Human factors in ship design and operation

RINA

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

Human Factors in Ship Design

and Operation

16 – 17 November 2011

© 2011: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects

The Institution is not, as a body, responsible for the opinions

expressed by the individual authors or speakers

THE ROYAL INSTITUTION OF NAVAL ARCHITECTS 10 Upper Belgrave Street London SW1X 8BQ

Telephone: 020 7235 4622

Fax: 020 7259 5912

ISBN No: 1-905040-91-1

Human Factors in Ship Design and Operation, 16 - 17 November 2011, London, UK

CONTENTS

The Human Element Competency Required for Design Appraisal

O.Walker, Lloyd's Register, UK

The Human Factor in the Investigation of Marine Casualties, Amendments to

Manila STCW78 2010

J Alvite Castro, A Coruña University, Spain

Effect of Noise on Human Performance on Board Ships

Emek Kurt and O. Turan, University of Strathclyde, UK

Human Factor Design in UK Defence

A Springall, Defence Engineering and Support, Sea Systems Group

Manning Centred Design in the Netherlands

W.M. Post, TNO Human Factors, The Netherlands

Enhancing Safety Performance with a Leading Indicators Program

C. Tomlinson, ABS, B. Craig, Lamar University, M. Meehan, AP Moller-Maersk

Performance of Seafarers During Extended Simulation Runs

A Kircher, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden

Fatigue and Performance in Bridge and Engine Control Room Watch Keeping on

A 6 on/6 Off Watch Regime

P.Maurier and P.Corrignan, Bureau Veritas, M.Barnett, D.Gatfield,

The Effects of Human Factors on Ship Collision Frequency

M. Hänninen, Aalto University School of Engineering, Finland

Perception of Risk – Some Consideration of the Impact on the Inclusion of

Human Factors in Risk Assessments

V. Pomeroy, University of Southampton, UK

Safety Consequences Onboard Shortsea Ships Due to Crew Innovation

W. Post, TNO, The Netherlands

Mapping of Work Areas in a Platform Supply Vessel (PSVS): A Case Study

K.Nordby, S. Komandur, C.Lange and A.Kittlsen, Aalesund University College,

Norway

Maritime Platform Habitability Assessment

A Woolley, M. Riding, V.Pit and R. Mead, DSTO, Australia

© 2011: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects

Human Factors in Ship Design and Operation, 16 - 17 November 2011, London, UK

Analysis and Evaluation of Static Working Postures on Crew, to Determine

Ergonomic Risk on Board Vessels

A Lossa, D Avilla, Cotecmar, Colombia

Enhancing Marine Ergonomic Design Via Digital Human Modeling

T.Dobbins, STResearch, J.Hill, Trident Marine, S. McCartan, Coventry University, UK

Developing a Standard Methodology for Dynamic Navigation in the Littoral

Environment

F.Forsman, J.Dahlman, Chalmers University, Sweden and T.Dobbins, STResearch

Ltd, UK

Shock Mitigation Seat Test and Evaluation Programme

J.Colwell, DRDC, Canada

© 2011: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects

Human Factors in Ship Design and Operation, 16 - 17 November 2011, London, UK

THE HUMAN ELEMENT COMPETENCY REQUIRED FOR DESIGN APPRAISAL

O Walker, Lloyd’s Register, UK

SUMMARY

One way for the human element to make an impact on a large scale is through inclusion of ergonomic requirements in

Class Rules. This can be achieved by two means; by introducing specific human element requirements into the Rules

and by making current rule requirements with human element implications more explicit. However, for surveyors who

assure Rule compliance, their knowledge or awareness of the human element is often poor or indeed absent. Any attempt

to address the human element in the Rules requires that the competence of surveyors is increased at the same time as the

Rules are revised. Raising awareness of the subject is an essential first step if the benefits of improved design are to be

realised. This paper outlines how Lloyd’s Register is striving to address the human element in the Rules whilst at the

same time putting in place mechanisms to ensure surveyor competency is met. The paper discusses the development of

internal human element awareness training, the first step towards achieving a competent workforce in this area.

NOMENCLATURE

ECL Ergonomic Container Lashing

(notation)

GBS Goal Based Standards

HEWG Human Element Working Group

IEC International Electrotechnical

Commission

ILO International Labour Organization

IMO International Maritime Organization

ISO International Organization for

Standardization

LR Lloyd’s Register

MLC Maritime Labour Convention

MSD Musculo-Skeletal Disorders

OSH Occupational Health and Safety

TC Technical Committee

1. INTRODUCTION

There is a growing awareness in the marine industry that

the human element needs to be considered in ship design

if seafarers are to operate a ship and its systems safely

and effectively. The traditional view which sees human

error as the individual responsibility of the officers and

the crew is simplistic and needs to change. There needs

to be a move to recognise the root cause of error which

can often be traced back to the design and build stage in

a ship’s lifecycle. These early stages of a ship’s lifecycle

present effective and practical opportunities for

mitigating some of the risks which the ship and its crew

would otherwise face when it enters into service.

The operational context onboard ship’s has changed and

there is evidence to suggest that these separate

developments may not be compatible. The seafarer

population is changing in terms of skills and competency.

Crew manning levels are reducing. The ship, its systems

and its equipment is becoming increasingly automated,

integrated and complex. Special consideration thus needs

to be made regarding usability and operability. There is a

danger that if this is not addressed, there will be major

repercussions for the industry.

Classification Rules and Regulations and Type Approval

are the main means of mitigating error in the design and

construction of ships and their components. Hence, the

inclusion of Human Element requirements in the Class

Rules and Regulations is one way to make a credible

impact on a large scale. Class provides a means, with

corresponding verification, to make far-reaching

improvements benefiting a large numbers of seafarers.

