Language in the USA Part 7 pot

Language ideology and language prejudice 299

but not for all of us. Many have strong negative reactions to Korean accents,

or to African American Vernacular English, but certainly not everyone does. In

Hawai‘i, where there is a long history of animus between people of Japanese and

Filipino national origin, one person with a foreign accent may reject a different

foreign accent or reject the creole that is spoken by so many in the islands. In

black communities in the Bronx (in New York City) and elsewhere, there is a great

deal of tension between African Americans and recent immigrants from Africa

and the Caribbean. In other communities, some people may cringe or glower

when they hear Spanish spoken on the street or spoken between sales clerk and

customer, while others may smile broadly to hear Italian or Polish spoken in

the same situations. The languages and language varieties we hear must pass

through our language ideology filters. In extreme cases, we feel completely justi￾fied in rejecting the communicative burden – and, in so doing, the person in front

of us.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (specifically Title VII of that law) provides

recourse for workers who are discriminated against on the basis of race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin. The scope of the law was broadened in 1980 to

address trait-based discrimination (for example, language that is linked to national

origin). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (abbreviated EEOC) is

responsible for the overview and administration of Title VII. In its Guidelines on

Discrimination because of National Origin, the EEOC currently defines national

origin discrimination

. . . broadly as including, but not limited to, the denial of equal employment

opportunity because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s place of origin;

or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics

of a national origin group. [Federal Register 1988:¶1606.1; italics added]

The spirit of the law is clear: an employer may not reject a job candidate or fire or

refuse to promote an employee because the employee externalizes in some way

an allegiance to another culture. In the case of racial discrimination, the courts

have determined that no personal preference (neither the employer’s nor that

of his customers) can excuse discrimination. Similarly, a qualified person may

not be rejected on the basis of linguistic traits the employer or the employer’s

customers find aesthetically objectionable, as long as those linguistic traits are

linked to a category protected by the Civil Rights Act, and that includes national

origin. In contrast to racial discrimination, however, an employer has some latitude

in matters of language: “An adverse employment decision may be predicated

upon an individual’s accent when – but only when – it interferes materially with

job performance” (Civil Rights Act of 1964, §701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e et

seq.).

Let’s return now to the story we began with at the head of the chapter. Florence

Kyomugisha lost her job at the University of Wisconsin in part because of alleged

communication difficulties with her supervisor, Ms. Clowney. It is important to

note that after its independence from Great Britain, Uganda adopted English as its

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official language. English is the language of government and commerce and the

primary medium of education; official publications and most major newspapers

appear in English, and English is often employed in radio and television broad￾casts. Ms. Kyomugisha, a fluent speaker of Runyankole and Luganda, is also a

native and fluent speaker of Ugandan English. As the chancellor of the univer￾sity acknowledged in 1996, while Ms. Kyomugisha does not speak “Wisconsin

English, she nevertheless speaks perfectly fine English” (Kyomugisha v. Clowney,

complaint filed October 16, 1997).

In her complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Ms. Kyomugisha

claimed national origin discrimination linked to language traits. This is a subject

her attorney explored during the deposition of her supervisor, Ms. Clowney, who

is also an attorney. (A deposition is testimony taken under oath as part of the

preparation for a trial.) The attorney uses the term animus to refer to prejudice or

malevolent ill will.

attorney: . . . You know about discriminatory animus from your pro￾fessional preparation in the field of affirmative action and

discrimination law; isn’t that correct? . . . you were respon￾sible for doing the investigations of discrimination at the

university, and you need to know what the law is about that,

correct?

clowney: . . . Yes, sir.

attorney: And you know about the sociology of discrimination,

right?

clowney: Yes.

...

attorney: And you would agree that the process of communication

between two individuals involves a degree of burden shar￾ing between the two individuals for purposes of making

each other understood, correct?

clowney: Sometimes. It depends on the nature of the two individuals.

I would agree that the burden is more on an investigator to

be understood in an university community than employ￾ees. The burden is more so on the professional than the

nonprofessional.

attorney: Now, I’m speaking of two people who speak with each

other, who have divergent accents. You agree that you have

an accent, correct?

clowney: At times I might. I don’t know if I do or not; you tell me.

attorney: Well, isn’t it true that all people have an accent of one kind

or another?

clowney: Not all people, some people. My mother is a schoolteacher

and she doesn’t necessarily have an accent.

Language ideology and language prejudice 301

attorney: Well, do you think somebody from another part of the coun￾try who speaks with a different intonation would say that

that person in fact has an accent?

clowney: Possibly, yes.

...

attorney: And communication between two such people involves the

acceptance of a certain responsibility for burden sharing

between each other in order to effectuate communication;

isn’t that correct?

clowney: It can. It depends on the relationship between the two indi￾viduals.

attorney: One of the factors in that relationship that could make the

communication difficult is when one individual refuses to

accept burden, a burden in connection with effectuating

comprehensibility; isn’t that correct?

clowney: How about the burden on the other person to go and take

courses and study and to be understood as well. What about

– why should the burden–I also understand diversity, but

why should the burden be on the recipient rather than, I

mean, if you look at modern-day diversity studies, we’d be

here all day. There’s a double burden; there’s a dual burden.

