Judicial Practice, Customary International Criminal Law and Nullum Crimen Sine Lege

Thomas Rauter

Judicial Practice,

Customary

International

Criminal Law and

Nullum Crimen

Sine Lege

Judicial Practice, Customary International Criminal

Law and Nullum Crimen Sine Lege

Thomas Rauter

Judicial Practice, Customary

International Criminal Law

and Nullum Crimen Sine Lege

Thomas Rauter

Bezirkshauptmannschaft Salzburg-Umgebung

Land Salzburg

Salzburg, Austria

ISBN 978-3-319-64476-9 ISBN 978-3-319-64477-6 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-64477-6

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017948010

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Preface

We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today is the

record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned

chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. We must summon such detachment and

intellectual integrity to our task that this Trial will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling

humanity’s aspirations to do justice.1

These were the words addressed by the chief US prosecutor Robert H. Jackson to

the International Military Tribunal at the opening of the trial of the major war

criminals on 21 November 1945 in Nuremberg. Those words remind us that it is the

task of every international criminal tribunal to uphold fundamental principles of

criminal justice in order to preserve the integrity of the system of international

criminal justice and not to sacrifice these principles to obey a “cry for vengeance

which arises from the anguish of war”.2

When the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

took up its work in the 1990s, it was faced with the problem that the development of

international criminal law had virtually stood still since the post-World War II

criminal convictions. Indeed, by setting up the ICTY, the UN Security Council

(SC) ended a 60-year period of drought in which no international tribunal existed

that could enforce international criminal law. Only occasionally were domestic

cases held that reminded us that international criminal law even existed.3 Apart

from the rare judicial enforcement, conventional developments in this field of law

were also scarce. To date we do not have an international convention on crimes

against humanity. It is only reasonable, therefore, that the ICTY and the

1

IMT Nuremberg, 2 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal

(1947) (“Blue Series”), 101 (Justice Robert H. Jackson, Prosecutor’s Address of Nov. 21, 1945 to

the International Military Tribunal.)

2

Ibid.

3

See, for example, Supreme Court of Israel, Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 Interna￾tional Law Reports (1968), 277; French Court de Cassation, Barbie Case, 78 International Law

Reports (1988), 125.

v

international criminal tribunals that followed, such as the International Criminal

Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cam￾bodia (ECCC) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), had to rely on

customary international law as their main source of international criminal

convictions.

However, taking recourse to an unwritten source of law such as customary

international law is problematic from a human rights perspective. One of the

fundamental principles of criminal law, the nullum crimen sine lege principle, has

been aptly described by von Liszt as “the citizen’s bulwark against the State’s

omnipotence”, protecting the individual against arbitrary charges.4 The principle

of nullum crimen sine lege inter alia requires that the law is accessible and criminal

prosecution is foreseeable for the individual.5 However, customary international

law as the underlying legal basis for individual criminal responsibility in interna￾tional criminal proceedings is problematic. It has been stated that this particular

source of law is “situated in a theoretical minefield”.6 Simma and Alston have

remarked that customary international law suffers from an “identity crisis”.7 There

is no coherent theory on customary international law, but varying doctrinal and

methodological approaches exist that compete to establish and determine custom￾ary international law “properly”.8 For this reason, the Secretary General of the

United Nations made it clear that, in order to comply with the nullum crimen sine

lege principle, the ICTY shall only apply norms that are “beyond any doubt part of

customary law”.9

Nevertheless, international criminal law, being at the interception of human

rights, humanitarian law and criminal law, appears to be torn by moral aspirations

that determine the way the law needs to be interpreted and applied. The human

factor in yielding to the moral pull is quite understandable. Critics such as Robinson

consider that international criminal tribunals apply a “victim-focused teleological

reasoning aggravated by utopian aspirations”.10 However, the source of authority

for judges of international criminal tribunals rests upon the application of existing

customary international criminal law. Thus the UN Secretary General’s demand

that international criminal tribunals apply norms, “which are beyond any doubt part

4

F. von Liszt, The Rationale for the Nullum Crimen Principle, 5 Journal of International Criminal

Justice (2007), 1009–1010, reproducing from his essay Die deterministischen Gegner der

Zweckstrafe, 13 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (1983), 325ff. 5

See further Chap. 3, Nullum Crimen Sine Lege. 6

M. Koskenniemi, The Pull of the Mainstream, 88 Michigan Law Review (1990), 1947. 7

B. Simma and P. Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General

Principles, 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law (1988–1989), 88.