Addressing the human element both in the Rules and in

supporting consultancy services is an activity that is

strongly supported by senior staff in Lloyd’s Register

(LR) and by its Technical Committee. Addressing the

human element in the Rules is however a challenging

activity and one which has no quick win solution. The

process from concept through to approval of Rule

requirements is lengthy, and one where many hurdles

present themselves. This includes gaining acceptance

from both internal and external stakeholders. Internal

stakeholders such as surveyors need clear verifiable

requirements and mechanisms need to be put in place to

ensure they are able to competently verify ergonomic

Rule requirements. External stakeholders such as

shipyards are also critical, as they are often the body who

chooses the Classification Society. If Rule requirements

are too complex it will increase the cost of build and this

will be unappealing to the yards.

This paper will explore the testing nature of writing

ergonomic Rule requirements and the issues regarding

competency of surveyors who provide assurance of the

Rules.

2. CHALLENGES OF APPLYING

ERGONOMICS TO DESIGN

There are several problems that have contributed to the

challenges faced by ergonomists when it comes to safe

ship design. A principal challenge is that ergonomic

design for seafarers is largely not considered in the

marine environment. Although this is slowly changing,

the marine industry still needs to take considerable steps

if it is to catch up with other high hazard industries such

© 2011: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects

Human Factors in Ship Design and Operation, 16 - 17 November 2011, London, UK

as rail and aviation which have been proactive in

ergonomic design for many years.

An early challenge will be in educating designers and

other stakeholders of the benefits of ergonomics in

design. The reason why the industry still lags behind is

due to a distinct lack of knowledge among designers of

ships and their systems. Naval architects generally

receive little or no training in Occupational Safety and

Health (OSH) or work system design. The same can also

be said for Class Surveyors. In general, operational

design comes some way behind the classic 3 S’s that

dominate ship design, i.e. speed, strength and stability.

In March 2010, after several years of development, LR

launched its first ergonomic themed Rules notation –

Ergonomic Container Lashing (ECL). The notation is

currently optional but may become mandatory in time.

The intention of the optional notation is to improve the

safety of working arrangements for port workers and the

ship’s crew when performing container securing,

inspection and other related tasks. The problems faced in

developing, gaining approval, and achieving buy in for

the notation from surveyors are noteworthy. In critiquing

the work undertaken for ECL, several challenges for the

rules ergonomist emerged [1]. Many of the challenges

could be considered relevant for applying ergonomics in

ship design generally.

In order to understand the challenges faced, a brief

synopsise of the problems with current container ship

design is useful. Container securing carried out by port

workers is one of the most dangerous and physically

demanding jobs in the shipping industry. The main

hazards are falls from height, falls on the level, slips,

trips and musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs) [2]. There

are several working positions onboard where such

hazards are prevalent, these include; working on hatch

cover ends, working on outboard positions, working on

lashing bridges and working between container stacks on

hatch covers. The design of container ships is a

challenging high pace activity, where structural strength,

ship dynamics, carrying capacity and other factors

interact. In general, the main pressure on ship designers

is to ensure that the container stacks do not impair ship

safety, and that the containers are safely stowed. The role

of the port worker is generally not considered.

At the outset, addressing the design shortcomings to

create a safe and operable working environment for port

workers, appeared to be a relatively straightforward task.

The type of design requirements to address many of the

hazards could be described as relatively low cost, simple

measures. However the process of developing criteria

that were ergonomically sound and technically clear,

assessable and acceptable to all stakeholders including

surveyors was not without numerous challenges and

proved to be an immense learning curve for the Rules

Ergonomist. It is not unexpected that ergonomic

requirements proposed for inclusion in the Rules are

rigorously scrutinised by surveyors, as verification of

Class Rules will be their responsibility.

An essential element of developing criteria for ECL was

to gain approval and acceptance from surveyors. A

principal intention of the notation was that it be applied

and understood by surveyors with minimal support. Both

plan approval surveyors and field surveyors require well

written explicit rules. For the plan approval surveyor,

each applicable rule has to be checked against the ship’s

plans without any ambiguity. The field surveyor will be

required to check those aspects of the rules that can’t be

verified from plans.

Even though the criteria in ECL are fairly

straightforward the novelty of an ergonomic themed

notation was met with resistance where, in the opinion of

the surveyors, the requirements were unverifiable and

assessment of compliance was not straightforward.

Surveyors make judgements about engineering, but not

human behaviour. They are not trained to make

ergonomic judgements, thus some of the proposed

requirements in the notation that were not structurally

defined and could not be verified on plans had to be re￾evaluated. For any ergonomic requirements to be

accepted, a Rules ergonomist learns quickly that it is

essential that any criteria are defensible and they are of

scientific merit.

A further novel feature for surveyors in the notation and

one which could be applicable to many ergonomic design

scenarios onboard is the mitigation of occupational

health hazards. As stated earlier, the prevalence of MSDs

among port workers is a problem. Requirements in the

notation relating to occupational health often required

more justification to surveyors and designers possibly

because OSH is unfamiliar to them.

3. LR STRATEGY FOR RULES

DEVELOPMENT

A key part of the LR strategy for the human element is to

improve the way it is addressed in the Class Rules. The

principle that Class Rules should address the human

element comes from a decision of the LR Technical

Committee (TC) in 2007 and the theme of seafarer safety

comes from the extension of the LR mission statement to

emphasise safety and environment.

