Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015

v

FUTURE OF THE NUCLEAR SECURITY

ENVIRONMENT IN 2015

Proceedings of a

Russian—U.S. Workshop

Ashot A. Sarkisov and Rose Gottemoeller, Editors

Joint Committees on the

Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015

Committee on International Security and Arms Control

Policy and Global Affairs

In cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sciences

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS

Washington, D.C.

www.nap.edu

vii

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v

v v

COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE OF THE NUCLEAR SECURITY

ENVIRONMENT IN 2015

THE U.S. NATIONAL ACADEMIES

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER, Cochair, Carnegie Moscow Center/Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace

LINTON F. BROOKS, Independent National Security Consultant

MONA DREICER, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

JAMES FULLER, University of Washington, Seattle

RICHARD W. MIES, Independent National Security Consultant

CHERRY MURRAY, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

M. TERESA OLASCOAGA, Sandia National Laboratories

COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE OF THE NUCLEAR SECURITY

ENVIRONMENT IN 2015

RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

VICE ADMIRAL ASHOT A. SARKISOV, Cochair, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS)

REAR-ADMIRAL VYACHESLAV M. APANASENKO, Russian Academy of Rocket and

Artillery Sciences

EVGENY N. AVRORIN, All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics

LEONID A. BOLSHOV, Nuclear Safety Institute, RAS

LEV D. RYABEV, Rosatom

With the support of

ANATOLY I. ANTONOV, Department of Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign

Affairs

ANDREY A. KOKOSHIN, Institute for International Security Problems, RAS

National Research Council Staff

ANNE M. HARRINGTON, Director, Committee on International Security and Arms Control

RITA S. GUENTHER, Senior Program Associate, Committee on International Security and

Arms Control

Russian Academy of Sciences Staff

TATIANA POVETNIKOVA, Program Officer, Nuclear Safety Institute, RAS

OLGA KUZNETSOVA, Policy and Security Fellow, Nuclear Safety Institute, RAS

YURI SHIYAN, Director, Office for North American Scientific Cooperation, RAS

vii

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the nearly two decades of transition following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the

United States and the Russian Federation have jointly cooperated on several Cooperative Threat

Reduction Programs designed to safely and securely manage Russia’s nuclear weapons and the

materials used to build them.1

Through the joint implementation of these programs, U.S. and

Russian experts have developed an effective working relationship, collaborating to improve the

safety and security of nuclear materials across Russian civilian and military facilities, and to

prevent the proliferation of these materials and associated expertise beyond Russia. As became

particularly evident following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, these programs are of

vital importance to the security of the United States, the Russian Federation, and the international

community.

Now, after years of productive cooperation, the relationship between the United States

and Russia is evolving from one of assistance to one of partnership, which has demonstrated the

potential to address a wide range of challenges facing the international nuclear security

environment, including issues of non-proliferation, the global expansion of nuclear power, and

nuclear terrorism. The two countries are therefore poised to carry their experience and expertise

as advanced nuclear states into a new phase of partnership, leading efforts to strengthen nuclear

security bilaterally and in broader regional and international contexts.

The formal basis, upon which that partnership now rests, the Cooperative Threat

Reduction agreement between the United States and Russia, is scheduled to expire in 2013.2

Following this date, the Russian Federation will assume full programmatic and financial

responsibility for managing and securing vast quantities of nuclear materials. During the

February 2005 summit in Bratislava, Slovakia, Presidents Vladimir V. Putin and George W.

Bush confirmed their commitment to strengthening their partnership as a means of addressing

not only existing challenges of nuclear security and counter-terrorism, but also the challenges of

coming decades.3

This commitment to continued cooperation provided the context for the joint National

Academies’ (NAS)-Russian Academy of Sciences’ (RAS) public workshop on the Future of the

Nuclear Security Environment in 2015, held November 12-13, 2007, in Vienna, Austria, with the

support of the U.S. Department of Energy and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The papers contained in this proceedings were presented at this two-day workshop convened at

1

For further information regarding the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, see

http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn_lug/overview.htm; accessed April 8, 2008. 2

The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of 2003 mandates that a sustainable materials protection,

control, and accounting system be transferred to sole Russian Federation support no later than January 1, 2013. For

further information regarding the Bob Stump Act, see http://www.army.mil/armybtkc/docs/PL%20107-314.pdf;

accessed May 1, 2008.