8

See further Chap. 4, The Formation of Customary International Law and Its Methodological

Challenges.

9

Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution

808 (1993), 3 May 1993, UN Doc S/25704), para 34 (SG Report on ICTY).

10C.f. D. Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 Leiden Journal of

International Law (2008), 944f.

vi Preface

of customary international law”, is its legitimizing source of authority. Conse￾quently, judges adjudicating on the strength of law must keep a clear distinction

between de lege lata and de lege ferenda. Humanitarian and moral considerations

can only be taken into account by judges when they have found adequate expression

in legal form.

The aim of this book is to analyse the methodology used by international

criminal tribunals when determining customary international criminal law and to

consider the compatibility of these methodological approaches with the nullum

crimen sine lege principle.

Salzburg, Austria Thomas Rauter

Preface vii

Acknowledgements

This book is the revised version of the PhD thesis that has been submitted to obtain

the degree of doctor iuris at the Paris Lodron University of Salzburg. I am much

obliged to all those who encouraged and helped me in working on this book. Chief

among those are my two PhD supervisors, Prof. Kirsten Schmalenbach and Prof.

Otto Triffterer. By her dedication to legal research, Prof. Kirsten Schmalenbach has

been a role model to me throughout the years. Without her, I would not be the

lawyer I am today, and I can hardly put my gratitude into words. Prof. Otto

Triffterer has been an inspiration to so many international criminal law students,

including myself. It was an honour to receive his critical and useful feedback in

particular at the early stage of writing this thesis.

I am also grateful to Prof. William Schabas for accepting to be the second

examiner to the PhD thesis. The first paragraph of his report reads as follows:

“Bismarck famously said that if one loves laws and one loves sausages, it is better

not to see how they are made. After reading this thesis, we might add ‘including

customary law’”. This quote offers proof that being one of the leading authorities in

international criminal law does not necessarily deprive you from a great sense of

humour.

I am particularly indebted to my fellow colleagues at the Paris Lodron Univer￾sity of Salzburg, Dr. Lando Kirchmair, Mag. Robert Kogler, Maga

. Sandra

Hummelbrunner and Dr. Lucia Schulten, not only for their insightful comments

on many of the chapters but most importantly for their great company and

friendship.

I also want to thank Dr. Ian Macgregor Morris for proofreading and correcting

my adventurous grammatical creations.

Needless to say, while all of these people mentioned above have substantially

contributed to this book, the responsibility for any remaining errors rests with me.

Last but not least, I gratefully acknowledge the financial support received from

the Anniversary Fund of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB).

ix

Contents

1 Introduction ........................................... 1

1.1 Research Questions . . . .............................. 1

1.2 Structure of the Thesis ............................... 2

1.3 Terminology ...................................... 3

2 State Responsibility and the Criminal Liability of the Individual ... 5

2.1 Nuremberg: Setting the Stage . ......................... 5

2.2 International Criminal Law: A Collision of Legal Systems . . . . . 11

3 Nullum Crimen Sine Lege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

3.1 Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

3.2 Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and Domestic Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

3.3 The Four Guarantees of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege . . . . . . . . . . . 20

3.4 Theoretical and Philosophical Foundations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3.5 Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the IMT Nuremberg

and the IMTFE Tokyo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3.6 Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and Post World War II US Military

Tribunals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

3.7 Changing the Picture? Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and Its Inclusion

in Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law Conventions . . . . 31

3.8 The Obligation of International Criminal Tribunals to Comply

with Nullum Crimen Sine Lege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

