Technology, Knowledge and the Firm Implications for Strategy and Industrial Change PHẦN 6 pot

DaimlerChrysler made some agitated remarks concerning competitors’

allegations of health and safety problems of methanol. At a conference

in Nagoya 2000 a Daimler executive exclaimed: ‘Yes, methanol is poiso￾nous if you drink it, but so is gasoline.’25

With DaimlerChrysler (and Ford via partnership) on methanol, and

GM (and Toyota) on gasoline, the industry was mixed in its fuel prefer￾ence, and the race to win the dominant design intensified. The gasoline

option received a relatively surprising push when the third largest FC con￾sortium in the field (Nissan, Renault and PSA) decided to pursue gasoline

FCVs, thereby following GM–Toyota’s lead in July 2001.26 Both Renault

and PSA had relatively modest FCV activities, but increased their efforts

around 1998–1999, like most of the automotive industry. In July 2000 they

decided to join forces, as individual efforts were bound to be marginal

given their respective budgets. With this collaboration they formed a

counterweight to Daimler–Ford–Ballard and GM–Toyota. With their

decision to support the gasoline path the majority of the industry sup￾ported gasoline.27

As for the rest of the industry, not all companies were that pronounced

about their fuel preference. The fourth major player in FC technology was

Honda, which had not given any comments on the methanol–gasoline

debate, other than that it would continue its direct hydrogen option. All

other players are relatively small. Companies like Mitsubishi, Mazda,

Hyundai, Daewoo, Fiat, BMW each had their respective FC program, but

quite modest. These players either did not have the resources to develop all

the necessary components for FCVs, or were partly owned by a parent

company; usually the fuel strategy of the parent company is followed

(Mazda with Ford, Mitsubishi with Daimler, Opel, Suzuki, Isuzu with GM,

etc.). The determining factor seems to be the high cost of developing a gas￾oline or methanol reformer; therefore its development is limited to those

companies with a strong financial arm. In the past Nissan had mentioned

that this was a main reason not to choose methanol or gasoline. With its

Renault–PSA partnership Nissan seems more confident in pursuing these

alternative fuel options.28

At a conference in Stuttgart in October 2002, DaimlerChrysler’s head of

FC activities, Dr. Panik, announced that DaimlerChrysler was continuing

its efforts in methanol, although they recognized that gasoline FCVs were

becoming an increasingly supported option by the industry.29 Industry

experts commented that DaimlerChrysler was now more or less alone in its

methanol preference, and that most companies were either supporting

the gasoline path, or remaining with direct hydrogen. Only firms related to

or owned by Daimler, mainly Chrysler and Mitsubishi were still active in

methanol.

140 Innovation and firm strategy

3.3.4 Concluding 1990–2002

Table 6.2 shows the individual firms’ fuel use in demonstration vehicles, as

an indication of fuel preference. First it shows that all firms active in

FC technology have experimented with both hydrogen and methanol. This

reflects the widespread activities in methanol, and indicates the industry

consensus on this fuel. Second, it shows the hydrogen models are still

in the majority; this reflects the fact that although alternative fuels are

explored, hydrogen-based FCVs are technically still seen as the best solu￾tion. Third, there are still only two gasoline FCV demonstration models,

due to the complexity of the gasoline reformer in comparison to the

methanol reformer. In this case press statements are essential in assess￾ing fuel preference. The variable ‘number of demonstration vehicles’ thus

has some limitations; company statements serve as a necessary addition.

In the future patent research could further enhance the assessment of fuel

preference.

Figure 6.3 shows the accumulated number of demonstration vehicles

using either hydrogen, methanol or gasoline over time, quarterly. It shows

how hydrogen FCV dominated until the beginning of 1997. Methanol FCVs

increased from then until the end of 2000, when this number stabilized. From

that point on hydrogen FCV surged.

Shifts in fuel preference for the fuel cell vehicle 141

Table 6.2 Fuel preference in demonstration vehicles per firm 1993–January

2002

Firm Hydrogen Methanol Gasoline

models models models

DaimlerBenz/Chrysler 6 2 –

General Motors 3 3 1

Toyota 5 2 –

Ford 3 1 –

Honda 3 2 –

Chrysler (until 1999) – 1 1

Nissan 1 1 –

Mazda 2 1 –

Renault 2 – –

PSA 2 – –

BMW 2 – –

Hyundai 1 1 –

Mitsubishi 1 1 –

Volkswagen 2 – –

Fiat 1 – –

Figure 6.4 schematizes the fuel preference of the different car companies

over the decade. Methanol dominated in 1997–1999. A shift to gasoline can

be discerned from then on. In the patterned area underneath in Figure 6.4

the companies are mentioned which have not made specific announcements

on preference; however industry experts expect most of these companies to

have discarded methanol (Volkswagen, Honda, Ford) and to be actively

evaluating gasoline (Ford, Mazda).

4. ANALYSIS

Based on the above description of the industry reaction to fuel preference

the process of technological decisionmaking and determinants of techno￾logical change will be discussed.

4.1 Technology Choices at Industry Level

How do technology choices at industry level come about? The case shows

how within the three periods one fuel dominates as the preferred fuel within

the automotive industry to fuel FCVs. Given that the hydrogen preference

in the early 1990s is due to the experimental nature of FC research, the

intentional choices for methanol and gasoline as the preferred fuel in the

commercial FCV are most interesting to study. The following mechanisms

can be discerned for methanol as well as gasoline.

First, a ‘credible actor’ in the automotive industry proposes an alterna￾tive to the current dominant technological solution; the credible actor plays

142 Innovation and firm strategy

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1990-I

1990-IV

1991-III

1992-II

1993-I

1993-IV

1994-III

1995-II

1996-I

1996-IV

1997-III

1998-II

1999-I

1999-IV

2000-III

2001-II

2002-I

year

fuel preference in demonstration vehicles

# of demonstr veh accumulative

hydrogen

methanol

gasoline

Figure 6.3 Industry fuel preference in demonstration vehicles 1990–2002