Responsible belief: a theory in ethics and epistemology

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RESPONSIBLE BELIEF

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RESPONSIBLE BELIEF

A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology

Rik Peels

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Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America

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To Herman Philipse

Ferrum ferro acuitur et homo exacuit

faciem amici sui (Proverbia 27:17)

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgments  xi

Introduction: Why Responsible Belief Matters  1

I.1 Responsible Belief and Blameworthy Belief  1

I.2 Aim of the Book  3

I.3 Why We Need an Account

of Responsible Belief  6

I.4 A New Approach: Intellectual Obligations

and Doxastic Excuses  8

I.5 Outline  11

1. Doxastic Responsibility: What Is It?  14

1.1 Introduction  14

1.2 Responsibility and Appraisal  15

1.3 Occurrent, Dormant, and Tacit Belief  28

1.4 Responsible Belief Is Blameless Belief  43

1.5 Conclusion  51

C ontents

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2. The Problem: Doxastic Control

and Doxastic Obligations  52

2.1 Introduction  52

2.2 The Argument from Doxastic Involuntarism  53

2.3 Obligations and Control  56

2.4 First Response: We Have Direct Intentional

Doxastic Control  61

2.5 Second Response: We Have Indirect

Intentional Doxastic Control  66

2.6 Third Response: We Have Compatibilist

Doxastic Control  72

2.7 Fourth Response: Doxastic Obligations

Without Any Kind of Control  81

2.8 Conclusion  87

3. The Solution: Doxastic Influence

and Intellectual Obligations  89

3.1 Introduction  89

3.2 Belief-influencing Factors  90

3.3 What Are Intellectual Obligations?  96

3.4 What Intellectual Obligations Do We Have?  100

3.5 Six Objections and Replies  108

3.6 Intellectual Obligations and Responsible Belief  117

3.7 Doxastic Excuses: Force, Ignorance, and Luck  124

3.8 Conclusion  130

4. Responsible Belief Entails the Ability

to Believe Otherwise  132

4.1 Introduction  132

4.2 What Is Force?  134

4.3 Force as a Doxastic Excuse  137

4.4 Blameworthy Force  143

C ontents

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4.5 Control over or Influence on Properties

of Beliefs  148

4.6 Doxastic Frankfurt-style Scenarios  150

4.7 The Doxastic Asymmetry Objection  157

4.8 Conclusion  162

5. Responsible Belief Is Radically Subjective  164

5.1 Introduction  164

5.2 What Is Ignorance?  165

5.3 Ignorance as a Doxastic Excuse  169

5.4 Ignorance as a Narrow and a Broad

Doxastic Excuse 182

5.5 Blameworthy Belief and the Regress Problem  185

5.6 Conclusion  198

6. Responsible Belief Is Compatible

with Doxastic Luck  199

6.1 Introduction  199

6.2 What Is Luck?  200

6.3 Four Varieties of Doxastic Luck and Luck as

a Doxastic Excuse  207

6.4 Consequential Luck and Accidentality  215

6.5 The Problem of Doxastic Luck  218

6.6 Conclusion  234

Appendix: Responsible Belief and Epistemically Justified Belief  237

Bibliography  251

Index  267

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My first encounter with philosophy took place when it was around five

o’clock in the morning. As a fifteen-year-old, I participated in a twenty￾four-hour class marathon to raise money for some charity organization.

Ieke Haarsma, who taught philosophy at my school, asked us whether

plants can sleep. I first considered this a silly question—of course plants

cannot sleep. In fact—just to assure the reader—I still think plants

cannot sleep. Upon further consideration, however, it seemed to me

not as obvious why precisely we should think that plants cannot sleep.

Ever since that little event early in the morning, philosophy has gained

increasing importance in my life. What started as an intellectual game

has become for me a highly influential method for approaching, under￾standing, and sometimes even changing reality. Indeed, it has become

an inalienable part of my own identity, bringing along both the advan￾tages and disadvantages of a philosophical life. I thank Ieke Haarsma for

introducing me to the wonderful world of philosophy.

I could not have written this book without the help, support, and

critical feedback from my colleagues and students at the Philosophy

Departments of Utrecht University and the Vrije Universiteit

Amsterdam. These departments, as well as the Philosophy Department

of Oxford University during Hilary and Trinity terms 2011, have

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provided a stimulating research environment in which working on this

project was a true pleasure.

Much of the material of this book was presented in some earlier (and,

I  am afraid, often premature) version at several conferences. I  thank

the audiences for their searching questions and helpful suggestions at

the conference on Doxastic Agency and Epistemic Responsibility at the

University of Bochum, Germany; the Fifth Annual Dutch OZSW

Conference at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, the Netherlands;

the Fourth Annual Dutch Conference on Practical Philosophy at the

Technological University Eindhoven, the Netherlands; the Epistemology

Meeting:  Doxastic Attitudes at Ghent University, Belgium; the 85th

Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association at

the University of Sussex, United Kingdom; the Second Annual Dutch

Conference on Practical Philosophy at the University of Groningen, the

Netherlands; the conference on Moral Responsibility:  Neuroscience,

Organization, and Engineering at the Technological University of Delft,

the Netherlands; the Meta-ethics and Moral Psychology Study Group at

Utrecht University; the 19th Inter-university Workshop on Philosophy

and Cognitive Science at the University of Zaragoza, Spain; the confer￾ence on Recent Trends in Philosophy of Language and General Analytic

Philosophy at Tilburg University, the Netherlands; The Young European

Epistemologists Workshop and the Epistemic Agency Conference at

the University of Geneva; the conference on Responsible Belief in the

Face of Disagreement, the First and Second Workshops in Analytic

Philosophy; and the conference on The Value of Knowledge at the Vrije

Universiteit Amsterdam.

For their careful reading and rigorous comments on the entire

book, I would like to thank Tony Booth, René van Woudenberg, and

Ralph Wedgwood. I am heavily indebted to them. I would also like

to thank Matthias Steup and Nicholas Wolterstorff who reviewed the

manuscript for Oxford University Press and went to great lengths to

provide helpful comments. These have led to the rewriting of many

confused and unclear passages. I would also like to thank Niko

Nottelmann; I have benefited immensely from many enjoyable dis￾cussions with him on a large number of the issues dealt with in this

book.

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For their astute comments on one or several parts (of earlier versions

or presentations) of the book, I would like to thank Joel Anderson, Max

Baker-Hytch, Arianna Betti, Martijn Blaauw, Martijn Boot, Gerhard

Bos, Niek Brunsveld, Adam Carter, Bob Coenraats, Lieven Decock,

Boudewijn de Bruin, Leon de Bruin, Henk de Regt, Jeroen de Ridder,

Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Richard Feldman, Mikkel Gerken, Jeffrey

Glick, Alvin Goldman, John Greco, Dirk-Martin Grube, Peter Hacker,

Paul Helm, Peter Kirschenmann, Hilary Kornblith, Andrea Kruse,

Pierre Le Morvan, Joop Leo, Clayton Littlejohn, Sebastian Lutz, Rosja

Mastop, Conor McHugh, Anne Meylan, Jesse Mulder, Fred Muller,

Thomas Müller, Bert Musschenga, Philip Nickel, Dawa Ometto, Marina

Oshana, Alvin Plantinga, Stefan Roski, Emanuel Rutten, Marcel

Sarot, Katrien Schaubroeck, Jeroen Smid, Michael Smith, Nicholas

Southwood, Matthias Steup, Derek Strijbos, Jesper Tijmstra, Dorette

van der Tholen, Janneke van Lith, Gert van den Brink, Jessica van der

Schalk, Vincent van Oostrom, Han van Wietmarschen, Albert Visser,

Jan Vorstenbosch, Heinrich Wansing, Brian Weatherson, Jan Willem

Wieland, Timothy Williamson, and Michael Zimmerman.

I thank the Templeton World Charity Foundation, through whose

support publication of this book was made possible. The opinions

expressed in this publication are mine and do not necessarily reflect the

views of Templeton World Charity Foundation.

A heartfelt thank you to my executive editor, Peter Ohlin, my pro￾duction editors Emily Sacharin and Radha Subburathnam, and my copy

editor Johanna Baboukis, for their continual encouragement and their

hard work to make the publication of this book possible.

Several of the ideas and arguments in this book are based on work

that I  published previously. Much of it has undergone substantial

revision—hopefully for the better—but many of the core ideas survived

and made it into this manuscript. I thank the editors involved for their

kind permission to use this material.

The final section of chapter 1 is based on “Why Responsible Belief

Is Blameless Belief ” (co-authored with Anthony Booth), The Journal

of Philosophy 107.5 (2010), 257–265. The main body of chapter  2

is derived from “Against Doxastic Compatibilism,” Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research 89.3 (2014), 679–702. The paragraphs on

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belief-policies in chapter 3 summarize what I argue in “Belief-Policies

Cannot Ground Doxastic Responsibility,” Erkenntnis 78.3 (2013), 561–

569. The main body of chapter 4 draws from material published in “Does

Doxastic Responsibility Entail the Ability to Believe Otherwise?,”

Synthese 190.17 (2013), 3651–3669.

The first section of chapter  5, on the nature of ignorance, makes

use of material from “What Is Ignorance?,” Philosophia 38.1 (2010),

57–67, “Ignorance Is Lack of True Belief: A Rejoinder to Le Morvan,”

Philosophia 39.2 (2011), 345–355, and “The New View on Ignorance

Undefeated,” Philosophia 40.4 (2012), 741–750. The main argument of

the chapter can be found in an earlier version in “What Kind of Ignorance

Excuses? Two Neglected Issues,” Philosophical Quarterly 64.256 (2014),

478–496. The final section draws on material from “Tracing Culpable

Ignorance,” Logos and Episteme 2.4 (2011), 575–582.

The parts of chapter  6 on the nature of luck and the problem of

doxastic luck are based on “A Modal Solution to the Problem of Moral

Luck,” American Philosophical Quarterly 64.256 (2015), 478–496.

The Appendix makes use of material from “Let’s Bite the Bullet on

Deontological Epistemic Justification: A Response to Robert Lockie,”

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4.12 (2015), 42–49, and

can be found in a more elaborate form in “Epistemic Justification and

Responsible Belief,” Synthese (2016), forthcoming.

Finally, I  would like to thank Herman Philipse, who was also my

PhD supervisor, for his many invaluable, constructive comments.

I especially want to thank him for his hospitality and the fun we had dur￾ing our memorable fortnightly paper discussion sessions at his home.

Even, or maybe especially, where our views do not seem to converge,

such as our opinions in the philosophy of religion, his ideas and criti￾cisms have been greatly inspiring for me. It is to him that I dedicate this

book, with gratitude.