial Stress, Economic Slowdown, and Recession 136

Has Financial Innovation Affected the Interplay between Financial Stress and Economic Cycles 141

The Current Financial Crisis in Historical Context 145

Conclusions 148

Appendix 4.1. Data and Methodology 154

References 156

Chapter 5. Fiscal Policy as a Countercyclical Tool

Understanding the Fiscal Policy Debate 160

How Has Discretionary Fiscal Policy Typically Responded? 166

Are Fiscal Policy Reactions Different in Emerging and Advanced Economies? 170

The Macroeconomic Effects of Discretionary Fiscal Policy 173

A Simulation-Based Perspective on Fiscal Stimulus 180

Conclusions and Policy Considerations 183

Appendix 5.1. Data and Empirical Methods 187

References 195

Chapter 6. Divergence of Current Account Balances across Emerging Economies

Recent Current Account Patterns in Emerging Economies 199

What Factors Have Contributed to Recent Current Account Patterns 210

Sustainability of Current Account Imbalances 221

Conclusions and Policy Implications 228

Appendix 6.1. Variable Definitions and Data Source 229

Appendix 6.2. Econometric Approach 231

References 237

Annex: IMF Executive Board Discussion of the Outlook, September 2008 241

Statistical Appendix 247

Assumptions 247

What’s New 250

Data and Conventions 250

Classification of Countries 252

General Features and Composition of Groups in the World Economic

Outlook Classification 254

List of Tables

Output (Tables A1–A4) 259

Inflation (Tables A5–A7) 267

Financial Policies (Table A8) 273

Foreign Trade (Table A9) 274

Current Account Transactions (Tables A10–A12) 276

Balance of Payments and External Financing (Tables A13–A15) 282

Flow of Funds (Table A16) 286

Medium-Term Baseline Scenario (Table A17) 290

contents

World Economic Outlook and Staff Studies for the World Economic Outlook, Selected Topics 291

Boxes

1.1 The Latest Bout of Financial Distress: How Does It Change the Global Outlook? 11

1.2 House Prices: Corrections and Consequences 16

1.3 Measuring Output Gaps 26

2.1 EMU: 10 Years On 58

3.1 Does Financial Investment Affect Commodity Price Behavior? 88

3.2 Fiscal Responses to Recent Commodity Price Increases: An Assessment 103

3.3 Monetary Policy Regimes and Commodity Prices 112

4.1 Policies to Resolve Financial System Stress and Restore Sound Financial Intermediation 151

5.1 Differences in the Extent of Automatic Stabilizers and Their Relationship

with Discretionary Fiscal Policy 161

5.2 Why Is It So Hard to Determine the Effects of Fiscal Stimulus? 164

5.3 Have U.S. Tax Cuts Been “TTT”? 172

6.1 Current Account Determinants for Oil-Exporting Countries 200

6.2 Sovereign Wealth Funds: Implications for Global Financial Markets 204

6.3 Historical Perspective on Growth and the Current Account 214

A1 Economic Policy Assumptions Underlying the Projections for Selected Economies 248

Tables

1.1 Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections 2

2.1 Advanced Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, and Unemployment 52

2.2 Advanced Economies: Current Account Positions 54

2.3 Selected Asian Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, and Current Account Balance 65

2.4 Selected Western Hemisphere Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, and

Current Account Balance 67

2.5 Selected Emerging European Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, and

Current Account Balance 70

2.6 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Real GDP, Consumer Prices, and

