Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War - The last Maoist war

Chinese Military Strategy in the

Third Indochina War

This book examines the Sino-Vietnamese conflicts of the late 1970s and 1980s,

attempting to understand them as strategic, operational, and tactical events.

The Sino-Vietnamese War was the Third Indochina War, and contemporary

Southeast Asia cannot be properly understood unless we acknowledge that the

Vietnamese fought three, not two wars to establish their current role in the

region. The war was not about the Sino-Vietnamese border, as frequently

claimed, but about China’s support for its Cambodian ally, the Khmer Rouge,

and this book addresses both US and ASEAN involvement in the effort to

support the regime. Although the Chinese completed their troop withdrawal in

March 1979, they retained their strategic goal of driving Vietnam out of Cambo￾dia at least until 1988, but it was evident by 1984–85 that the Chinese Army,

held back by the drag of its “Maoist” organization, doctrine, equipment, and per￾sonnel, was not an effective instrument of coercion.

Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War will be of great interest

to students of Southeast Asian politics, Chinese security, and military and stra￾tegic studies in general.

Edward C. O’Dowd holds the Major General Matthew C. Horner Chair of

Military Theory at the Marine Corps University, Quantico.

Asian security studies

Series Editors: Sumit Ganguly

Indiana University, Bloomington

and

Andrew Scobell

US Army War College

Few regions of the world are fraught with as many security questions as Asia.

Within this region it is possible to study great power rivalries, irredentist con￾flicts, nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation, secessionist movements,

ethnoreligious conflicts and inter-state wars. This new book series will publish

the best possible scholarship on the security issues affecting the region, and will

include detailed empirical studies, theoretically oriented case studies and policy￾relevant analyses as well as more general works.

China and International Institutions

Alternate paths to global power

Marc Lanteigne

China’s Rising Sea Power

The PLA Navy’s submarine challenge

Peter Howarth

If China Attacks Taiwan

Military strategy, politics and economics

Edited by Steve Tsang

Chinese Civil–Military Relations

The transformation of the People’s Liberation Army

Edited by Nan Li

The Chinese Army Today

Tradition and transformation for the 21st century

Dennis J. Blasko

Taiwan’s Security

History and prospects

Bernard D. Cole

Religion and Conflict in South and Southeast Asia

Disrupting violence

Edited by Linell E. Cady and Sheldon W. Simon

Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia

Zachary Abuza

US–Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century

More than words

Edited by Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup and Andrew Scobell

India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad

The covert war in Kashmir, 1947–2004

Praveen Swami

Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War

The last Maoist war

Edward C. O’Dowd

Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-making

Confucianism, leadership and war

Huiyun Feng

Chinese Military Strategy in

the Third Indochina War

The last Maoist war

Edward C. O’Dowd

First published 2007

by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada

by Routledge

270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2007 Edward C. O’Dowd

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now

known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in

any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing

from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN10: 0-415-41427-X (hbk)

ISBN10: 0-203-08896-4 (ebk)

ISBN13: 978-0-415-41427-2 (hbk)

ISBN13: 978-0-203-08896-8 (ebk)

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s

collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

ISBN 0-203-08896-4 Master e-book ISBN

In Memoriam

Denis Twitchett (1925–2006)

Scholar, Mentor, Friend

Contents

List of maps ix

Acknowledgments x

PART I

Introduction 1

1 Introduction 3

PART II

Background 11

2 The Chinese political work system 13

PART III

Narrative 31

3 Hanoi and Beijing on the road to war 33

4 The 1979 campaign 45

5 The Battle of Lang Son, February–March 1979 74

6 Artillery diplomacy: waiting for the “second lesson” 89

PART IV

Explorations 109

7 Crisis in command: the cadre system under stress in the

Guangzhou Military Region 111

8 Political work in the 1979 campaign 122

9 Politics versus firepower: the paradox of Maoist tactics 143

PART V

Conclusion 157

10 Conclusion: the legacy of an “incredible, shrinking war” 159

Appendix 1: principles of the political work system 167

Appendix 2: principal duties of the political commissar 169

Notes 170

Bibliography 205

Index 229

x Contents

Maps

1 The China–Vietnam border 47

2 The main attacks (1979) 47

3 Symbols 48

4 Ground order of battle comparison: 1979 48

5 Military regions and the Cau River defensive line 50

6 The Lang Son Front (1979) 56

7 The Cao Bang Front (1979) 58

8 The Lao Cai Front (1979) 61

9 The Battle of Lang Son (1979) 75

10 The northern approach to Lang Son: the Dong Dang–Tham

Mo area (1979) 80

11 The northern approach to Lang Son: the Tham Lung–Khau

Ma Son area (1979) 81

12 The southern approach to Lang Son: the Chi Ma–Loc Binh

area (1979) 85

13 The southern approach to Lang Son: the Loc Binh–Lang Son

area (1979) 86

14 The Fakashan area (1981) 94

15 The Laoshan area (1984–86) 99

16 Artillery diplomacy: major attacks (1980–87) 106

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank all the scholars and friends who have helped me complete

this study. I owe special thanks to Professor Susan Naquin for her guidance and

insight. Without her endless patience, this project could never have been com￾pleted. I wish to thank Professors Ellis Joffe, Tom Christiansen, Sheldon Garon,

and Paul Miles for their contributions to this project. I also thank Professors

Arthur Waldron and Denis Twitchett for their encouragement and support.

Professor Liz Lunbeck and Dean David Redman deserve special thanks for

giving me a second chance to complete the dissertation upon which this study is

based. John F. Corbett, Jr has generously shared his materials and knowledge

about this topic. His friendship and support have been crucial to this project.

Professor Paula Baker has been unceasingly helpful, and I am grateful for her

comments and encouragement.

Merle L. Pribbenow made important contributions by sharing his library and

translations of Vietnamese military publications. Keith, who does not need to be

further identified, deserves special thanks for providing assistance, translations,

and help with Chinese language material. Weber Wung also deserves special

thanks for his help in this area.

Dr Lew Stern, Dotty Avery, and C. Dennison Lane loaned me important

papers and shared their views on the topic. Their observations were essential to

my understanding of the Southeast Asian situation.

Ralph Mavis and Professor Bob Schopp helped out by listening to a litany of

strange ideas and gently skewering the worst.

Diane Bischoff, Anna Jean Shirley, and Jagjeevan Virdee made this project a

reality even when my lack of administrative, computer, graphic, and other skills

made it almost certain to fail.

This study could not have been completed without the support of the Marine

Corps University Foundation.

Any flaws and shortcomings readers find in this volume are the responsibility

of the author.

Part I

Introduction