3

For further information regarding the “Joint Statement by President Bush and President Putin on Nuclear Security

Cooperation,” of February 24, 2005, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050224-8.html;

accessed February 23, 2008. See also Appendix D for full text of this Joint Statement.

viii

the Austria Center (see Appendix A for the workshop agenda). The workshop was held in

Vienna as a means of placing the discussion in the larger context of international developments

in nuclear security, many of which (e.g. safeguards and international access to peaceful energy)

involve various aspects of the IAEA. Throughout the workshop, IAEA experts participated in

the discussions and provided useful insights into areas of technical cooperation that would

benefit from joint U.S.-Russian involvement (see Appendix B for the list of workshop

participants). The workshop was organized by joint committees of the U.S. National Academies

and the Russian Academy of Sciences, co-chaired by Rose Gottemoeller and Academician Ashot

Sarkisov (see Appendix C for committee bios). The joint committees met in Washington, D.C.

in June 2007, and in Moscow in August 2007, to plan the workshop and to seek the views and

opinions of experts knowledgeable about the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs and its

potential for expanded cooperation and partnership.

Workshop presenters from the Russian Federation and the United States included

employees of national laboratories of the two countries, former government officials of the two

countries, a United Nations representative, independent consultants, academics, and those

currently serving in private industries and non-governmental organizations.4

Each was asked to

address, in part or in full, the following questions:

• What do U.S. and Russian experts perceive as the main challenges to nuclear security

in 2015, and how can they work over the next decade to address these challenges as

partners?

• What factors might assist or obstruct the partners as they address those challenges?

• How can this partnership concretely and effectively assist mutual non-proliferation

goals in other regions such as Asia and the Middle East, and/or in multi-lateral

arrangements such as the provision of international fuel services and broader

technology cooperation?

• How can the U.S. and Russia work to sustain the non-proliferation advances gained

through more than a decade of material protection, control, and accounting and other

cooperative efforts?

• In addition to sustaining existing efforts, how can new approaches such as public￾private partnerships, strengthened legal structures, and effective management tools be

successfully employed to address emerging challenges?

In their written as well as oral remarks, participants expressed their own individual views and did

not represent the views or positions of their governments or employers. This facilitated an open

and frank discussion, and while no formal consensus among participants was sought, a surprising

degree of agreement was articulated, particularly on the trends in the nuclear security

environment, priorities for the U.S.-Russian partnership, and available tools to address future

security challenges.

4

For more general discussion of public-private partnerships and creative incorporation of private organizations into

future bilateral and multi-lateral non-proliferation cooperation, see the paper by Vyacheslav Apanasenko in this

volume.

ix

The workshop was designed to explore various views on where our U.S.-Russian security

relationship in 2015 could and perhaps should be, and various means of achieving an “ideal

relationship,” realizing that there are perhaps many “ideals.” Therefore, authors drew variously

on past and present experiences to form their arguments and descriptions of that “ideal” future

relationship. Some articulated these steps more clearly than others, but we hope that as a whole

the volume is able to provide a broad spectrum of ideas and views for the future relationship in

2015.

TRENDS, PRIORITIES, AND TOOLS FOR EXPANDED PARTNERSHIP

An important trend identified by many workshop participants is that Russia and the

United States are continuing the transition from an assistance relationship, which was prevalent

during the 1990s, to a partnership relationship. A partnership relationship implies that the two

countries are willing to share in setting priorities for cooperation, managing projects, and funding

cooperative efforts. Priorities for this evolving partnership include both persistent challenges,

such as further reductions in nuclear weapons in the pursuit of fulfilling Article VI of the Treaty

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,5

and new challenges such as the expansion of

nuclear energy technologies, nuclear forensics, nuclear terrorism, and challenges which may

arise in third countries. Several workshop participants identified a particularly promising area

for full partnership in efforts to develop nuclear fuel assurances for those countries seeking to

expand nuclear power without developing all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. By partnering to

address this immediate global opportunity, Russia and America may continue to lead the

international community not only in scientific and technical advances, but also in nuclear non￾proliferation policy.