Current Account Balance 73

2.7 Selected African Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, and

Current Account Balance 76

2.8 Selected Middle Eastern Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, and

Current Account Balance 78

3.1 Contributions of Common Factors to Commodity Price Fluctuations 94

3.2 Selected Indicators of Spillovers across Major Food Commodity Prices 98

3.3 Global Oil Demand and Production by Region 120

3.4 Elasticity Estimates Used for Price Calculations 123

4.1 Descriptive Statistics on Financial Stress Episodes 134

4.2 Descriptive Statistics on Financial Stress, Slowdowns, and Recessions 137

4.3 Cross-Section Regressions 144

4.4 Six Major Periods of Financial Stress and Economic Contractions 149

4.5 Data 154

4.6 Average Yearly Share of Total Bank Assets of Banks in Sample 156

contents

vi

5.1 Macroeconomic Indicators around Downturns, with and without a Fiscal Impulse: All

Economies 176

5.2 Real GDP Growth and Fiscal Impulse under Various Initial Conditions: All Economies 178

5.3 Real GDP Growth and Fiscal Impulse by Composition: All Economies 180

5.4 Responses of Real GDP to Discretionary Fiscal Policy Changes 181

5.5 List of Countries and Downturn Episodes 189

5.6 Discretionary Fiscal Policy and Growth: Regression Results with

Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Estimator Using Elasticity-Based Fiscal Impulse Measure 191

5.7 Discretionary Fiscal Policy and Growth: Regression Results with

Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Estimator Using Regression-Based Fiscal Impulse Measure193

6.1 Determinants of the Current Account Balance 217

6.2 Duration Regressions of Persistent and Large Current Account Deficits 226

6.3 Explaining Differentiated Effects in Emerging Europe 233

6.4 List of Persistently Large Current Account Imbalance Episodes 235

6.5 Duration Analysis and Domestic Financial Sector Liberalization 236

6.6 Duration Analysis and Risk of Abrupt and Non-Abrupt Endings 236

Figures

1.1 Global Indicators 3

1.2 Current and Forward-Looking Indicators 4

1.3 Global Inflation 5

1.4 External Developments in Selected Advanced Economies 6

1.5 External Developments in Emerging and Developing Economies 7

1.6 Developments in Mature Credit Markets 8

1.7 Mature Financial and Housing Market Indicators 9

1.8 Emerging Market Conditions 10

1.9 Measures of Monetary Policy and Liquidity in Selected Advanced Economies 22

1.10 Measures of the Output Gap and Capacity Pressures 24

1.11 Global Outlook 25

1.12 Risks to the Global Outlook 30

1.13 Impact of Financial Shock on the Global Economy 32

1.14 Current Account Balances and Net Foreign Assets 34

1.15 Median Forecast Errors during Global Recessions and at Other Times, 1991–2007 42

1.16 Histograms of Forecast Errors, 1991–2007 43

1.17 Probability of Global Recessions 44

1.18 Illustrative GPM-Based 90 Percent Confidence Intervals 46

2.1 United States: Strains on Households 50

2.2 Western Europe: Slowing Demand and High Inflation 53

2.3 Japan: How Well Would the Economy Weather a Terms-of-Trade Shock? 57

2.4 Emerging Asia: Remaining Inflation Concerns 63

2.5 Latin America: Inflation Returns 68

2.6 Emerging Europe: Are Credit Booms Cooling Off? 69

2.7 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Managing the Commodity Price Boom 72