It is imperative that the strategic direction for human

element rules development is justifiable with clear

benefits if it is to be supported by the Marine Technical

Director and the TC. In order to develop the technical

scope of the strategy, the themes and human element

priority areas identified by the IMO Human Element

Working Group and the Goal Based Standards Working

Group have been examined. The strategy has also been

determined from the ILO Maritime Labour Convention

(MLC) and other industry initiatives such as the Alert

project. This examination has helped determine the

© 2011: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects

Human Factors in Ship Design and Operation, 16 - 17 November 2011, London, UK

forthcoming plan of work for addressing human element

in the Class Rules.

The IMO made a statement in a 2003 Resolution,

‘Human Element Vision, Principles and Goals for the

Organization vision’ [3]. While the Resolution was

devised to direct the work of IMO itself, it lays out an

approach that the human element should be addressed by

the wider marine industry. It acknowledges that ‘(the

human element) involves the entire spectrum of human

activities performed by ships’ crews, shore based

management, regulatory bodies, recognized

organizations, shipyards, legislators, and other relevant

parties, all of whom need to cooperate to address human

element issues effectively’.

IMO’s Human Element Working Group (HEWG), which

has up until now been convened at periodic sessions of

the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine

Environment Protection Committee, considers design as

well as operational matters. The HEWG has issued

Circulars to facilitate action. A ‘Checklist for

Considering Human Element Issues by IMO Bodies’ [4]

includes working environment and human factors

engineering criteria. In its ‘Framework for Consideration

of Ergonomics and Work Environment’ [5] it specifies

areas in which the efforts of IMO should be strengthened

in this regard. The identified design areas have a strong

link with Rules development. Included among the criteria

are stairs, vertical ladders, walkways and work platforms

and aspects of the working environment such as layout of

spaces, noise, climate and vibration.

The Human Element is further addressed by IMO’s Goal

Based Standards (GBS). MSC 296(87) stipulates ‘that

the rules incorporate human element and ergonomic

considerations into the structural design and arrangement

to facilitate operations, inspection and maintenance

activity’ [6].The priority areas closely align with those

raised by the HEWG and these will become part of our

statutory programme of work in Rules development.

The forthcoming implementation of the ILO MLC [7]

will also have implications for the Rules development

strategy. In addition to operational elements, the

Convention also stipulates some design

recommendations, for example, crew accommodation,

washroom facilities, lighting, noise and temperature

levels.

Another indication of what needs to be addressed comes

from the publication Alert! – The International Maritime

Human Element Bulletin [8]. Alert! is a Nautical Institute

project, sponsored by the Lloyd’s Register Educational

Trust, which has been hugely successful in improving

awareness of the human element in the marine industry

over the last number of years. Series 2 assembled a list of

top issues to be tackled as a priority. Included in the list

was addressing slips, trips and falls and automation and

alarm management, both of which are strongly rule

related.

Analysis of these themes and priorities has helped

develop a strategy for implementing the human element

in the Rules and has helped identify our programme of

work. Some Human Element themes relate to short or

long term harm to seafarers and will be addressed in part

through statutory instruments. Their inclusion in the

Rules will be determined by the schedule of the relevant

instrument. The Rules will detail the design requirements

to meet the statutory targets. These issues will include;

 Environmental targets (noise, vibration,

lighting, indoor climate, toxicity)

 MLC topics in particular accommodation and

thermal injury

Other themes in the GBS and HEWG strategy are

intended to be progressed entirely by Class. These are;

 Slips, trips and falls

 Access / egress

The intention is that slips, trips and falls will be the next

area of Rules development due to commence in 2012.

Slips, trips and falls are the leading cause of seafarer

injuries onboard commercial vessels and improving

design to reduce risks meets what industry stakeholders

need and expect.

There will be three stages to each piece of development

work: Research, Development and Approval (of

proposal). Each stage will take approximately a year

elapsed time. This time estimate has been based on our

current rule development work. Much of the required

time will be taken up in consultation with stakeholders

and waiting for feedback.

Rules development work for 2011 has seen proposed

requirements for ergonomic design of control stations. At

the time of writing this paper, the rules proposal is

awaiting approval from the TC due in late October. This

Rule proposal is discussed in more detail in the next

section of the paper.

4. RULES DEVELOPMENT

4.1 THE STORY SO FAR

The development of ergonomic requirements is not a

totally new concept to LR. The importance of this

discipline has been recognised in the development of

human element rule requirements for key elements in

other LR optional notations, for example Navigational

Arrangements (NAV1), Integrated Bridge Systems (IBS)

and Passenger and Crew Accommodation Comfort

(PCAC). Also, as mentioned earlier the first pure

ergonomic themed optional notation ECL was launched

in 2010. In development at present is another pure

© 2011: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects

Human Factors in Ship Design and Operation, 16 - 17 November 2011, London, UK

ergonomic optional notation for the offshore support

vessel (OSV) bridge. This notation will be called Ship

Control Centre (SCC) when launched.

As a result of the aforementioned 2007 TC request to

address human element in the Rules, the current focus

has moved onto developing mandatory requirements in

our core Rules. There are two possible means of

addressing human element in these Rules. It can be

achieved by introducing specific human element

requirements into the Rules or by making current rule

requirements with human element implications more

explicit.

In 2003, LR initiated a project to find out what the

society already said in its Rules with regard to the

Human Element [9]. The study found over 1000

requirements that had implicit human element

requirements. The findings from this project reinforced

the importance of addressing surveyor competency. If

surveyors are not educated in the human element it is

likely that they are not making inferences regarding

human behaviour in any of these implicit requirements.

