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Law’s cut on the body of human rights
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Law’s Cut on the Body of
Human Rights
Scenes of violence and incisions into the fl esh inform the demand for law. The
scene of little girls being held down in practices of female circumcision has
been a defi ning and defi nitive image that demands the attention of human
rights, and the intervention of law. But the investment in protecting women
and little girls from such a cut is not all that it seems. Law’s Cut on the Body of
Human Rights: Female Circumcision, Torture and Sacred Flesh considers how such
images come to inform law and the investment of advocates of law in the
imagination of this scene. Drawing on psychoanalytic and postcolonial theory,
and accompanying ideas in political theology, Juliet Rogers examines the
language, imagery and excitement that accompanies recent initiatives to
legislate against what is called ‘female genital mutilation’. The author
complements this examination with a consideration of the scene of torture
exposed in images from Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. Rogers argues
that the modes of fascination and excitement that accompany scenes of torture
and female circumcision betray the fantasy of a political condition against
which the subject of liberal law is imagined; this is a subjectivity in a state
of non-mutilation, non-prohibition or, in a psychoanalytic idiom, noncastration. To support the fantasy of this subject, the mutilated subject, the
author suggests, is rendered as fl esh cut from the democratic nation state,
deserving of only selective human rights, or none at all.
Juliet Rogers teaches criminology at the University of Melbourne.
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Law’s Cut on the Body
of Human Rights
Female circumcision, torture
and sacred flesh
Juliet Rogers
First published 2013
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
A GlassHouse Book
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2013 Juliet Rogers
The right of Juliet Rogers to be identifi ed as author of this material has
been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means,
now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording,
or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identifi cation and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Rogers, Juliet.
Law’s cut and the body of human rights: female circumcision, torture, and
scared fl esh/Juliet Rogers.
pages cm
1. Female circumcision—Law and legislation. 2. Women—Legal status,
laws, etc. 3. Women’s rights. I. Title.
K3611.F45R64 2013
344.03’219816—dc23
2012050797
ISBN 978-0-415-66170-6 (hbk)
ISBN 978-0-203-51704-8 (ebk)
Typeset in Garamond
by Keystroke, Station Road, Codsall, Wolverhampton
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
1 Fantasies of the cut 1
2 The making of a fantasy - the image of female genital
mutilation 22
3 ‘I love you . . . I mutilate you’: the remnant of
the (mutilated) fl esh 47
4 The clear message of law 66
5 The vi olence of the Other’s law 86
6 The sacred fl esh of human rights 107
7 The torture of the good 125
8 Woman does not exist in human rights 140
References 154
Index 165
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For Michelle.
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Acknowledgments
My thanks to European University Institute and to Yale Law School for giving
me quiet thoughtful places to work on this manuscript, particularly to
Shana Jackson for fi nding me a place in the sun, and to Bo Burt, Dori Laub
and Francesco Francioni for their conversation.
This research was only made possible by the intellectual and political work
of the African Women’s Working Group in Victoria. Members of the group,
including Munira Mohamed, Munira Adam, Miriam Idris, Nikki Marshall
and Amna Maleken, generously shared with me the group’s documents and
discussions. Munira Mohamed’s ongoing encouragement and support assisted
me in continuing what was, at many times, a diffi cult issue to pursue
politically, intellectually and socially. My warmest thanks are also extended to
Amuna Abdella for her intellectual rigour together with her trust, friendship
and the introductions she offered me in this project. Chris Bayly also shared
with me her meticulous fi les of meetings and conversations that took place at
the time of the consultations into the application of ‘female genital mutilation
legislation’ in Australia. These documents were invaluable in directing and
legitimating this research. Some of the work I mention is ongoing and the
struggle against the violence of ‘female genital mutilation legislation’ is
being continued by Samia Baho, Mansura Dopico and Maria Dimopolous.
The work begun by Samia, Maskepe Sejoe and others through the Family and
Reproductive Rights Education Program in Victoria continues the debates
and, where possible, enables community dialogue. I am grateful for the
information these people have shared with me, their integrity, political
commitment and for their work in advance.
My thanks to my own students whose conversations and own projects have
infl uenced the work in this book, including Sahar Ghumkhor, Mohamad
Tabbaa, Hussein Mohamud, Felicity Grey and Diego Mendez. My warmest
thanks particularly to Sahar for her editorial rigour, inspirational conversation
in this area and her patience.
My love and thanks to Adam Driver, Anna Szorenyi, Steve Pukallus
and Surya Purekh for the conversations that got me on the right track in
the fi rst place. And to Judith Grbich, Ian Duncanson, Andrea Rhodes-
x Acknowledgments
Little – friends and teachers who have held my hands through this work for
some time now.
