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The Balance of power in world history
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The Balance of Power in
World History
Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little and
William C. Wohlforth
Edited by
The Balance of Power in World History
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Also by Stuart J. Kaufman
MODERN HATREDS: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War
Also by Richard Little
THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD (co-editor with John
Williams)
THE BALANCE OF POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BELIEF SYSTEMS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (co-editor with Steve Smith)
GLOBAL PROBLEMS AND WORLD ORDER (co-author with R.D. Mckinlay)
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS IN WORLD HISTORY (co-author with Barry Buzan)
INTERVENTION: EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL WAR
ISSUES IN WORLD POLITICS (3rd edition) (co-editor with Brian White and
Michael Smith)
THE LOGIC OF ANARCHY (co-author with Barry Buzan and Charles A. Jones)
PERSPECTIVES ON WORLD POLITICS (3rd edition) (co-editor with Michael Smith)
Also by William C. Wohlforth
COLD WAR ENDGAME (editor)
ELUSIVE BALANCE AND PERCEPTIONS IN THE COLD WAR
WITNESSES TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR (editor)
WORLD OUT OF BALANCE: International Relations Theory and the Challenge
of American Primacy (co-author with Stephen G. Brooks)
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The Balance of Power in
World History
Edited by
Stuart J. Kaufman
Department of Political Science and International Relations
University of Delaware, USA
Richard Little
Department of Politics
University of Bristol, UK
and
William C. Wohlforth
Department of Government
Dartmouth College, USA
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Editorial matter, selection, introduction and conclusion © Stuart
J. Kaufman, Richard Little and William C. Wohlforth 2007
All remaining chapters © respective authors
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.
No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90
Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP.
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this
work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2007 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
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PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave
Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.
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ISBN 13: 978–0–230–50710–4 hardback
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This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully
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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The balance of power in world history / edited by Stuart J. Kaufman,
Richard Little, William C. Wohlforth.
p. cm.
Papers presented at a workshop on Hierarchy and Balance in
International Systems held at Dartmouth College, October 18–20, 2003.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-230-50710-7 (alk. paper)
1. Balance of power – History – Congresses. 2. International relations –
History – Congresses. I. Kaufman, Stuart J. II. Little, Richard, 1944–
III. Wohlforth, William Curti, 1959–
JZ1313.B34 2007
327.1′1209–dc22 2007021646
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
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Contents
List of Tables and Maps vii
Acknowledgments viii
Biographies ix
1 Introduction: Balance and Hierarchy in International
Systems 1
William C. Wohlforth, Stuart J. Kaufman and Richard Little
2 Balancing and Balancing Failure in Biblical Times:
Assyria and the Ancient Middle Eastern System,
900–600 BCE 22
Stuart J. Kaufman and William C. Wohlforth
3 The Greek City-States in the Fifth Century BCE:
Persia and the Balance of Power 47
Richard Little
4 Intra-Greek Balancing, the Mediterranean Crisis
of c. 201–200 BCE, and the Rise of Rome 71
Arthur M. Eckstein
5 The Forest and the King of Beasts: Hierarchy and Opposition
in Ancient India (c. 600–232 BCE) 99
William J. Brenner
6 The Triumph of Domination in the Ancient Chinese System 122
Victoria Tin-bor Hui
7 ‘A Republic for Expansion’: The Roman Constitution
and Empire and Balance-of-Power Theory 148
Daniel Deudney
8 Hierarchy and Resistance in American State-Systems
1400–1800 CE 176
Charles A. Jones
9 Stability and Hierarchy in East Asian International Relations,
1300–1900 CE 199
David C. Kang
v
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10 Conclusion: Theoretical Insights from the Study of
World History 228
Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little and William C. Wohlforth
Appendix A 247
Bibliography 250
Index 273
vi Contents
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List of Tables and Maps
Tables
2.1 Summary of Balancing Behavior in Key Periods 42
9.1 East Asian Political Systems, 1200–1900 202
9.2 Per Capita Levels of Industrialization (UK in 1900=100) 205
9.3 Relative Shares of World Manufacturing (in percentages) 206
