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Dimensions of Expertise

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Philosophy of Education, Richard Pring

Vocational and Professional Capability, Gerard Lum

Perspectives of Quality in Adult Learning, Peter Boshier

Work Based Knowledge, Carol Costley and Pauline Armsby

Dimensions of Expertise

A Conceptual Exploration of Vocational

Knowledge

Christopher Winch

Continuum International Publishing Group

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© Christopher Winch 2010

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form

or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any

information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the

publishers.

Christopher Winch has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988,

to be identifi ed as Author of this work.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN: 9781847062680 (hardcover)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, Chennai, India

Printed and bound in Great Britain by the MPG Books Group

To all the members of my family.

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Contents

Acknowledgements viii

Preface ix

1. The Two Faces of Expertise 1

2. Current Philosophical Debates about Knowing How 19

3. Skills and Their Discontents 39

4. Beyond Skill – the Complexities of Competence 58

5: To Follow a Rule . . . The Normative Basis of Practical Knowledge 78

6. Theory, Underpinning Knowledge and Practice 98

7. Tacit Knowledge 117

8. Can There be a Theory of Expertise? 135

9. Novice, Journeyman, Expert 154

10. Vocational Education and the Development of Expertise 177

Bibliography 197

Index 205

Acknowledgements

I have profi ted in the writing of this book from the thoughts and com￾ments of more people than can be mentioned here. I would, however, like

to express a special thanks for inspiration from Linda Clarke, Michaela

Brockmann, Paul Hager, Gerard Lum, Theodore Lewis, John Gingell,

Richard Pring, Ewart Keep, Lorraine Foreman-Peck, Leesa Wheelahan,

Geoff Hinchliffe, Mili, Rohit Dhankar, Padma Sarangapani, Dietrich

Benner, Ewart Keep, Geoff Hayward, Lorna Unwin and Michael Young.

Preface

A detailed philosophical debate on the nature of expertise has been long

overdue. This volume is a modest attempt to start that debate. The focus

is twofold. First, I attempt to explain and defend a particular account of

know-how, or practical knowledge, derived primarily but not exclusively

from the pioneering work of Gilbert Ryle. The book takes account of the

debate that Ryle’s work has engendered over the 64 years since he fi rst

published on this issue. Second, I try to relate this epistemological debate

to various discussions concerning the nature of expertise that have arisen

in vocational and professional education over the past 25 years, including

attempts to provide a theory of expertise.

This book argues against the possibility of a general theory of expertise

on the grounds that the activities to which the term ‘expertise’ is applied

are too diverse for a theory to be possible. This is not to say, however, that

there is nothing useful that can be said about expertise. One of my aims

has been to chart the various dimensions of expertise that might need to

be taken account of in trying to provide a description of expertise in any

particular area. In this sense, the book can be said to offer guidance to

those who wish to explore the character of expertise in the particular area

in which they work.

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Chapter 1

The Two Faces of Expertise

Introduction

This book attempts two interrelated tasks. The fi rst is to arrive at an under￾standing of practical knowledge and how expertise is related to it. The

second is to show how such an understanding informs the various educa￾tional tasks of developing expertise. ‘Practical knowledge’ is understood

in a broad sense of ‘knowing how’ rather than ‘knowing that’, as set out

by Ryle1

and includes consideration of the moral aspect of knowing how to

act, as well as what is known as practical judgement in the broader sense

of being able to act rationally in practical contexts and includes considera￾tion of ‘competence’, ‘skill’ and related terms. Declarative knowledge and

knowledge by acquaintance are not the main concern, although, as will

be seen, the relationships between these and practical knowledge will be

a continuing thread in the discussion, particularly declarative knowledge.

Indeed, in order to understand these relationships it will be necessary to

devote some attention to some important distinctions within these two

areas of knowledge, namely the distinction between organized knowledge

and singular knowledge on the one hand and between aspectual and non￾aspectual acquaintance on the other hand.

There are two related aspects to the concept of expertise. On the

one hand, an expert can be thought of as a subject expert, someone who

is extremely knowledgeable concerning an academic subject area. An

important feature of subject expertise is the ability to acquire fresh

knowledge within the subject, such as a scientist or scholar might accom￾plish. On the other hand, the concept of expertise is related to practical

activity such as carpentry, medicine, engineering, painting or fi shing,

which involves mastery of an occupation, profession or activity. We tend

to think of the fi rst kind of expertise as related to declarative or proposi￾tional knowledge and the second related to practical knowledge, ability

or skill. Although I shall be concerned primarily with the practical kind

2 Dimensions of Expertise

of expertise, one of the central arguments of this book is that there is

often an intimate relationship between the two and that they cannot

really be understood except in terms of each other. Thus, the kinds of

mastery involved in subject expertise involve practical knowledge, while

most kinds of practical expertise involve some, and sometimes a con￾siderable degree of, propositional knowledge. In order to understand

either kind of expertise, we need to be able to understand each kind of

knowledge and how each relates to the other, while not losing sight of

acquaintance knowledge.