My warm thanks to Anne Orford for her insightful conversation throughout the better parts of this research, and for her intellectual inspiration
and reminders of the maternal. My heartfelt gratitude goes to Peter Rush and
Alison Young for their friendship, inspiration and enduring support. And
particularly to Connal Parsley, Justin Clemens, Bill MacNeil, Maria
Aristodemou, Costas Douzinas and again to Peter and Alison, for their
conversation, comments and their sanction of the peculiarities of approaches
such as these.
My thanks always to Cara for her incredible generosity and love, and to
both she and Ed for their food, art work and smiles at the end of the day. If
only I could have written this book in Lego my absences would have been less.
Chapter 1
Fantasies of the cut
We must see right away how crude it is to accept the idea that, in the
ethical order itself, everything can be reduced to social constraint . . . as
if the fashion in which that constraint develops doesn’t in itself raise
a question . . .1
Scenes of torture and of female genital mutilation2
are imagined as scenes of
pain and of incisions into the fl esh. Both are scenes where someone is described
as being held down. Both are scenes where fl esh is manipulated, stressed or
cut and both are scenes that have attracted the specifi c attention of human
rights advocates, of domestic laws and of human rights doctrine. The fl esh of
the so-called ‘mutilated woman’3
is imagined to require protection from the
cut. And the fl esh of the tortured is often sacrifi ced to the fl esh of democratic
polis: The People. The value of the fl esh – how much can be cut and what
remains – is a measurement which employs doctrines of biomedicine, law,
human rights and political theology. Flesh is worth something in the domestic
and universal polis, but not all fl esh is equivalent, not all bodies are uncut, not
all humans are sacred.
The imaginations of female genital mutilation and of torture offer a way of
trying to understand the disparities in law’s attention and the modes through
1 Lacan (1992), 225.
2 I will use the term ‘female genital mutilation’ or ‘fgm’ when referring to the event that
the laws, or the western discourses on ‘female genital mutilation’, mean to describe. I will
use the term ‘female circumcision’ when referring to the practices described as such by the
communities who practice them. The terms ‘infi bulation’, ‘pharaonic circumcision’,
‘clitoridectomy’ and ‘sunna’ are also used to describe the practices in English-speaking
countries and I will use these terms where they function as helpful descriptions. I have not
used the names for the practices in the relevant languages because I am not describing the
practices in those contexts, but in the contexts of their perception in western discourse.
The practices are, of course, diverse, far more diverse than these names suggest, but I am
not talking about their diversity. I am talking about the fantasy of their sameness as the
monolithic practice ‘female genital mutilation’.
3 This is the term used by the Family Law Council in Family Law Council (1994b).
2 Law’s Cut on the Body of Human Rights
which law regulates life. The scenes are not the same – although female
genital mutilation is often described as ‘torture’ – and they attract very
different investments. Both practices evoke comment, but the violent outrage
against female genital mutilation is certainly disproportionate to the quiet,
and usually scholarly, objections to torture. About torture, the western subject
is arguably ambivalent; about female genital mutilation . . . we are (almost)
passionately united in a fi ght for the good, a fi ght, as Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak has described, to ‘save brown women from brown men’.4
Subjects of
western democracy, who identify with the values of liberal law, are rarely
ambivalent about little (Muslim) girls being held down, while about the
holding down of brown (Muslim) men . . . we’re not so sure.
This book is a meditation on the scenes that have come to inspire law on
the practices imagined to be female genital mutilation, and on torture, imagined to be interrogation. It is an examination of the fantasies that underpin
these scenes as the political, legal and popular commentary on the practices
and their products. In this book I contest that every law comes with an image.
How else would we know what to constrain? Or why it need be constrained?
But these images are not self-evident representations of cultural or legal practices: they are scenes which provoke rage, pain and excitement, and they are
scenes which demand intervention, as the cut of law and the care of human
rights. These scenes are particular, invested and haunted by the ordinary anxieties of subjects before law; anxieties that I will discuss as political and psychological. These anxieties can be understood, in a psychoanalytic idiom, as
anxieties about castration, which are then heightened by the cuts of law: the
cutting off of the king’s head, the increased aggressions in democratic sovereigns (since 9/11), and even by the assertion of a universalism of human
rights. The particular representations of scenes of female genital mutilation
and torture alleviate some of these anxieties by turning the cuts toward
another, but these scenes also announce the possibility of the cut arriving on
the subject of liberal law. The scenes thus serve, like all scenes in a psychoanalytic idiom, to thwart castration, but these scenes are also legal scenes that
announce the cut as prohibitions and, sometimes, arbitrary incursions of law.
They are scenes which promote a demand for sovereign attention – as the
attention of liberal law – and they are scenes which serve to thwart and
announce law’s cut: announcing a very violent cut, indeed.
There is a familiar scene of what is termed female genital mutilation. It is
of a child held down, her legs parted, she is screaming while she is being cut
with an unidentifi able piece of metal. This image is familiar because it is
repeated. It is not easily forgotten for this repetition and for its disturbing
motifs: the pain of a child, the loss of innocence and the loss of desire. It is the
image presented as the justifi cation and imperative for action on female
4 Spivak (1999), 284–7.
Fantasies of the cut 3
genital mutilation and, like most images presented as violence, it is effective.