Fortunately, more than a decade of cooperation has provided a wide variety of tools to

experts from both countries as they seek to address these priorities, including: government-to￾government and non-governmental arrangements, systematic approaches such as that of Strategic

Master Plans, and public-private partnerships. A solid yet flexible legal foundation for

cooperation, political support at the highest levels, projects of appropriate size and scale for the

tasks at hand and the resources of those involved, and sustained engagement by qualified and

dedicated individuals are well-proven mechanisms for developing the mutual understanding,

trust, and commitment required for Russia and the United States to remain productive partners.

Much work remains, however, to ensure that a successful transition to full partnership is

accomplished in the coming years, well before 2015.

Now the third in a very successful series of joint NAS-RAS projects on nuclear security,

this workshop proceedings serves as the basis for exploring the possibility of a further joint

NAS-RAS effort to provide concrete recommendations for both Moscow and Washington on

how they may proceed in transitioning to full partnership, in which both Russia and the United

States can serve as leaders bilaterally and internationally in responding to the difficult nuclear

security challenges that face us all in the coming decades.

5

To read the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, see

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf; accessed April 6, 2008.

x

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This publication was made possible through the support of the U.S. Department of

Energy. The Russian Academy of Sciences and the International Atomic Energy Agency also

provided critical logistical and administrative support in both Moscow and Vienna, without

which the preparatory meetings and workshop would not have been possible. Such generous

support, whether in the form of financial contributions, visa invitations, administrative

assistance, or transportation, is greatly appreciated.

This volume has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their technical

expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the NRC's Report Review Committee. The

purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the

institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets

institutional standards for quality. The review comments and draft manuscript remain

confidential to protect the integrity of the process.

We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this volume: Sergei

Vyachaslavovich Astapov, Institute of Strategic Stability; Lewis Dunn, Science Applications

International Corporation; Sergei Ruchkin, World Nuclear Association; Halvor Andre Undem,

International Atomic Energy Agency; Ned Wogman, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory;

and Sergei Aleksandrovich Zelentsov, Institute of Strategic Stability.

Although the reviewers listed above have provided constructive comments and

suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the content of the individual papers. Responsibility

for the final content of the papers rests with the individual authors.

We also wish to thank the following individuals for their cooperation and support, for

their assistance in making the workshop possible, and subsequently for their assistance in

producing these proceedings: Christopher A. Eldridge (IAEA), Eva Fritz (IAEA), Rita Guenther

(Committee on International Security and Arms Control), Tatiana Povetnikova, (Nuclear Safety

Institute, RAS), Yuri Shiyan (RAS), and Olga Smyshlyaeva (Nuclear Safety Institute, RAS). We

are also grateful to Tariq Rauf (Office of the Director General, IAEA) for his participation in the

workshop and the paper provided for this proceedings. Finally, we are grateful to Sergei

Astapov and Sergei Zelentsov of the Institute of Strategic Stability for their comments on select

papers.