There are some striking differences between having

mandatory requirements in the core Rules and

requirements in optional class notations. Some

immediate differences include the fact that any

mandatory requirements will be applicable to all ships

and not to just those who have opted for it. As such, a

balance must be struck that allows a best practice

approach but one that is realistically going to be

implemented on all vessels. If ergonomic requirements

are not pragmatic and are too sweeping, they will not be

accepted and the time taken during the development

stage will have been poorly spent. Further, there is going

to be an inevitable increase in human element

competency required by surveyors worldwide when

ergonomic requirements become part of the mandatory

class rules. As such, need for a human element surveyor

authorisation becomes paramount. This will be discussed

in the next section of the paper

4.2. CURRENT RULES DEVELOPMENT

In 2010, the first rule proposal was submitted for

approval to the TC as a result of their 2007 request. The

changes proposed related to the Electrical Engineering

Rules and are intended to contribute to improving the

safety of electrical installations on ships, represent good

practice and to be practical to implement. The proposal

was kept purposely short in scope in order to assess

receptiveness of the TC. The proposed requirements

which both introduced some new requirements and also

made some current requirements more explicit were

approved.

This year has seen a far more comprehensive and

ambitious proposal being put forward for approval that

addresses the human element in the control engineering

Rules. Around two years have elapsed, since inception of

the request to do the work, to the current stage where

imminent approval is awaited. The development of

sensible requirements for control stations can be

described as being relatively straightforward. The

challenge has been in making them pragmatic, verifiable

and acceptable to all stakeholders. These requirements

will become applicable to all LR Classed vessels, so they

need to be thoroughly researched, developed and be of

good quality ergonomics.

The existing control engineering Rules already have

some intentional human element requirements. However,

surveyor feedback indicates that the full intent of some of

these requirements is not always fully understood and

their intended benefits are thus not necessarily achieved.

The scope, of these same requirements, doesn’t include

all elements of the control work space. There are for

instance, no requirements relating to either the physical

work environment or the physical layout of control

stations in the present requirements. The current Rules

proposal therefore intends to address both the

explicitness and scope of the current human element

requirements.

This ergonomic Rule proposal is more ambitious as we

are seeking for it to have its own section within the

Control Engineering Rules Chapter. This section would

be sub-divided covering physical layout of control

stations, the physical operator working environment, the

operator interface, controls and displays. The overall goal

of this proposed set of requirements is to enhance

operational performance, reduce risks to safety and to

reduce the likelihood of human error.

The Rule proposal has been developed using a

combination of International Standards. There are no

specific IMO, ISO or IEC marine standards for ship

control rooms per se, so a range of standards specific for

bridge design, engine room design and general control

room design have been applied. The proposal attempts to

bring control station design to a standard comparable to

the bridge by taking the applicable good design

principles from the bridge standards and transferring

them to control station design.

5. SURVEYOR COMPETENCY

REQUIREMENTS

As ergonomic Rule requirements increase, the

competency of surveyors needs to increase at the same

time. The verification of any ergonomic requirements in

the Rules will be undertaken by surveyors. LR is not

intending to employ large numbers of ergonomists in

place of surveyors to assure ergonomic requirements.

However, there may be special cases, for example the

SCC notation (when launched), which may require

ergonomists to provide assistance to plan approval

surveyors. This is because the notation has some very

© 2011: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects

Human Factors in Ship Design and Operation, 16 - 17 November 2011, London, UK

complex ergonomic requirements that would be outside

surveyor remit.

Surveyors provide feedback during the course of the rule

development process. In order that they provide valuable

feedback and also engage, with what is intended to be

achieved, they need to have competency in the human

element.

As discussed earlier, surveyors are trained to make

decisions about engineering not human behaviour.

Therefore, the need to have a Human Element

Competency framework for surveyors is equally as

important as any new human element Rule requirements

themselves. Similar to Rules development, a programme

of work has been developed to meet this need.

In order to develop an appropriate training programme a

Training Needs Analysis (TNA) was conducted in the

first instance.

5.1 TRAINING NEEDS ANALYSIS

It is normal when doing a Training Needs Analysis to

have user tasks pre-defined. Here, however, the analysis

is proceeding on the basis of material to be learned.

Therefore, we need to define tasks before we can identify

the training gap in terms of knowledge, skills and

attitudes (KSA) and then work out training delivery. To

some extent, the tasks and the KSA are being developed

together in this analysis.

5.1 (a) Surveyor Tasks to incorporate operational

design

There are some surveyor tasks that would have an

indirect affect on operational design. Approving

workshop practice, for example welding, is an example

of that. The bulk of the surveyor’s tasks, however, can

have a significant and direct impact on operational

design. The tasks to be considered are:

 Plan approval (hull and structure, machinery,

controls and systems)

 Initial survey, sea trials

 Periodic surveys

 ISM audits

 Regulatory survey

5.1 (b) Knowledge, Skills and Attitudes

If surveyors are to be expected to verify human element

requirements in the Rules, we need to ensure they are

provided with baseline knowledge of the subject. They

will first and foremost need to gain an understanding as

to what the human element is and be persuaded of its

importance in the marine industry and in their day to day

duties. Surveyors will need to know some material – or at

least enough to know where to find material - and when

to seek assistance with non-routine matters.

The craft skills to be developed for the application of the

human element to Rules include being able to conduct an

informal context of use analysis and to identify critical

factors in the range of contexts that may be encountered,

for example language differences.

The attitude that needs to be developed among surveyors

is one where they begin to think about operability as

similar to other aspects of safety. There may be areas

where poor usability is irrelevant, and this needs to be

acknowledged but the prevalence of areas where it is an

error-producing condition needs to be appreciated.

5.2 TRAINING DELIVERY PROPOSALS

In the first instance, there will be a human element

awareness raising course developed. This course will be

fairly basic in scope, as it needs to lay the foundations for

education in this subject. The intention is that this course

will be completed by all marine surveyors. To address

the findings of the KSA analysis the course will cover

the following topics:

 The benefits of addressing the human element

 The relevance of the human element in design,

build and operation in a rapidly changing

marine environment (new technology, changing

seafarer population)

 Regulatory expectations with respect to the

human element

 The people aspects of system design (both the

effect of (Occupational Health and Safety) and

affect of people (‘human error’) with respect to

hazards)

 Context of Use analysis for design evaluation of

Human Element issues

 Information on where to access human element

material

Further training needs will be met as the Rules develop

in specific areas. Specific topic areas are required for the

different types of survey task. For example, the control

station Rules, expected to be approved in November

2011, will require specific training and guidance for

electrotechnical surveyors. Both a guidance document

will be developed to support these new Rule

requirements and training will be developed tailored to

the needs of surveyors assuring these requirements.

The competence of surveyors performing statutory

surveys to apply the increasing number of human

element regulations also needs to be addressed.

5.3 TRAINING DESIGN

The human element awareness raising course will need

to be completed by all marine staff who work in: field

survey, plan approval survey, statutory survey or design

support for new construction or existing ships. In order to

reach such a global community, it has been decided that

© 2011: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects

Human Factors in Ship Design and Operation, 16 - 17 November 2011, London, UK

the training will be provided through e-learning

accompanied by an online assessment. E-Learning is a

widely used training method adopted by LR and has been

considered the most practical approach to take for this

course.

The course is currently in the process of being

developed. At the time of writing this paper, the draft

storyboard had been devised and work is due to

commence with a third party training company shortly.

The intended roll out of the course will be the first

quarter of 2012.

5.4 IMPLEMENTING TRAINING

Implementing a training course particularly on a novel

subject brings a range of challenges. However, the

human element is now part of the LR Surveyor

Competency Framework. This has added considerable

weight to the training course as it will assist with its take

up. As part of the competency scheme, it will become a

prerequisite for all surveyors to undertake the training.

Successful completion of the training course and

assessment will become the means to assess the surveyor

competency in human element.

The success of the course will be measured by the

number of queries received from surveyors. We do not

expect surveyors to make expertise-based human element

decisions but we do hope that they will be able to

recognise human element issues and will seek assistance

from a human element specialist when required.

As the Rules develop in the different engineering areas,

and specific training is developed, these training courses

will become part of the competency schemes within the

specialised domains.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The need to address the human element in design is

essential if seafarers are to be able to operate a modern

ship and its systems safely and effectively. Class Rules

and Regulations are the main means of mitigating human

error in the design and construction of ships and their

components. Hence, the inclusion of human element

requirements in the Rules is one way of making a

credible impact on a large scale.

Rule development is a challenging activity. The process

is lengthy with no quick win solution. There are internal

and external stakeholders who bring a diverse range of

needs that have to be addressed. There is also a

considerable amount of persuading that needs to be done

in order to gain buy-in.

In developing good quality ergonomic rules, it is

essential that they are verifiable and pragmatic. They

need to be in a language that is understood by non￾ergonomists and for which compliance assessment is

straightforward.

The competency of surveyors needs to improve at the

same time as rules develop. Surveyor competency in the

human element becomes essentially as important as any

new rule requirements, as they will be the group who

provide assurance that the Rules are satisfied. This is a

huge task that can only be achieved through awareness

raising (such as Alert!) and training.

7. REFERENCES

1. WALKER, O., EARTHY, J., SHERWOOD

JONES, B. and TOZER, D., ‘Safety onboard

ship. A case study in the transition from science

to enforcement’, Lloyd’s Register, UK, 2010.

2. SHERWOOD JONES, B., ‘Ergonomic design

of container ships to facilitate container

securing’, Lloyd’s Register, UK, 2008.

3. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME

ORGANIZATION, ‘Resolution A.947(23),

Human Element Vision, Principles and Goals

for the Organization’, IMO, 2004.

4. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME

ORGANIZATION, MSC-MEPC.7/Circ,

‘Checklist for Considering Human Element

Issues by IMO Bodies’, IMO, 2006.

5. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME

ORGANIZATION, MSC-MEPC.7/Circ,

‘Framework for Consideration of Ergonomics

and Work Environment’, IMO, 2006.

6. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME

ORGANIZATION, MSC.296(87), ‘Adoption of

the Guidelines for Verification of Conformity

with Goal-Based Ship Construction Standards

for Bulk Carriers and Oil Tankers’, IMO, 2010.

7. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR

ORGANIZATION, ‘Maritime Labour

Convention’, ILO, 2006.

8. NAUTICAL INSTITUTE, ‘Alert! The

International Maritime Human Element

Bulletin’, The Nautical Institute, 2003-present.

9. ANTONIO, L. and EARTHY, J.V., ‘The

Human Element in Class Rules’, Lloyd’s

Register, 2003.

© 2011: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects

Human Factors in Ship Design and Operation, 16 - 17 November 2011, London, UK

8. AUTHOR’S BIOGRAPHY

Olivia Walker is a Senior Human Element Specialist in

Lloyd’s Register’s Marine Product Development

department. Her role involves establishing the human

element in the Rule for Ships, managing ergonomic

Rules projects and developing human element training

for LR surveyors. She also participates in human element

training for Chinese and Korean shipyards. She has a

background in occupational psychology and has

previously worked as a researcher for the rail industry’s

confidential reporting organisation, CIRAS. At CIRAS

she ascertained safety concerns amongst railway

employees and identified themes and trends in the UK’s

rail industry. Previous to this role she worked for a

human factors consultancy where she conducted

qualitative and quantitative analysis for HSE, FSA and

ABI projects.