9.4 Quantities of Tribute During the Ming Era 208
9.5 Chinese Data for Ships Visiting Japan, 1641–1683 209
9.6 Japanese Silver Exports, 1648–1672 210
9.7 East Asia and Europe over the Last Six Centuries 215
10.1 Frequency in Decades of Different System Polarities 231
Maps
Map 2.1 The Assyrian Empire, c. 860 BCE 24
Map 2.2 The Assyrian Empire, c. 730 BCE 34
Map 2.3 The Assyrian Empire, c. 705 BCE 36
Map 2.4 The Assyrian Empire, c. 640 BCE 39
Map 5.1 Northeast Indian Kingdoms and Republics,
c. 600–450 BCE 105
Map 6.1 Ancient China in the Middle to Late Spring and
Autumn Period 124
Map 6.2 Ancient China, c. 450 BCE 125
Map 6.3 Ancient China, c. 350 BCE 126
Map 6.4 Ancient China, c. 257 BCE 127
vii
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Acknowledgments
This volume is the product of a workshop on Hierarchy and Balance in
International Systems that took place at Dartmouth College, October
18–20, 2003. We are grateful to the Department of Government for
hosting the workshop and to the John Sloan Dickey Center for
International Understanding for sponsoring the workshop.
viii
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Biographies
William J. Brenner is a doctoral candidate in the Department of
Political Science at Johns Hopkins University.
Daniel Deudney is Associate Professor of political science at Johns
Hopkins University. His most recent book is Bounding Power: Republican
Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village (2007).
Arthur M. Eckstein is Professor of History at the University of Maryland
at College Park. He is the author of three books, an edited book, and
some 45 articles, mostly dealing with Roman imperial expansion under
the Republic, and Greek perceptions of that phenomenon, but ranging
into the ancient historical foundations of political science – and as far
afield as American culture in the 1950s. His latest book is Mediterranean
Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome (2006).
Victoria Tin-bor Hui is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at
the University of Notre Dame. She is author of War and State Formation
in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe (2005), which won the
2006 Jervis-Schroeder Award from the American Political Science
Association and the 2005 Edgar S. Furniss Book Award from the
Ohio State University’s Mershon Center for International Security
Studies.
Charles A. Jones studied philosophy and history at Cambridge.
Originally a specialist in the political history of international business
he taught international political economy at the University of Warwick
before moving to Cambridge to teach international relations theory in
1998.
David C. Kang is Associate Professor of Government, and Adjunct
Associate Professor and Research Director at the Center for International
Business at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. Kang is author of
China Reshapes East Asia: Power, Politics, and Ideas in International
Relations (forthcoming). He received an A.B. with honors from Stanford
University and his Ph.D. from Berkeley.
ix
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Stuart J. Kaufman is Professor of Political Science and International
Relations at the University of Delaware. His previous book is entitled,
Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (2001).
Richard Little is Professor of International Politics at the University of
Bristol. He is a former editor of the Review of International Studies and a
former president of the British International Studies Association. He is
the co-author with Barry Buzan of International Systems in World History
(2000). His most recent book is The Balance of Power in International
Relations: Metaphors, Myths, and Models (2007).
William C. Wohlforth is Professor of Government at Dartmouth
College. He is the author of Elusive Balance and Perceptions in the Cold
War (1993) and editor of Witnesses to the End of the Cold War (1996) and
Cold War Endgame (2002).
x Biographies
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1
1
Introduction: Balance and
Hierarchy in International Systems
William C. Wohlforth, Stuart J. Kaufman and Richard Little
The balance of power is one of the most influential ideas in international relations (IR). No theoretical concept has been the subject of
as much scholarly inquiry and none is more likely to fall from the lips
of foreign policy analysts and practitioners. This continued fascination
with the balance of power is understandable, for it appears as central to
scholarly debates about the basic properties of international systems as
it is to policy debates over responses to US primacy in the early
21st century. Yet it has never been systemically and comprehensively
examined in premodern or non-European contexts – and therefore it
has never been considered in the context of previous cases of unipolarity. Balance-of-power theory and policy analysis thus rest on profoundly unbalanced empirical foundations. Almost everything we
think we know about the balance of power is the product of modern
European history and the global experience of the 20th and early
21st centuries.
