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Twin surveys of senior public relations executives and public relations majors compared perceptual similarities and differences in leadership qualities, skill development sources, and unique features of public relations leadership. The perceptual gap revealed what students believe to be important or less important in the self-actualization process as future leaders. The results offered pedagogical recommendations on how to integrate leadership training in public relations education to prepare students with a sustainable competitive advantage
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Twin surveys of senior public relations executives and public relations majors compared perceptual similarities and differences in leadership qualities, skill development sources, and unique features of public relations leadership. The perceptual gap revealed what students believe to be important or less important in the self-actualization process as future leaders. The results offered pedagogical recommendations on how to integrate leadership training in public relations education to prepare students with a sustainable competitive advantage

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Theoretical Computer Science 628 (2016) 78–91

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Theoretical Computer Science

www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs

Relations between robustness and RKA security under

public-key encryption

Hui Cui ∗, Yi Mu, Man Ho Au

School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Wollongong NSW2522, Australia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history:

Received 26 May 2014

Received in revised form 7 March 2015

Accepted 9 March 2016

Available online 14 March 2016

Communicated by X. Deng

Keywords:

Robustness

Related-key attack

Public-key encryption

We revisit the notions of robustness introduced by Abdalla, Bellare and Neven (TCC 2010),

and related-key attack (RKA) security raised by Bellare, Cash and Miller (ASIACRYPT 2011).

In the setting of public-key encryption (PKE), robustness means that it is hard to produce

a ciphertext that is valid for two different users, while RKA security means that a PKE

scheme is still secure even when an attacker can induce modifications in a decryption

key, and subsequently observe the outcome of this PKE scheme under this modified key.

In this paper, we explore the relationship between RKA security and various notions of

robustness (weak, strong, complete, and so so). We show, there is no implication between

weak (strong) robustness and RKA security while complete robustness implies RKA security

but is not implied by RKA security; besides complete robustness, there exist other ROB

definitions that can imply RKA security if they meet some security requirements. This

result provides a different framework enabling the construction of PKE schemes that are

secure under the restricted related key attacks. Also, we instantiate how a robust PKE

scheme achieves RKA security, and compare it with other existing ways of achieving RKA

security in public-key setting.

© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The crucial security requirement of encryption is providing privacy of the encrypted data, i.e. data privacy. To capture

various requirements of data privacy, formalizations like indistinguishability or non-malleability [15] under either chosen

plaintext attacks (CPA) [17] or chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) are proposed. In recent years, user privacy has become

an equally relevant concern, which leads to anonymity, to be another pursued goal in encryption schemes. Anonymity,

also known as key privacy, was introduced in [4], meaning that a ciphertext does not leak any information about the

public key under which it was created, thereby making the communication anonymous. Under this scenario, a fundamental

question was raised in [1]: how does a legal user know whether or not an anonymous ciphertext is intended for him

or her? Furthermore, what will happen if a decryption key on a ciphertext was not created for it? To address this issue,

robustness was put forward in [1], which guarantees that decryption fails with high possibility if the “wrong” decryption

key is used.

* Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: hc892@uowmail.edu.au (H. Cui), ymu@uow.edu.au (Y. Mu), aau@uow.edu.au (M.H. Au).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2016.03.015

0304-3975/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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