2.8 Sub-Saharan Africa: The Mixed Blessing of High Commodity Prices 75

2.9 Middle East: Managing Inflation Pressures 79

3.1 Commodity Prices in Historical Context 85

contents

vii

3.2 Marginal Change in Energy Intensity, Commodity Inventories, and OPEC Spare Capacity 86

3.3 Grain and Oil Demand, Production, and Inventories in Comparison 87

3.4 Oil Supply Developments 95

3.5 Price Trends of Major Foods 97

3.6 Duration and Amplitude of Food and Crude Oil Price Cycles 99

3.7 Inflation around the World 100

3.8 Changes in International and Domestic Commodity Prices and Headline Inflation 101

3.9 The Relative Importance of Food and Energy 105

3.10 Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies 106

3.11 Commodity Price Pass-Through 107

3.12 Changes in Expected Inflation in Response to Changes in Actual Inflation 108

3.13 Activity, Interest Rates, and Inflation 110

3.14 Stylized Advanced Economy with Adverse and Favorable Supply Shocks 111

3.15 Stylized More-Vulnerable Emerging Market Economy with Adverse and

Favorable Supply Shocks 115

3.16 Potential Costs of Delaying Interest Rate Hikes 116

3.17 Commodity and Petroleum Prices 118

3.18 World Oil Market Balances and Oil Futures Price 119

3.19 Developments in Food and Metal Markets 122

4.1 Financial Stress and Output Loss 130

4.2 Financial Stress Index 134

4.3 Financial Stress and Shocks 135

4.4 Contribution of Banking, Securities, and Foreign Exchange to Current

Financial Stress Episode 136

4.5 Lag between Financial Stress and Downturns 138

4.6 Selected Macrovariables around Economic Downturns with and without Financial Stress 139

4.7 Banking-Related Financial Stress, Slowdowns, and Recessions 140

4.8 Cost of Capital and Bank Asset Growth around Banking Financial Stress Episodes 141

4.9 Selected Macrovariables around Financial Stress Episodes 142

4.10 Initial Conditions of Financial Stress Episodes 143

4.11 Financial Stress and Economic Downturns: Controlling for Four Main Shocks 145

4.12 The Procyclicality of Leverage in Investment and Commercial Banks 146

4.13 Procyclical Leverage and Arm’s-Length Financial Systems 147

4.14 Arm’s-Length Financial Systems, GDP Growth, and Bank Leverage 148

4.15 The Current Financial Stress Episode in the United States and Euro Area in

Historical Context 150

5.1 How Often and Quickly Has Fiscal Stimulus Been Used in G7 Economies? 167

5.2 How Strong Was the Fiscal Policy Response in G7 Economies? 168

5.3 How Have Fiscal Policy Responses Varied across Advanced Economies? 169

5.4 Is There a Bias toward Easing during Downturns in G7 Economies? 170

5.5 Did G7 Economies Respond to Erroneously Perceived Downturns? 171

5.6 Composition of Fiscal Stimulus during Downturns for Advanced and

Emerging Economies 174

5.7 Fiscal Policy Responses in Downturns and Upturns 175

5.8 Macroeconomic Indicators after Downturns, with and without a Fiscal Stimulus 177

5.9 Changes in Real GDP Growth and Fiscal Policies under Various Initial Conditions 179

5.10 Effect of Fiscal Expansion in a Large Economy 182

contents

viii

5.11 Fiscal Expansion in a Large Economy Compared with a Small Open Economy

with Monetary Accommodation 184

5.12 Effect of Fiscal Expansion in a Small Economy with Market-Risk-Premium Reaction 185

6.1 Patterns of Divergence in Current Account Balance 199

6.2 External Balances by Component 203

6.3 Current Account Balance, Saving, and Investment 208

6.4 Saving and Investment by Components 209

6.5 Growth Takeoffs 210

6.6 Current Account Reversals around Crises 211

6.7 Current Account Balance and Real GDP per Capita Growth 212

6.8 Patterns of Financial Development 213

6.9 Explaining the Current Account Balances of Emerging Asia and Emerging Europe 218

6.10 Explaining Current Account Balances: Results by Subregion 219

6.11 Deviation from Predicted Real Effective Exchange Rates 221

6.12 Residual Current Account Balance, Deviation of Real Effective Exchange Rate from

Predicted Level and Stock of Reserves 222

6.13 Persistently Large Current Account Deficit and Surplus Episodes, 1960–2007 223

6.14 Duration of Large, Persistent Current Account Deficits, 1960–2007 224

6.15 Survival Functions of Deficit Episodes 225

6.16 Predicted Duration and Actual Length of Ongoing Deficit Episodes 227

6.17 Corporate Profitability and Productivity Growth 228

A number of assumptions have been adopted for the projections presented in the World Economic

Outlook. It has been assumed that real effective exchange rates will remain constant at their average

levels during August 18–September 15, 2008, except for the currencies participating in the European

exchange rate mechanism II (ERM II), which are assumed to remain constant in nominal terms

relative to the euro; that established policies of national authorities will be maintained (for specific

assumptions about fiscal and monetary policies in industrial countries, see Box A1); that the average

price of oil will be $107.25 a barrel in 2008 and $100.50 a barrel in 2009, and remain unchanged in

real terms over the medium term; that the six-month London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) on U.S.