There is a growing contemporary philosophical literature on the nature

of practical knowledge, which was largely restarted by Ryle and which

has come to life in recent years. Ryle’s celebrated distinction between

two kinds of knowledge, knowing how and knowing that has become hotly

contested, with some commentators arguing for an assim ilation of prac￾tical to propositional knowledge, while others have sought to distinguish

skill from practical knowledge. Others again have tried to defend Ryle’s

initial distinction. Work carried out by David Carr in the early 1980s

was taken up by Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson in 2001 and the

debate has continued with contributions from Ian Rumfi tt, John Koethe,

Paul Snowdon and Tobias Rosefeldt among others. Although relevant

to the interest in skill and expertise in vocational education, the main￾stream philosophical debate has not so far touched on an issue that

was not treated in a satisfactory way by Ryle, namely the relationship

between practical and propositional knowledge in action and judge￾ment. However, it is a question not only of considerable epistemo logical

interest in its own right but also one of great relevance to our full under￾standing of expertise.

Chapter 2 will deal with the debate initiated by Ryle. It is, however, worth

refl ecting on why the debate has educational signifi cance; this will be the

main task of the current chapter. In its concerns with teaching and learn￾ing Philosophy of Education has, in the main, focused on the learning

of propositional knowledge in formal educational contexts. One must,

of course, be careful not to overstate this case. Aristotle’s work practical

knowledge and the development of the virtues and Rousseau and his suc￾cessors’ claim that learning takes place in practical ways, should give the

lie to the idea that Philosophy of Education is unconcerned with practical

knowledge or its acquisition in a variety of contexts. It is, however, arguable

that it has not received the detailed attention that it deserves in compar￾ison with the attention paid to the teaching and learning of propositional

The Two Faces of Expertise 3

knowledge. It is even more plausible to argue that the relationship between

the ways in which propositional and practical knowledge are related in

action has received comparatively little attention. Yet this is a matter of the

greatest interest to those who are concerned, as I am, with the development

of professional judgement, action and expertise.

What are the Issues?

Ryle argued that knowing how could not be subsumed to knowing that. The

latter should be considered as a distinct epistemic category. In Chapter 2,

his arguments will be considered. It is, however, worth noting that although

Ryle’s distinction is widely employed and recognized in everyday contexts,

his arguments for that distinction are by no means universally accepted.

In the main, those who reject them also reject Ryle’s claim that knowing

how is a distinct category from knowing that. For such commentators, any

instances of knowing how are, in fact, instances of knowing that. I will call

this Thesis 1.

What hangs on this dispute? Those who resist Ryle’s distinction claim, on

the whole, that knowing how is a species of knowing that. In other words

knowing that or propositional knowledge is a more basic epistemic cat￾egory than knowing how and that, despite some appearances to the con￾trary, in its fundamentals knowing how is a form of knowing that. If this

claim is true then one important proposition follows:

1. Anything that can intelligibly be said about a case of knowing that can

be intelligibly said about a case of knowing how.

What applies to a whole conceptual fi eld must also apply to its parts.

Of course, the converse does not follow, that what can be intelligibly said

about knowing how cannot necessarily be intelligibly said about knowing

that. If the critics of Ryle are correct, then nothing that can intelligibly said

about knowing that cannot be intelligibly said about knowing how. This

has the potential to pose problems for those who hold Thesis 1. It is rel￾evant to our understanding of practical knowledge in educational contexts

as well, since a faulty account of the relationship between knowing that and

knowing how threatens to pose diffi culties for the development of useful

pedagogies and curricula in areas, such as vocational education, that are

engaged in the development of practical knowledge.

4 Dimensions of Expertise

On the face of it, 1 is problematic. To keep matters simple, let us use

examples of knowing that where a knower knows one proposition and of

knowing how where an agent knows how to do one action. Then

2. A knows that p

where p is a proposition, does not look like

3. A knows how to F

where F is an action.

It does not look as if

4. A knows how to p*

makes any sense, thus violating 1 above.

This is not, however, a fatal fl aw in Thesis 1 as it can be maintained that,

in order to lay bare the conceptual relationship between knowing how and

knowing that, one must do a little ‘unpacking’; a procedure not unknown

to Ryle himself. This can be done by showing that the best way to read

A knows how to F

is as

5. A knows that w is a way to F

Where w is a procedure, and if

w is a way to F

is abbreviated as p.

Then it can be shown that

A knows how to F

can be understood as

A knows that p

and 1 is not violated.