I’ll – I’ll say there’s a dual burden.

attorney: Isn’t it true that in some conversations where one person

has a racial animus of one type or a national origin ani￾mus of one type that person refuses to accept a burden,

any burden for effectuating the communication . . . and

thereby make – makes the allegation that the person is

incomprehensible?

clowney: I’m not going to answer that. I’m not an expert on com￾munications skills. I’ve written papers on communication

skills and racial animus. I can’t say that. You’re – you’re

asking me to draw inferences here and I can’t say that.

There are people I know that are trained who don’t have

any kind of animus; and if they can’t understand someone,

they get frustrated, and then have nothing to do with race,

sex, religion, whatever. But the bottom line is that, you

know, it’s – you have to listen a little bit carefully, but, you

know.

...

attorney: Do you feel like you accepted your portion of the burden

in trying to understand Florence’s oral communications?

...

clowney: Yes.

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attorney: . . . whether you feel that you accepted your portion of the

burden to comprehend what Florence was saying to you

when she was orally communicating with you?

clowney: Yes, I do.

attorney: Do you feel that you made a reasonable good faith effort

to understand Florence?

clowney: Yes, I do.

attorney: Is it your testimony that notwithstanding that effort that was

not enough and you still had oral communication problems

with Florence?

clowney: Yes, I do.

Subsequent to this deposition, the university decided to settle this case before

it came to trial, and Ms. Kyomugisha received compensatory damages, back

pay, and the attorney’s costs she had incurred. The university’s lawyers did not

disclose the reasons the university decided to offer a settlement, but from her

deposition there would seem to be some question about the true origin of Ms.

Clowney’s communication difficulties with Ms. Kyomugisha. She asked, “How

about the burden on the other person to go and take courses and study and to

be understood as well . . . why should the burden be on the recipient . . . ?”

After Ms. Kyomugisha had worked successfully for four years with three other

supervisors, it would be difficult to justify a claim that her accent was a bur￾den or barrier in any general sense. As Ms. Clowney herself seems to acknowl￾edge, racial or national origin animus can raise a barrier of its own to successful

communication.

Ms. Kyomugisha was knowledgeable about the law, and she had the strength

of will necessary to pursue her legal rights. She was successful, but many others

are not. Everyday in the USA, individuals are taught that the language they speak

marks them as less-than-good-enough. Some turn away from them, pretending

not to understand their language. The repercussions of such linguistic rejection

are vast, because

. . . our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the

misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real

damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back

to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.

[Taylor 1994: 25]

Linguists are interested in the process of language subordination – how it works,

why it works, and why we let it work. Standard language ideology is introduced

by the schools, vigorously promoted by the media, and further institutionalized by

the corporate sector. It is underscored and underwritten in subtle and not so subtle

ways by the judicial system. Thus, it is not surprising that many individuals do not

recognize the fact that, for spoken language, variation is systematic, structured,

and inherent, and that the national standard is an abstraction. What is surprising

Language ideology and language prejudice 303

and deeply disturbing is the way that many individuals who consider themselves

democratic, even-handed, rational, and free of prejudice hold on tenaciously to a

standard language ideology.

Suggestions for further reading and exploration

Lippi-Green (1987) exposes and indicts social institutions that instill language

prejudice and discrimination, including how the spoken accents of animated Hol￾lywood characters perpetuate stereotypes. Cameron (1995) is strong on politi￾cal correctness, sexist language, and linguistic prescriptivism, but with examples

drawn largely from Britain. Less accessible and more theoretical, Eagleton (1991)

addresses ideologies from a Marxist point of view. Gee (1996) begins his excellent

analysis of discourse and literacy from a moral perspective. McKay and Wong

(1988) gathers in one place descriptions of contemporary language minorities in

the USA, particularly Hispanic and Asian groups; some chapters offer a histori￾cal perspective and others address educational implications of language diversity.

Herman and Chomsky (1988), relying on case studies, propose a propaganda

model of the press and argue that the press is manipulated by government and

corporations into playing a role in shaping events, rather than fairly reporting

them. Fairclough (1992) gives good representation to analyses of critical lan￾guage awareness and critical discourse analysis. Crawford (1992) documents the

historical roots of US language policy (with pieces by Benjamin Franklin and

Theodore Roosevelt, among many others), the official English movement and

the issues surrounding it, and the symbolic implications of language conflict.

Woolard and Schieffelin (1994) reviews and analyzes the literature on the subject

of language ideology. Foucault (1984), in a classic treatment, addresses questions

of who has the right to speak and be heard and the implications of the answers

to those questions. Bourdieu (1991) is a classic treatment of the role of symbolic

power in social life.

References

Alatis, James. 1970. “Linguistics and the Teaching of Standard English to Speakers of Other

Languages or Dialects.” In Alatis’s Report of the Twentieth Annual Round Table Meeting

on Linguistics and Language Studies. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.

Associated Press. 1992. “Debate Over Teachers with Accents,” New York Times. July 5, Sec.

1, p. 12.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. Language and Symbolic Power. Ed. and intro. by J. B. Thompson.

Trans. G. Raymond and M. Adamson. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Cameron, Deborah. 1995. Verbal Hygiene. London and New York: Routledge.

Card, Orson Scott. 2003. http://www.hatrack.com/osc/reviews/restaurant/utah/gardenwall.

shtml

Crawford, James, ed. 1992. Language Loyalties: a Source Book on the Official English Con￾troversy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Eagleton, Terry. 1991. Ideology: an Introduction. London: Verso.

Fairclough, Norman, ed. 1992. Critical Language Awareness. London: Longman.