dollar deposits will average 3.2 percent in 2008 and 3.1 percent in 2009; that the three-month euro

deposits rate will average 4.8 percent in 2008 and 4.2 percent in 2009; and that the six-month Japanese

yen deposit rate will yield an average of 1.0 percent in 2008 and 1.2 percent in 2009. These are, of

course, working hypotheses rather than forecasts, and the uncertainties surrounding them add to the

margin of error that would in any event be involved in the projections. The estimates and projections

are based on statistical information available through early October 2008.

The following conventions have been used throughout the World Economic Outlook:

. . . to indicate that data are not available or not applicable;

— to indicate that the figure is zero or negligible;

– between years or months (for example, 2006–07 or January–June) to indicate the years or

months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months;

/ between years or months (for example, 2006/07) to indicate a fiscal or financial year.

“Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.

“Basis points” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent

to ¼ of 1 percent point).

In figures and tables, shaded areas indicate IMF staff projections.

Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals shown are due to rounding.

As used in this report, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a

state as understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territo￾rial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and indepen￾dent basis.

Assumptions and Conventions

ix

This report on the World Economic Outlook is available in full on the IMF’s website, www.imf.org.

Accompanying it on the website is a larger compilation of data from the WEO database than in the

report itself, consisting of files containing the series most frequently requested by readers. These files

may be downloaded for use in a variety of software packages.￾Inquiries about the content of the World Economic Outlook and the WEO database should be sent by

mail, electronic mail, or telefax (telephone inquiries cannot be accepted) to:

World Economic Studies Division

Research Department

International Monetary Fund

700 19th Street, N.W.￾Washington, D.C. 20431, U.S.A.￾E-mail: [email protected] Telefax: (202) 623-6343

Furrtherr Ini fforma rmatiion aandd Ddaataa

The analysis and projections contained in the World Economic Outlook are integral elements of the

IMF’s surveillance of economic developments and policies in its member countries, of developments

in international financial markets, and of the global economic system. The survey of prospects and

policies is the product of a comprehensive interdepartmental review of world economic developments,

which draws primarily on information the IMF staff gathers through its consultations with member

countries. These consultations are carried out in particular by the IMF’s area departments together

with the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department (formerly Policy Development and Review Depart￾ment), the Monetary and Capital Markets Department, and the Fiscal Affairs Department.

The analysis in this report has been coordinated in the Research Department under the general

direction of Olivier Blanchard, Economic Counsellor and Director of Research. The project has been

directed by Charles Collyns, Deputy Director of the Research Department, and Jörg Decressin, Division

Chief, Research Department. The analysis has benefited from input during the early stages by Simon

Johnson, the former Economic Counsellor and Director of Research.

The primary contributors to this report are Roberto Cardarelli, Kevin Cheng, Stephan Danninger,

Mark De Broeck, Selim Elekdag, Thomas Helbling, Anna Ivanova, Florence Jaumotte, Daehaeng Kim,

Michael Kumhof, Subir Lall, Tim Lane, Douglas Laxton, Daniel Leigh, Valerie Mercer-Blackman,

Jonathan Ostry, Alasdair Scott, Sven Jari Stehn, Steven Symansky, Natalia Tamirisa, and Irina Tytell.

Toh Kuan, Gavin Asdorian, Ioan Carabenciov, Huigang Chen, To-Nhu Dao, Stephanie Denis, Nese Er￾bil, Angela Espiritu, Elaine Hensle, Patrick Hettinger, Annette Kyobe, Susana Mursula, Jair Rodriguez,

Bennett Sutton, and Ercument Tulun provided research assistance. Saurabh Gupta, Mahnaz Hemmati,

Laurent Meister, and Emory Oakes managed the database and the computer systems. Jemille Colon,

Tita Gunio, Shanti Karunaratne, Laura Leon, Patricia Medina, and Sheila Tomilloso Igcasenza were

responsible for word processing. Other contributors include Steven Barnett, Rudolf Bems, Irineu de

Carvalho Filho, Stijn Claessens, Kevin Clinton, David Coady, Gianni de Nicolò, Ondrej Kamenik, Julie

Kozack, Luc Laeven, Prakash Loungani, Dirk Muir, Krishna Srinivasan, Emil Stavrev, Stephen Tokarick.