Rose Gottemoeller Academician Ashot A. Sarkisov

U.S. National Academies’ Cochair Russian Academy of Sciences’ Cochair

xi

CONTENTS

OVERVIEW OF U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP AND PERCEPTIONS 1

OF THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT

LEADERSHIP THROUGH PARTNERSHIP: A VISION FOR THE 2015 3

NUCLEAR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Ambassador Linton Brooks

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION IN THE 13

NUCLEAR ARENA: A REVIEW OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS

Lev D. Ryabev

ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE THROUGH LONG-TERM 27

COOPERATION: APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM U.S.-RUSSIAN

MPC&A PROGRAMS

THE EXPERIENCE OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN COOPERATION 29

ON PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS

Sergei V. Antipov, Nikolai N. Ponomarev-Stepnoi, Vladimir K. Sukhoruchkin

MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING: LESSONS 37

LEARNED APPLIED TO UNITED STATES AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR

SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015

Dori Ellis, Bryon Gardner, M. Teresa Olascoaga

THE KOLA TECHNICAL AND TRAINING CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY 49

Sergei V. Antipov, Nikolai N. Ponomarev-Stepnoi, Vladimir K. Sukhoruchkin

PARTNERSHIP IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF THE 21ST CENTURY: 57

A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY

AGENCY

ASSURANCES OF SUPPLY VS. PROLIFERATION: A NEW FRAMEWORK 59

FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY

Tariq Rauf

xii

FULL PARTNERSHIP: SHARING STRATEGIC, MANAGEMENT AND 69

FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES

THE SALIENT NEED TO DEVELOP NEW APPROACHES TO ADDRESS 71

NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION ISSUES

Academician Ashot A. Sarkisov

MINIMIZING CIVIL HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM STOCKS BY 2015: 89

A FORWARD-LOOKING ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION

Philipp Bleek and Laura Holgate

COST-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND 105

TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION: THE CRDF EXPERIENCE

Eric Novotny

A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE: EXPANDING NUCLEAR ENERGY AND 111

ASSOCIATED SECURITY CHALLENGES

INTERNATIONAL URANIUM ENRICHMENT CENTER IN ANGARSK: 113

A WAY TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY AND

NON-PROLIFERATION

Sergei V. Ruchkin

NUCLEAR POWER OF FAST REACTORS: A NEW START 125

Viktor V. Orlov

LEGAL ASPECTS OF NEGOTIATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE, AND 135

IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USE OF

NUCLEAR ENERGY

Alexander A. Pikaev

PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR 145

NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBLEMS ARISING FROM A

NUCLEAR POWER RENAISSANCE

Academician Evgeny N. Avrorin

CREATIVE SOLUTIONS TO TOMORROW’S CHALLENGES: 151

OPPORTUNITIES FOR BI-LATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL

COOPERATION

NUCLEAR TERRORISM THREATS AND RESPONSES 153

Cristina Hansell

xiii

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIPS: 163

FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, PROMISING DIRECTIONS AND METHODS OF

RUSSIAN – AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD OF NON￾PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Vyacheslav M. Apanasenko

U.S. AND RUSSIAN COLLABORATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR 179

FORENSICS

Michael Kristo

MAXIMIZING U.S.-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015: 203

LEGAL OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Orde F. Kittrie

NUCLEAR SECURITY AND NON-PROLIFERATION FOR THE COMING 215

DECADES: COOPERATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 217

Viktor S. Koltunov, Vitali L. Kotyuzhansky, Yuri F. Zabaluyev

APPROACHES TO REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR MULTI-POLARITY 229

Pavel S. Zolotarev

NUCLEAR SECURITY IN 2015: THE CASE OF NORTH KOREA 237

Joel Wit

BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OF EXPERIENCE: 245

TRENDS, PRIORITIES, AND TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S.

COOPERATION

BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OF EXPERIENCE: TRENDS, 247

PRIORITIES, AND TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION

Rose Gottemoeller and Academician Ashot A. Sarkisov

LIST OF ACRONYMS 255

APPENDIXES 259

A FUTURE OF THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN 261

2015 WORKSHOP AGENDA

B FUTURE OF THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN 265

2015 WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

C JOINT NATIONAL ACADEMIES’-RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF 267

SCIENCES’ COMMITTEE MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES

xiv

D JOINT STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENTS VLADIMIR V. PUTIN 273

AND GEORGE W. BUSH AND INTERNATIONAL STATEMENTS

ON NUCLEAR SECURITY

E AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 301

STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF

PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY