In Defense of Animals Part 3 ppt

On the Question of Personhood beyond Homo sapiens

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something, permitting us to identify paradigm persons and, beyond these

easy cases, other individuals who are sufficiently similar to warrant inclusion

under the concept.

Do we know of any persons, extinct or currently living, beyond Homo

sapiens?

Other Hominid Persons

Normal children of our species, Homo sapiens, are among the paradigm

persons. Surely, then, at least some members of other hominid species were

also persons, for there is no reason to think they were all vastly less

endowed with personhood-relevant properties than human children are. Let

me explain.

Although ours is the only surviving hominid species, hominid evolution

featured various others, including Homo erectus, Homo habilis, Homo rudolfensis,

Australopithecus africanus, Australopithecus robustus, and others. Interestingly,

two of the great ape species, chimpanzees and bonobos, and the various

hominid species, including ours, had a common ancestor who lived only 5

to 7 million years ago (Dawkins 1993: 82; see also Hecht 2003).

Now consider whichever hominid species we evolved from. Typical mem￾bers of that species were genetically a bit different from us. Yet it is hardly

plausible that no members of that species were sufficiently like our (normal)

human children – who are clearly persons – to qualify as persons. Indeed,

there is no natural marker that could separate the two species in the course

of evolution; it is not as if some decisive mutation created a massive gulf

dividing us from our immediate predecessors. Any dividing line in hominid

evolution would be something to draw in an arbitrarily chosen place at least

as much as a biological reality to find. So, because normal human children

are clearly persons, at least some hominids who were not Homo sapiens were

persons as well. Therefore, in actual fact and not just science fiction and

speculative religion, there have been persons beyond Homo sapiens.

One might object that, since our concept of personhood is relatively

modern, it makes no sense to attribute it to prehistoric hominids. But the

objection is confused. While our concept of personhood is modern, the con￾cept designates a kind of being with certain complex forms of consciousness.

Such beings existed long before any arrived at the modern concept, just as

plutonium and dinosaurs existed long before anyone employed the concepts

of plutonium and dinosaurs.

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David DeGrazia

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Ordinary Great Apes and Dolphins as

Borderline Persons

Even if hominid evolution featured some persons beyond our species, one

might argue, there are no known cases of living nonhuman persons. But

as the only candidates we know are terrestrial beings, this contention begs

the question of whether any nonhuman animals are persons. I will argue

that normal representatives of the great ape and certain cetacean species

are borderline persons, lying in an ambiguous gray area between paradigm

persons and those who are clearly not persons.

To which animals are we referring? The great apes include (“common”)

chimpanzees, bonobos (sometimes called “pygmy chimpanzees”), gorillas,

and orangutans. Sometimes for convenience I will refer to great apes simply

as “apes” – although there are also “lesser apes,” gibbons and siamangs, to

whom I will not be referring. Cetaceans include all whales, including the

smaller whales known as dolphins (of the family Delphinidae) and porpoises

(of the family Phocoenidae). Sometimes the term “dolphin” is used broadly

to include both of these families of smaller whales, and for convenience

I will adopt this broader usage. Available evidence suggests that apes and

dolphins are the most cognitively, emotionally, and socially advanced

nonhuman animals, making them the best known candidates for presently

living nonhuman persons.

Let’s briefly review some of this evidence, beginning with the great apes.

Although their capacity for intentional action is evident in virtually every￾thing they do, it is especially apparent in certain activities that express un￾usual deliberateness, reasoning, or planning. For example, chimpanzees

regularly use tools such as moss for a sponge, stems as probes for insects,

and rocks as nut-crackers (see, e.g., McGrew 1992: 44–6). Meanwhile, all

of the apes engage in social manipulation, including deception, of their

fellows (see, e.g., Byrne 1996; de Waal 1997: 39–40; Tomasello and Call

1997: 235–59). Further, apes are self-aware in more than one way. Bodily

self-awareness, which is manifested in all intentional action, is more im￾pressively revealed in apes’ imitation of bodily gestures,3

use of mirrors to

investigate otherwise inaccessible markings on their own bodies,4

and use

of televised images of their out-of-view arms to reach hidden objects (see

Tomasello and Call 1997: 52). Social self-awareness, meanwhile, is evident

in apes’ natural social structures, which feature dominance hierarchies,

long-term relationships, and shifting allegiances; individuals need to know

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