External consultants include Joshua Aizenman, Antonio Fatás, Christopher Meissner, and Hyun Song

Shin. Linda Griffin Kean of the External Relations Department edited the manuscript and coordinated

the production of the publication. Lucy Scott Morales provided editorial assistance.

The analysis has benefited from comments and suggestions by staff from other IMF departments, as

well as by Executive Directors following their discussions of the report on September 17 and 19, 2008.

However, both projections and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff and should not be

attributed to Executive Directors or to their national authorities.

Preface

xi

Foreword

xii

Foreword

Having just joined the IMF, I can take very

little credit for this edition of the World Economic

Outlook. I regret it: Like its predecessors, this is

a remarkable document which gives the reader

a clear sense of what is happening in the world

economy. I thank Simon Johnson, Charles Col￾lyns, Jörg Decressin, and their team for their

work.

Chapters 1 and 2 assess the state and the

evolution of the world economy, an exercise that

has rarely been so difficult. The world economy

is decelerating quickly—buffeted by an extraor￾dinary financial shock and by still-high energy

and commodity prices—and many advanced

economies are close to or moving into recession.

Developments in financial markets have domi￾nated the news in recent weeks. The subprime

crisis that unfolded in 2007 has now morphed

into a credit crisis that has caused major disrup￾tion to financial institutions in the United States

and Europe. Intensifying solvency concerns

about a number of the largest U.S.-based and

European financial institutions have pushed the

global financial system to the brink of systemic

meltdown. The effects on the real economy have

been limited so far. In part, this may be because

tax rebates in the United States supported con￾sumption, while strong nonfinancial corporate

balance sheets and profitability have allowed

firms to use their own funds rather than borrow.

But neither of these factors can be expected

to last for very long. Credit conditions have

become significantly tighter in recent weeks,

threatening the ability of nonfinancial firms

and a number of emerging economies to raise

capital. The U.S. and European authorities have

taken extraordinary measures, including mas￾sive liquidity provision, intervention to restore

weak institutions, extension of guarantees, and

recent U.S. legislation to use public funds to buy

troubled assets from banks. But it is not yet clear

that these measures will be sufficient to stabilize

markets and bolster confidence, and the situa￾tion remains highly uncertain.

This is not the only shock buffeting the world

economy. Prices of oil and basic commodities

have reached historically high levels in recent

months. In advanced economies, a combina￾tion of real wage flexibility, well-anchored

inflation expectations, and prospects of sharply

reduced activity have helped to limit rises in

core inflation. But in emerging and developing

economies, the impact has been much more

damaging. Real wages have fallen substantially.

Oil exporters have found it difficult to dampen

overheating economies.

Looking to the future, it is necessary to assess

how these shocks will likely work their way

through the world economy. Our forecasts are

based on three major assumptions. The first

is that commodity and oil prices are likely to

stabilize, relieving pressure on inflation and

giving more room, if needed, for expansionary

policies. The second is that U.S. housing prices

and activity will hit bottom within the next year,

leading to a recovery of residential investment.

The third is that, although credit will remain

tight, the elements of a systemic solution to the

financial crisis are now being put in place and

will prevent a further worsening of financial

intermediation. It is this combination that leads

us to forecast that world growth will begin to

recover at the end of 2009, albeit at a very slow

pace. There is, however, more than the usual

amount of uncertainty, and the downside risks

are far from negligible.

As usual, this World Economic Outlook also

tackles a number of topically important issues

in greater depth. Chapter 3 examines the threat

that the recent boom in commodity prices could

unwind the past two decades’ progress against

inflation. To be sure, the fall in some prices—

notably for oil—since mid-July has eased some

of the pressure, but it is too early to relax. Com-

Foreword

xiii

modity prices are likely to remain much higher

in real terms than in recent decades, and this

shift in relative prices will need to be absorbed

without triggering second-round effects on price

and wage formation. This task is likely to be

easier in the advanced economies, where widen￾ing output gaps are helping to restrain inflation

pressures. Moreover, these economies are much

less commodity-intensive than they were in the

1970s and have more flexible labor markets

and well-established monetary policy frame￾works that have largely succeeded in anchoring

inflation expectations. However, emerging and

developing economies are more vulnerable to

inflation spillovers—because of their greater

resource intensity, less-well-established policy

frameworks, and more rapid rates of growth. In

many of these economies, second-round effects

are already increasingly visible, and although

slowing global growth and softening commodity

prices should help rein inflation back in, risks

remain that continued inflationary excesses will

degrade hard-earned inflation-fighting creden￾tials, requiring even tougher action in the future

to put the cork back in the bottle.

Chapter 4 addresses what is clearly a central

concern for the global economy: What will be

the impact of the current financial crisis on

economic activity? It is now all too clear that we

are seeing the deepest shock to the global finan￾cial system since the Great Depression, at least

for the United States. Are we then doomed to

a slump in output as occurred in the 1930s? As

Chapter 4 shows, the historical record is mixed.

Periods of financial stress have not always been

followed by recessions or even by economic

slowdowns. However, the analysis also shows that

when the financial stress does major damage to

the banking system—as in the current epi￾sode—the likelihood increases of a severe and

protracted downturn in activity. This is clearly

demonstrated by the experiences of many econ￾omies that have struggled with virulent financial

crises over the past decades, for example, the

Nordic countries and Japan. Moreover, econo￾mies with more-arm’s length or market-based

financial systems seem to be particularly vul￾nerable to sharp contractions in activity in the

face of financial stress. This is because leverage

tends to be more procyclical in these econo￾mies—the risks of a credit crunch are greater.

Does this mean that the United States—with a

market-based financial system par excellence—is

heading for a deep recession? Not necessarily,

because, as the chapter shows, other factors

also matter. Two sources of support for the U.S.

economy are the quick and strong reaction of

the Federal Reserve to lower policy rates and the

robust state of the U.S. nonfinancial corporate

sector. Low indebtedness and high profits have

helped U.S. businesses ride the financial storm.

However, the longer the financial crisis contin￾ues, the less likely it is that nonfinancial firms

will be able to support strong growth.

Chapter 5 takes a fresh look at an old

debate—about the value of fiscal policy as a

countercyclical tool—which has taken on new

relevance as the global economy slows and

as turbulence in financial markets has raised

questions about the effectiveness of monetary

policy. The findings are not very encouraging

for proponents of fiscal activism: fiscal multipli￾ers—the impact of discretionary fiscal stimulus

on output—are generally found to be quite low,

and sometimes even to operate in the wrong

direction, especially in economies with high

debt levels where a turn to expansionary fiscal

policy may raise doubts about long-term debt

sustainability. This does not necessarily mean

that policymakers should abandon fiscal policy

as a countercyclical tool, but it does underline

that fiscal initiatives, when needed, must be well

targeted to have the maximum short-run impact

without undermining long-run fiscal rectitude.

It is also worthwhile to consider whether

the role of fiscal policy as a macroeconomic

stabilizer could be enhanced by strengthening

the broader fiscal framework. Two options are

worth considering. First, there is the possibility

that automatic stabilizers could be boosted by

making regular tax and transfer programs more

cyclically responsive. For example, the generos￾ity of unemployment insurance systems could be

automatically increased when the economy is in

Foreword

xiv

a downturn and jobs are harder to find. Second,

steps could be taken to strengthen the overall

governance structure for fiscal policy—thereby

reducing the risk of “debt bias” by ensuring that

fiscal easing during a downturn is balanced by

tightening during expansions. Improved gov￾ernance could bolster the credibility and thus

the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus. Recognizing

the pros and cons of these approaches, I do feel

they are worthy of consideration.

Finally, Chapter 6 tries to solve an important

puzzle: Why have the current account balances

of emerging economies been so divergent in

recent years, with some economies in emerg￾ing Asia registering large surpluses and others,

particularly in emerging Europe, sustaining very

large and long-lasting deficits? There is no single

answer, but the chapter suggests that important

contributors have been emerging Europe’s rapid

financial liberalization and capital account open￾ing, particularly in those economies integrat￾ing rapidly into the European Union, and the

focus in emerging Asia on building large stocks

of international reserves as self-insurance in

the wake of the Asian crisis of 1997–98. This

leaves open the question of whether the recent

patterns will be sustained. Certainly the turbu￾lent global environment is putting a strain on

economies with large current account deficits

and commensurately large external financing

requirements.

Olivier Blanchard

Economic Counsellor and Director, Research Department

The world economy is entering a major downturn

in the face of the most dangerous financial shock in

mature financial markets since the 1930s. Global

growth is projected to slow substantially in 2008, and

a modest recovery would only begin later in 2009.

Inflation is high, driven by a surge in commodity

prices, but is expected to moderate. The situation is

exceptionally uncertain and subject to considerable

downside risks. The immediate policy challenge is to

stabilize financial conditions, while nursing econo￾mies through a period of slow activity and keeping

inflation under control.

Global Economy under Stress

After years of strong growth, the world

economy is decelerating quickly (Chapters 1

and 2). Global activity is being buffeted by an

extraordinary financial shock and by still-high

energy and other commodity prices. Many

advanced economies are close to or moving into

recession, while growth in emerging economies

is also weakening.

The financial crisis that first erupted with the

U.S. subprime mortgage collapse in August 2007

has deepened further in the past six months

and entered a tumultuous new phase in Septem￾ber. The impact has been felt across the global

financial system, including in emerging markets

to an increasing extent. Intensifying solvency

concerns have led to emergency resolutions of

major U.S. and European financial institutions

and have badly shaken confidence. In response,

the U.S. and European authorities have taken

extraordinary measures aimed at stabilizing

markets, including massive liquidity provision,

prompt intervention to resolve weak institu￾tions, extension of deposit insurance, and recent

U.S. legislation to use public funds to purchase

troubled assets from banks. However, the situa￾tion remains highly uncertain as this report goes

to press.

At the same time, the combination of the

surge in food and fuel prices under way since

2004 and tightening capacity constraints has

propelled inflation to rates not seen in a decade.

As analyzed in Chapter 3, consumer price rises

have been particularly strong in emerging and

developing economies. This acceleration reflects

the high weight of food in consumption baskets,

still-quite-rapid growth, and less-well-anchored

inflation expectations. Notably, countries that

have adopted inflation-targeting regimes have

generally fared better. In the advanced econo￾mies, oil price increases have pushed up head￾line inflation, but underlying inflation pressures

seem contained.

The recent deterioration of global economic

performance follows sustained expansion built

on the increasing integration of emerging and

developing economies into the global economy.

In hindsight, however, lax macroeconomic and

regulatory policies may have allowed the global

economy to exceed its “speed limit” and may

have contributed to a buildup in imbalances

across financial, housing, and commodity mar￾kets. At the same time, market flaws, together

with policy shortcomings, have prevented equili￾brating mechanisms from operating effectively

and allowed market stresses to build.

Recovery Not Yet in Sight and Likely to

Be Gradual When It Comes

Looking ahead, financial conditions are

likely to remain very difficult, restraining global

growth prospects. The baseline projections

assume that actions by the U.S. and European

authorities will succeed in stabilizing financial

conditions and avoiding further systemic events.

Nonetheless, even with successful implementa￾tion of the U.S. plan to remove troubled assets

from bank balance sheets, counterparty risk is

likely to remain at exceptionally high levels for

xv

Executive Summary