3.9 Nullum Crimen Sine Lege in International Criminal Law:

A sui generis Principle? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

3.10 The Guarantees of the Nullum Crimen Sine Lege Principle in

International Criminal Law: The Principle of Nullum Crimen

Sine Iure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

3.10.1 Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

3.10.2 The Quest for Applicable Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

xi

3.10.3 The scripta Requirement and the Sources of International

Law: International Conventions as the Sole Legal Basis

for Individual Criminal Responsibility? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

3.10.4 The stricta Requirement and the Sources

of International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

3.10.5 The praevia Requirement and the Sources

of International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

3.10.5.1 The Shift from Substantive Justice to Strict

Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

3.10.5.2 The praevia Requirement and International

Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

3.10.5.3 The praevia Requirement and General

Principles of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

3.10.5.4 The praevia Requirement and Customary

International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

3.10.6 The certa Requirement and the Sources of International

Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

3.10.6.1 The Two Facets of the certa Requirement . . . 66

3.10.6.2 The certa Requirement as an Imperative for

Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

3.10.6.3 The certa Requirement as a Safeguard

Requirement for the Individual . . . . . . . . . . . 67

3.10.6.3.1 The certa Requirement and the

Moral Blameworthiness . . . . . . . 68

3.10.6.3.2 The certa Requirement

and the General Sense

of the Underlying Criminality . . . 69

3.10.6.3.3 The certa Requirement

and the Concrete Underlying

International Criminal Norm . . . . 70

3.10.6.3.4 Legal Assessment of These Three

Approaches to Establish the certa

Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

3.10.6.4 The certa Requirement and Customary

International Criminal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

3.11 Concluding Remarks on the Principle of Nullum Crimen

Sine Iure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

4 The Formation of Customary International Law and Its

Methodological Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

4.1 Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

4.2 Traditional Customary International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

4.2.1 State Practice Under a Traditional Interpretation . . . . . . 94

4.2.2 Opinio Iuris Under a Traditional Interpretation . . . . . . . 95

4.2.3 Traditional Customary International Law: Practical

Concerns and Its Slow Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

xii Contents

4.3 Modern Customary International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

4.3.1 Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

4.3.2 The Procedural Aspect of Modern Customary

International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

4.3.3 The Substantive Aspect of Modern Customary

International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

4.4 The Identification of Customary International Law:

The Challenge Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

4.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

5 The Role of Judges When Determining Customary International

Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

5.1 The Initial Position: Being a Judge in the 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

5.2 The Role of Judges: Determining, Developing or Creating

Customary International Criminal Law? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

6 Methodological Approaches to Customary International Law by

International Criminal Tribunals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

6.1 The Disclosure of the Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

6.2 A Word of Caution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

6.3 Detectable Approaches to Customary International

Criminal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

6.3.1 The Traditional Two Elements Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 128

6.3.1.1 Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

6.3.1.2 ICTY Tadic´ Appeals Chamber Jurisdiction

Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

6.3.1.3 High Frequency and High Consistency

of State Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

6.3.1.4 Denying the Existence of Customary

International Criminal Law on the Basis

of the Traditional Two Elements Approach . . . 137

6.3.2 Non-allocation to Elements Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

6.3.3 Deductive Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

6.3.3.1 Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

6.3.3.2 Value-Based Deductive Approach and

Deduction from Technical Humanitarian

Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

6.3.3.3 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

6.3.4 Methodological Shortcuts: The Case Law Approach . . . 156

6.3.4.1 Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

6.3.4.2 Case Law as a Genuine “Subsidiary” Source

of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

6.3.4.3 International Case Law as Subsidiary Means

for the Determination of Customary

International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

6.3.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

Contents xiii

7 Relevant Material for Proving the Existence of Customary

International Criminal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

7.1 Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

7.2 Official Pronouncements by States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

7.3 Passive Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

7.4 National Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

7.4.1 Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

7.4.2 International Crimes Laws and National

Criminal Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

7.4.3 Military Manuals and Military Penal Codes . . . . . . . . . . 183

7.5 International Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

7.5.1 Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

7.5.2 Humanitarian Law Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

7.5.3 Other Statutes of International Criminal Tribunals . . . . . 193

7.5.3.1 Statutes of the IMT, IMTFE and Control

Council Law No. 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

7.5.3.2 Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL

and ECCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

7.5.3.3 Rome Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

7.5.4 Other International Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

7.5.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

7.6 UN Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

7.6.1 Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

7.6.2 UN General Assembly Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

7.6.2.1 UN General Assembly Resolutions

as a Law-Creating Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

7.6.2.2 UN General Assembly Resolutions

as Law-Determining Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . 207

7.6.3 UN Security Council Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

7.7 Jurisprudence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

7.7.1 Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

7.7.2 International Court of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

7.7.3 IMT Nuremberg and Post World War II Tribunals

Operating Under the Strength of Control Council

Law No. 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

7.7.4 Domestic Case Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

7.8 International Law Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

7.9 Writings of Legal Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

7.10 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

List of References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

xiv Contents

List of Abbreviations

AC Appeals Chamber

AP Additional Protocol

Art. Article

c.f. Confer (compare further)

CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child

Doc. Document

ECCC Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

ECHR European Convention on Human Rights

ECtHR European Court of Human Rights

ed. (eds.) Editor (editors)

e.g. Exempli gratia (for instance)

et al. Et alii (and others)

f. (ff.) Folio (foliis) (and the following)

FN Footnote

FS Festschrift

GAOR General Assembly Official Records

GC Geneva Convention

i.a. Inter alia (among other things)

IAC International armed conflict

ibid. Ibidem (in the same place)

ICC International Criminal Court

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICJ International Court of Justice

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

id. Idem (the same)

i.e. Id est (in other words)

IHL International humanitarian law

ILA International Law Association

ILC International Law Commission

xv

ILO International Labour Organization

ILR International Law Reports

IMT International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg)

IMTFE International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo)

JCE Joint criminal enterprise

LNTS League of Nations Treaty Series

NCSI Nullum crimen sine iure

NCSL Nullum crimen sine lege

NIAC Non-international armed conflict

para Paragraph

PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice

pp. Per procurationem (the following pages)

PTC Pre-Trial Chamber

SC Security Council

SCSL Special Court for Sierra Leone

SG Secretary General

TC Trial Chamber

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN United Nations

UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

UNTS United Nations Treaty Series

v. Versus (against)

Vol. Volume

xvi List of Abbreviations

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Research Questions

The aim of this study is to analyze the methodology used by international criminal

tribunals when determining customary international criminal law and to consider

the compatibility of these methodological approaches with the nullum crimen sine

lege principle. In that regard the following research questions are of particular

importance: Is there one approach common to international criminal tribunals or are

different approaches detectable in their jurisprudence when determining customary

international law? Do international criminal tribunals regard both traditional ele￾ments of customary international law, State practice and opinio iuris, as necessary

elements for the establishment of customary international law? Do international

criminal tribunals argue along the lines of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

requiring a high frequency and consistency of State practice, that is both “extensive

and virtually uniform”?1 In addition, the evidence used by international criminal

tribunals in order to establish the constituent elements of customary international

law will be analyzed. Finally, do international criminal tribunals distinguish,

according to Schwarzenberger, between the “law-creating processes” of public

international law on the one hand, and the “law-determining agencies” as subsidiary

means for the determination of a rule of law on the other?2

Assuming that they exist, how can different methodological approaches to

determine customary international law be assessed in light of the nullum crimen

sine lege principle? Does the principle require judges to apply the traditional

method to establish customary international law as being based on extensive,

1

See ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark, Federal

Republic of Germany v. the Netherlands), ICJ Reports (1969) 3, para 74.

2

G. Schwarzenberger, The Inductive Approach to International Law (1965), 5, 19ff.

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

T. Rauter, Judicial Practice, Customary International Criminal Law and Nullum

Crimen Sine Lege, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-64477-6_1

1