This book redresses this imbalance. We present eight new case
studies of balancing and balancing failure in premodern and nonEuropean international systems. Our collective, multidisciplinary and
international research effort yields an inescapable conclusion: much of
the conventional wisdom about the balance of power does not survive
contact with non-European evidence.
Given the foundational role of balance-of-power thinking in the evolution of the academic study of international relations, it is vital to be
clear about the specific aspects addressed here. Fifty years after Ernst
Haas (1953) identified eight different definitions of ‘balance of power,’
the concept remains so fiercely contested that the unmodified term is
too ambiguous to be meaningful. To clarify our goal, some explanation
is needed.
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Consider this deceptively simple statement from the 2002 United
States National Security Strategy document: ‘We seek … to create a
balance of power that favors human freedom’ (Bush, 2002). Haas
(1953) identified four different ways of using the ‘balance of power,’
and all four are apparent here. First, as is made clearer elsewhere in the
document, the statement is descriptive, identifying an international distribution of power in which the United States is the dominant state.
Second, it is prescriptive, indicating that this particular state of affairs
(American pre-eminence) should be maintained. Third, it is normative
or propagandistic associating American pre-eminence with the moral
good (human freedom). Finally, it is implicitly analytical, with the
‘balance of power’ representing the central mechanism in the operation of the international system; that is it assumes that creating ‘a
balance of power that favors human freedom’ is the critical step in promoting the goal of freedom. These different uses of the phrase are
usually intertwined because for propagandistic purposes they are mutually dependent, even though they are analytically distinct.
The element of propaganda is very evident in Bush’s use of balance
of power terminology because he wants to convince his audience that
all the great powers favor freedom and have formed a grand coalition
against those elements of the international system that are opposed to
freedom. It follows that the other great powers should not be concerned about US pre-eminence or by its decision to enhance its capabilities because they are all part of a common coalition. Unsurprisingly,
other great powers do not share this assessment. For some of them,
American pre-eminence represents a serious problem with the established balance of power. The French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine
asserted in 1999, for example, that ‘the entire foreign policy of
France…is aimed at making the world of tomorrow composed of
several poles, not just one’ (cited in Walt, 2002).
What makes the debate about the balance of power so complex is
that scholars, like statesmen, are also in dispute about what is meant
by the balance of power. Some scholars, as Haas (1953) noted, consider
‘the balance of power’ to be virtually identical with the notion of
power politics or with the international struggle for power – in short,
they consider it identical to realism. Other complications arise when
the focus is on the contemporary system because unipolarity is such a
recent development and indeed is often regarded as unique in the
modern world Some realists worry, for example, that US unilateralism
is now fragmenting the putative grand coalition in favor of freedom.
Though there is no consensus amongst the great powers in favor of
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‘hard balancing’ the United States by establishing a countervailing military alliance, it is argued that there is now evidence of the great
powers agreeing on less extreme measures to encourage the United
States to rein in its unilateralism – a phenomenon described as ‘soft
balancing’ (see, e.g., Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005).