More than that, it is seductive. It seduces us into believing the constraint is
required, the prohibition is necessary. Something is being done, someone
must be stopped – a child is being mutilated.
The call of mutilation is the call to law. The call to apply the law is not all
that it seems, however. This is not simply a statement about the political
investments and excitements that infi ltrate and inform the processes of law’s
production. These exist, and they infl uence process and product, often in
equal measure. The constraint of law, when accompanied by the images of
violence, such as those that accompany initiatives to legislate against female
genital mutilation, betray investments in the violence itself, or more precisely,
in the scene of violence: the scene of the little girl being held down. This
scene, I suggest in this book, is only part of the story. Just as the military and
legal rationales for contemporary scenes of torture – in Abu Ghraib,
Guantanamo Bay, and in black sites we can only imagine – are only parts of
the story of why torture is accepted in liberal societies.
The stories of legitimation that surround the prohibition of female genital
mutilation and the lack of objection to contemporary practices of torture
offer insight into the ambivalences of a legal subject before liberal law. These
are ambivalences about where and when the cut can and will arrive, about
who deserves the cut and about what will protect the subject from the
sovereign’s displeasure. The stories of torture and female circumcision embody
these ambivalences and are therefore not as simple as the books on airport
shelves,5
as the legal and political rhetoric would suggest. These are stories of
confusion and doubt about, what I discuss in this book as, the freedom from
the cut, as a freedom from the mutilations and prohibitions of law. Specifi cally
these are stories that are less about the necessity of anti-fgm law or indeed the
necessity of torturing the terrorist, and are more about the fear of law’s
mutilation of the imagined sovereignty of the democratic subject before
liberal law.
The confusions about the mutilations of the liberal subject, in the case of
stories of female genital mutilation, are soothed with an image of the violence
done to little girls. Similarly, the confusions about the reality of torture’s
potential cutting of the liberal subject are foreclosed by the imagination of
the violence of the terrorist – his inherent badness – and the urgency of the
‘ticking time bomb’. Both these scenes present the viewer with a scene of
cutting that exemplifi es the reality of law’s capacity to cut, if not now, then
later; if not later, then elsewhere. But in the rubric of cosmopolitanism and
progress, in the context of a universalism of law and human rights, in the
condition of a demand for the universalism of the human, these cuts represent
the possibility and potentiality of mutilations before law for everyone. And
5 I am gesturing to works such as Dirie (1998).
4 Law’s Cut on the Body of Human Rights
these cuts must be reckoned with. This book is a discussion of the means and
methods applied to this reckoning as the aggressions and fantasies that
accompany the fear of law’s cut. This book is therefore a story of violence and
a story of loss.
The fantasy of female genital mutilation
The story of female genital mutilation is represented in liberal discussions of
law and violence as a story of loss. This is less the story of the practices of
female circumcision, clitoridectomy, circumcision, sunna – or the many other
practices that have no English names – as it is the story of the subject, or
subjects, imagining the loss. From this perspective it is not self-evident as to
what loss means. The stories of legislating against these practices in countries
such as England, Australia, Scotland, Ireland, Italy, the United States and
Egypt are infused with notions of what loss is: as the loss of desire, the loss of
innocence and the loss of the freedoms of a little girl. This story of loss is a
political story, a legal story and a psychoanalytic story, that is, it is a story
where a number of images convene to produce law as an effort to produce a
self-evidence to loss, and an effort to stem the loss announced by an invocation
of law’s prohibition. The story of female genital mutilation is therefore no
innocuous story: someone is being held down, someone is being prohibited
and someone is being cut. But the answers to who this someone is, and who is
performing the cut, are not so clear, however. The story of legislating against
female genital mutilation is a story of questions, precisely the kind of questions which are diffi cult to ask when presented with images of screaming
children, walls covered with blood, and uncaring perpetrators. In this book
I suggest that the answers to questions are not as obvious as anti-fgm
advocates would have us believe, and they are the very ordinary questions
which not only need to accompany initiatives to legislate against female
genital mutilation, but need to accompany all law.
The fantasy of female genital mutilation which promotes law’s intervention
is well illustrated in dubious and not so dubious research, documentaries,
best-selling autobiographies, consultation papers, public documents, and in
the commentary in most seminars and classrooms dealing with law, human
rights and gender in the West. This fantasy is perhaps never quite so well
illustrated than in the photographic essay The Day Kadi Lost a Part of Her Life.
6
This is a text published internationally and cited as a very important antifemale genital mutilation text.7
It is a beautifully photographed coffee table
book,8
readily consumed through its black and white glossy pages.
6 Manresa and Ramos Rioja (1998).
7 Bone (1999), 19; Kissane (1993), 16; Manresa and Ramos Rioja (1998).
8 See Szorenyi (2006) for discussions of the coffee table book as humanitarian porn.