Lloyd's Register, its affiliates and subsidiaries and their

respective officers, employees or agents are, individually

and collectively, referred to in this clause as the 'Lloyd's

Register Group'. The Lloyd's Register Group assumes no

responsibility and shall not be liable to any person for

any loss, damage or expense caused by reliance on the

information or advice in this document or howsoever

provided, unless that person has signed a contract with

the relevant Lloyd's Register Group entity for the

provision of this information or advice and in that case

any responsibility or liability is exclusively on the terms

and conditions set out in that contract.

© 2011: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects

Human Factor in Ship Design and Operation, 16 - 17 Nov. 2011, London, UK

THE HUMAN FACTOR IN THE INVESTIGATION OF MARINE CASUALTIES,

AMENDMENTS TO MANILA STCW78/95 2010.

J Alvite Castro and R M De la Campa Portela, A Coruña University, Spain.

SUMMARY

Due to the rebound experienced by maritime accidents in 2010, the investigation of marine casualties requires

information on the human factor, particularly in the organizational factors and ergonomics. This study was carried out to

develop a systematic series of actions to implement the method ILO / IMO, based on amendments to STCW78 Manila

2010.The result serves to facilitate the identification and sequencing of acts or dangerous decisions that have been

involved in the development of maritime casualty as well as the underlying factors behind them. The aim is to finally

determine the existing safety problems and to develop appropriate corrective measures and their inclusion in the

"European Maritime Casualty Information Platform" (EMCIP).

1. INTRODUCTION

Technological advances in maritime sector have been

incorporated to the different fleets in a very dynamic way,

while human element has remained in a static position as

a basic component, with all its virtues and defects. In

past times safety was reached by two ways:

implementing technological and engineering solutions to

improve safety and to minimize the consequences of

maritime accidents, and through safety legislation on

ships project and equipment requirements. However and

despite of the technical innovations, maritime casualties

and incidents are still happening.

At first, maritime accidents investigations used to

attribute almost the whole accident responsibility to crew

and shore personnel. This implies that individual factor

was considered be the main causal factor. However when

maritime accidents investigations were made in depth, it

was reached the conclusion that, in the worst case, 80%

of maritime accidents are due to, among other causal

factors, work organization and ergonomic problems.

So, work organization and ergonomics seem to be the

main causes of human error, defined by International

Maritime Organization (IMO) as: “A departure from

acceptable or desirable practice on the part of an

individual or group of individuals that can result in

unacceptable or undesirable results” [1]

On the other hand, in 2010, an in depth revision on 78/95

International Convention on Standards of Training

Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW 78/95)[3] was

made. The amendments resulted from this revision

should be added to the whole of acting elements involved

in maritime accidents development and, of course, in

their subsequent factual investigation.

In 2010 the rate of fatal accidents in Europe experienced

an increase of 17% compared with 2009 one, as it is

shown in Figure 1.

This Figure also shows that fishing sector is the subsector

with higher fatal accidents rate, accounting 33% over the

whole. Spain Northwest region (Galicia) has one of the

biggest fishing fleet in Europe [6]. 40% of fatal accidents

in fishing sector happened in Galician fleet, so we

consider Galician fleet data on maritime accidents as

significant in European field.

Figure 1. EMSA. Maritime Accident Review 2010

Figure 2.ISSGA. Number of accidents in Galician fishing

fleet.

We can see, from data in Figure 2, an increase in the

number serious accidents. The long term effects of such

accidents prevent the return of workers to their jobs [7].

This breakdown in the downward trend, with and

increase of 28% on ships involved in accidents and 17%

on deaths in 2010, leads us to conclude that maritime

accidents investigation needs a new development on its

more important element, human factor, especially on the

more frequent incidence factors: work organization and

ergonomics [8].

Figure 3 shows that collisions are the maritime casualties

with higher number of ships involved, followed by

groundings. This gives us the approximate value of one

life lost every 9.5 ship accidents in European Union.

© 2011: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects

Human Factor in Ship Design and Operation, 16 - 17 Nov. 2011, London, UK

Figure3.Number of vessels involved in accidents

EMSA. Maritime Accident Review 2010

In this article the systematic and gradual ILO/IMO

process for human factors investigation and the models

used for identification and sequence of events are

improved through a systematic series of actions and

dispositions mainly based on 2010 Manila amendments

to STCW 78/95 Convention. The ILO/IMO process was

chosen because it includes the models used by the most

important Maritime Accident Investigation Committees,

such as British Maritime Accident Investigation Branch,

North American Coastguard and the European Maritime

Safety Agency.

The resulting models, once optimization is done, are

updated following the current legislation and could be

added to maritime accidents investigation methodology;

so that it is obtained a substantial improvement of

aforementioned process and the possibility of extrapolate

it to other models used in the future.

2. MATERIALS AND METHODS

We take as a starting point that every maritime accident

is due to a series of circumstances and actions. On this

multi-causality basis we can classify an accident in

accordance with its main causal factor: technical factor or

human factor.

The material circumstances or conditions that can lead to

an accident are known as technical factors. On the other

hand human factors bring together factors, circumstances

and conditions that can influence, in a positive or

negative way, seafarers behaviour and reliability. These

factors are related to individual characteristics,

ergonomics and work organization that are the basis of

maritime transport.

Human Factors consist of personal factors and social

factors [9]. Personal factors in turn consist of individual

factors, and work organization and ergonomic factors.