Critics, however, argue that this move represents what Giovanni
Sartori (1970) dubbed ‘concept misformation’ or ‘concept stretching’ –
essentially, stretching a term to refer to a phenomenon entirely distinct from the one it previously meant. As Lieber and Alexander (2005)
note, behaviors labeled ‘soft balancing’ are fundamentally different
from traditional balancing, and are instead ‘identical to traditional
diplomatic friction’. From the critics’ point of view, the underlying
logical error is to conflate balance-of-power theory’s analytical insight
(balancing tends to occur) with a particular descriptive position (that
must be what is happening now). Balance of power terminology is particularly prone to such concept stretching because the term was already
so elastic and diverse in meaning, but such stretching creates the risk
of turning the concept into what British statesman Richard Cobden
labeled it almost two centuries ago: ‘a chimera: It is not a fallacy, a
mistake, an imposture – it is an undescribed, indescribable, incomprehensible nothing’ (quoted in Haas, 1953: 443).
The aim of this book
Once we distinguish among these uses of the term balance of power, the
purpose of this book can be stated succinctly: to assess the central analytical and descriptive claims of systemic balance-of-power theory. Haas
(1953: 449–50) notes that some scholars, such as Spykman (1942), use
‘balance of power’ descriptively (as the Bush Administration did for propaganda reasons) to refer to a ‘balance of power’ in favor of some state –
in other words, to refer to some form of hegemony. That is clearly the
minority position however; for most American scholars trained in the
Cold War era it refers descriptively to equilibrium, or relative equality of
power between two or more states. Analytically, according to a careful
review by Levy, the core notion of balance-of-power theory is ‘that hegemonies do not form in multistate systems because perceived threats of
hegemony over the system generate balancing behavior by other leading
states in the system’ (Levy, 2004: 37). Theory based on this notion is the
one we term systemic balance-of-power theory.
We focus on systemic balance-of-power theory because of its central
importance to international relations theory and practice. As Levy and
William C. Wohlforth, Stuart J. Kaufman and Richard Little 3
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Thompson note in another review, its central claim ‘has been one of
the most widely held propositions in the field of international relations’ (2005: 1–2). Indeed, the assumption – made most explicitly in
Waltz’s seminal Theory of International Politics (1979), but widely held
by realists (Levy, 2004; Levy and Thompson, 2005) – is that this proposition is universally valid across time and space. Furthermore, this view
that balance is the historical norm is the source of the widespread
expectation, among scholars and practitioners alike, that states will
soon begin balancing against the United States; and of the assessment,
most starkly stated by Waltz (2000a: 56), that ‘the present condition of
international politics is unnatural.’ Even liberal institutionalists and
constructivists (Nye, 2003; Lebow, 2004), when arguing for restraint in
US foreign policy, cite the expectation of counterbalancing by other
states as a reason for their prescription.
The purpose of this study is therefore to test the logic and universality of balance-of-power theory against premodern evidence: the analytical statement that hegemonic threats tend to evoke balancing
behavior as the dominant response in international systems; and the
descriptive statement that ‘balances’ of power (as distinct from hegemonic or unipolar distributions of power) are as a result the most
common state of international systems. Nicholas Spykman and George
Bush notwithstanding, we distinguish theories of hegemony as competing with theories of balance. Far from attacking realism, however,
these analyses offer an assessment of balance-of-power theory largely
from within the realist paradigm, assessing how, why and how frequently the alternative outcomes of balance and hegemony have
historically emerged.
‘Balance of power’ theories that assert that the balance is associated
either with peace or with war represent an entirely different literature that
we do not address here. Again, Haas (1953) notes that both claims have a
long pedigree. Both have been examined recently in a literature pitting an
application of Organski’s power transition theory (Organski and Kugler,
1980) to all state dyads (associating dyadic imbalances of power with
peace) against the ‘balance of power’ assertion that parity in power is
associated with peace for all state dyads (see, e.g., Tammen et al., 2000;
Lemke, 2002; Moul, 2002). While we have doubts about the appropriateness of applying the balance-of-power idea in this way, we merely note
here that such an application constitutes a fundamentally different
theory from the ones we examine, considering a different dependent variable (peace rather than balance) and a different independent variable
(dyadic rather than systemic distribution of capabilities).
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