The former ones are such as age, physical and mental

condition, training and experience, competence to face

risk and to team work and, mainly, stress and fatigue [2].

Work organization and ergonomic factors are, among

others, ergonomic design of equipment and instruments,

working and rest hours, workload, division of tasks and

responsibilities, complexity of tasks and maintenance

management.

Social or Environment factors are, among others,

temperature, noise, visibility, vibration, weather and sea

conditions.

Another classification of maritime accidents attending

the starting causes could be:

 Root causes:

- Personal factors: inadequate training and

certification, physical or mental

impairment, fatigue and stress.

- Working factors: inadequate regulation

and poor maintenance.

 Immediate causes:

- Unsafe actions: to do task without

certification, training and/or adequate

protection equipment.

- Unsafe conditions: the lack of protection

equipment, noise and vibration.

In addition, STCW78/95 Convention and Code

establishes in detail the required skills to develop several

tasks, the level of knowledge and understanding required

to perform such tasks, the methods to demonstrate

competence and criteria to assess it.

Following the Manila amendments to STCW 78/95 are

listed and summarized.

PART A

Chapter I. General provisions







Increase of safety measures related to training

certificates. An electronic register tool to be

accessed by Parties in a controlled and safe way

could be used to verify seafarers’ identification,

training and medical data, allowed functions and

limitations.

Training and assessment processes shall be done

by qualified personnel. Reports containing

measures adopted by Member States to give full

effectiveness to the Convention should be

prepared.

Standards related to medical fitness for seafarers.

Chapter II. Master and deck department







Mandatory minimum requirement for

certification of masters, deck officers and

ratings forming part of a navigational watch,

related to celestial navigation, automatic radar

plotting aids and radar requirements.

Training for maritime environment awareness.

Leadership and team work.

Training related to vessel traffic services.

Chapter III. Engine department

 Requirements for coastal navigation.

© 2011: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects

Human Factor in Ship Design and Operation, 16 - 17 Nov. 2011, London, UK

 Training requirements for Electro-technical

officers.

 Training for maritime environment awareness.

Leadership and team working skills

 Updating of engineers competence

 Requirements for engine room ratings

certification.

Chapter IV. Radio Communication and Radio Operators

 The Radio Operators Services are updated to

reflect current regulations. The International

Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue

Manual (IAMSAR) is mentioned.

Chapter V. Special training requirements for personnel

on certain types of ships

 Mandatory minimum requirements for the

training and qualifications of personnel on oil

and chemical tankers, and liquefied gas tankers.

 Mandatory minimum requirements for the

training and qualifications of personnel on

passenger ships

Chapter VI. Emergency, occupational safety, security,

medical care and survival functions.

 New requirements to maintain professional

competence in areas where training cannot be

done on board.

 New requirements for security training and

dispositions to guarantee that seafarers are

properly trained to face a piracy attack.

Chapter VII. Alternative certification

 Changes done to other Chapters are mentioned,

even the additional requirements for ratings

certification and specifications for approved

deep sea services.

 Training required to certificate candidates to

several functions at the support level.

Chapter VIII. Watchkeeping

 Harmonization of rest hours with ILO 2006

Convention on Maritime Work requirements

with the aim of reducing fatigue and to assure

watckeeping capability.

 Updated and extended requirements on working

and rest hours.

 New requirement for alcohol and drug abuse

prevention.

PART B “Recommended guidance regarding provisions

of the STCW Convention and its Annex”

Convention and those involved in implementing,

applying or enforcing its measures, among others:

 Specific training on Electronic chart display

units and simulators.

 Prevention of alcohol and drug abuse on board.

 Implementation of online training methodology.

Within the framework of tacit acceptance procedure,

2010 Manila amendments will enter into force on 1

January 2012. International Convention on Standards of

Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for fishing

vessels personnel (STCW-F 95) will enter into force on

29 September 2012.

As central part of this article, the adjustment of the

IMO/ILO process for investigation human factors to

2010 Manila amendments was made. The results of such

an adjustment are detailed below.

3. RESULTS

Within the purposes of this study it is necessary to give

priority to methods for maritime accidents investigation

that allow to clarify if work organization and ergonomic

factors were causal factors in the accident. The most

advisable method is the ILO/IMO process for

investigating human factors due to the step-by-step

systematic approach given to the investigation. The

process steps are linked to each other as it is shown in

Figure 4.

This part of the STCW Code contains recommended

guidance intended to assist Parties to the STCW

© 2011: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects

Human Factor in Ship Design and Operation, 16 - 17 Nov. 2011, London, UK

The results obtained from the adaptation of each step of

ILO/IMO process to 2010 Manila amendments to STCW

78/95 Convention are following detailed.

Step 1 and 2: Collect occurrence data and determine

occurrence sequence.

The first step in the human factors investigation process

is the collection of work-related information regarding

the personnel, tasks, equipment, and environmental

conditions involved in the occurrence using SHEL model

(Figure 5)

The figure of “elected delegate” should be established

between the investigator and witnesses to help

trustworthy data transmission. SHEL model can be

combined with REASON model of accident causation to

develop and occurrence sequence [4] [5]. The occurrence

sequence is developed by arranging the information

regarding occurrence events and circumstances around

one of five production elements, i.e., decision makers,

line management, preconditions, productive activities,

and defence. At the same time the concept of active

versus latent or underlying factors is introduced.

Active factors are the final events or circumstances

which led to and occurrence. Within the objectives of

this article, active factors specified in 2010 Manila

amendments to STCW 78/95, such as drug and alcohol

abuse, medical standards, etc., should be added to usual

ones.

Underlying factors may reside at both the personal and

the organizational levels; they may be present in the

conditions that exist within a given work system.

Examples of latent factor are: inadequate rules and

procedures, insufficient training, high workload and

undue time pressure. Latent factors came from 2010

Manila amendments should be included: harmonization

of rest hours to reduce fatigue, application of leadership

and team working skills, specific training on electronic

chart display units, etc. It would be very interesting to the

investigator to have the possibility of accessing to

electronic certificate registration, specified in Chapter A￾I/2 of amended STCW 78/95, and to EMSA STCW

Information System which is nowadays in its second

phase of development.

Step 3 – Identify unsafe acts/decisions and conditions

In step 3 of the process, the information gathered and

organized using the SHEL and Reason frameworks is

used to initiate identification of causal factors, i.e.,

unsafe acts/decisions and conditions.

An unsafe act is defined as an error or violation that is

committed in the presence of a hazard or potential unsafe

condition. Decisions where there are no apparent

resultant actions but which have a negative impact on

safety should also be considered as unsafe acts.

An unsafe condition or hazard, as noted above, is an

event or circumstance that has the potential to result in a

mishap. Once an unsafe act, decision or condition has

been identified, the next stage is to determine the genesis

of that particular act or condition. The last unsafe act

precipitating the occurrence often provides a convenient

starting point for reconstruction of the occurrence.

Step 4 – Identify error or violation type

Figure 6 shows the GEMS framework adapted to 2010

Manila amendments to STCW 78/95.

© 2011: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects

Human Factor in Ship Design and Operation, 16 - 17 Nov. 2011, London, UK

This portion of the process is initiated for each unsafe

act/decision by posing the simple question "What is

erroneous or wrong about the action or decision that

eventually made it unsafe?".

Step 4 involves two sub-steps:

 Sub-step 1. Unintentional or intentional action.

First it is necessary to determine whether the

error or violation was an unintentional or

intentional action. Unintentional actions are

actions that do not go as planned; these are

errors in execution. On the other hand

intentional actions are actions that are carried

out as planned but the actions are inappropriate;

these are errors in planning.

 Sub-step 2. Error type or violation. The second

sub-step is the selection of the error type or

violation that best describes the failure, keeping

in mind the decision regarding intentionality.

There are four potential error/violation

categories, i.e., slip, lapse, mistake and violation.

A slip is an unintentional action where the

failure involves attention. These are errors in

execution. A lapse is an unintentional action

where the failure involves memory. These are

also errors in execution. A mistake is an

intentional action, but there is no deliberate

decision to act against a rule or plan. These are

errors in planning. A violation is a planning

failure where a deliberate decision to act against

a rule or plan has been made. Routine violations

occur everyday as people regularly modify or do

not strictly comply with work procedures.

Step 5 – Identify underlying factors

In this step the investigator attempts to reveal the

relationship between the occurrence errors/violations and

the behaviour that lead to them. Such behaviour consists

of a decision and an action or movement. In step 3, the

action or decision was identified. In step 4, what was

erroneous regarding that action or decision was revealed.

In step 5, the focus is on uncovering the underlying

causes behind the act or decision of an individual or

group. Among the underlying causes special mention

should be made to those contained in 2010 Manila

amendments to STCW 78/95 Convention. Underlying

causes of particular importance are those that could make

easier the removal of factors that led to working system

failure, such as fatigue, noise, vibration and bad smell.

These factors are known as underlying factors. They can

be found by examining the work system information

collected and organized using the SHEL or Reason

frameworks in steps 1 and 2.

Step 6 - Identify potential safety problems and develop

safety actions

Once underlying factors and safety problems are

identified an exhaustive list of safety actions should be

developed. These measures have to be implemented over

the fleet with the aim of reducing to a minimum the

possibility of recurrence. One of the main tasks of

Occupational Risk Prevention legislators is to avoid

accident repetition. With the goal of an effective

implementation, these safety actions have to be

economically feasible whether for the inherent saving

derived from their use, or with the help of specific grant

actions.

4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

A step by step systematic method to the identification of

human factors in maritime accidents was obtained. This

method is adapted to 2010 Manila amendments to STCW

78/95 Convention and Code. Models from ILO/IMO

process for investigating human factors were used.

Ergonomics and work organization factors were

identified as the main causal factors in maritime

accidents, and fatigue is the main underlying factor that

leads to such accidents. So it is of vital importance to

introduce Chapters AVIII and BVIII of Manila

amendments to STCW 78/95 into the accident

investigation method, at it is shown in Figure 5.

The main steps in maritime accident investigation are to

collect occurrence data and to determine occurrence

sequence, which are Steps 1 and 2 in ILO/IMO process

for human factors investigation. Occurrence data should

be obtained as soon as possible mainly interviewing

witnesses directly. Sometimes this direct interview is not

possible, so it seems interesting to consider if it would be

advisable to allow a crew member to start the

investigation in some particular cases, avoiding the

destruction of evidences that could be used to clarify

accident causes. At the same time it would be necessary

to train some crew members in maritime accident

investigation techniques, including this knowledge in

maritime education and training curriculum.

The figure of “elected delegate” should be established

between the investigator and witnesses to help

trustworthy data transmission. Such data should be later

incorporated to methods used in human factors

investigation. Regarding this elected delegate and with

the aim of being an effective figure in maritime accident

investigation it seems interesting to consider if it would

be advisable to have an appointed person in each

Harbour Master’s Office or local body in charge of

maritime navigation. This delegate must be trained in

maritime accidents investigation. At the same time this

person must be independent so that he could demonstrate

full objectivity. In the case of fishing ships this figure

could be a member of fishermen associations.

© 2011: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects