Thư viện tri thức trực tuyến
Kho tài liệu với 50,000+ tài liệu học thuật
© 2023 Siêu thị PDF - Kho tài liệu học thuật hàng đầu Việt Nam

ARNOLD, K. (1999). Design of Gas-Handling Systems and Facilities (2nd ed.) Episode 2 Part 7 docx
Nội dung xem thử
Mô tả chi tiết
CHAPTIR
14
Safety Systems*
This chapter discusses overall safety analysis techniques for evaluating
production facilities, describes the concepts used to determine where safety shutdown sensors are required, and provides background and insight
into the concept of a Safety and Environmental Management Program.
To develop a safe design, it is necessary to first design and specify all
equipment and systems in accordance with applicable codes and standards. Once the system is designed, a process safety shutdown system is
specified to assure that potential hazards that can be detected by measuring process upsets are detected, and that appropriate safety actions (normally an automatic shutdown) are initiated. A hazards analysis is then
normally undertaken to identify and mitigate potential hazards that could
lead to fire, explosion, pollution, or injury to personnel and that cannot
be detected as process upsets. Finally, a system of safety management is
implemented to assure the system is operated and maintained in a safe
manner by personnel who have received adequate training.
Safety analysis concepts are discussed in this chapter by first describing a generalized hazard tree for a production facility. From this analysis,
decisions can be made regarding devices that could be installed to monitor process upset conditions and to keep them from creating hazards.
^Reviewed for the 1999 edition by Benjamin T. Banken of Paragon Engineering
Services, Inc.
386
Safety Systems 387
This analysis forms the basis of a widely used industry consensus standard, American Petroleum Institute, Recommended Practice 14C, Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of Basic Surface Systems for Offshore Production Platforms (RP14C), which contains a procedure for
determining required process safety devices and shutdowns. The procedures described here can be used to develop checklists for devices not
covered by RP14C or to modify the consensus checklists presented in
RP14C in areas of the world where RP14C is not mandated.
While RP14C provides guidance on the need for process safety
devices, it is desirable to perform a complete hazards analysis of the
facility to identify hazards that are not necessarily detected or contained
by process safety devices and that could lead to loss of containment of
hydrocarbons or otherwise lead to fire, explosion, pollution, or injury to
personnel. The industry consensus standard, American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice 14J, Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore Facilities (RP14J), provides guidance as to the use of various hazards analysis techniques.
The final portion of this chapter describes the management of safety
using Safety and Environmental Management Programs (SEMP) as
defined in API RP75, Recommended Practices for Development of a
Safety and Environmental Management Program for the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Operations and Facilities, and using a Safety Case
approach as is commonly done in the North Sea.
HAZARD TREE
The purpose of a hazard tree is to identify potential hazards, define the
conditions necessary for each hazard, and identify the source for each
condition. Thus, a chain of events can be established that forms a necessary series of required steps that results in the identified hazard. This is
called a "hazard tree." If any of the events leading to the hazard can be
eliminated with absolute certainty, the hazard itself can be avoided.
A hazard tree is constructed by first identifying potential hazards.
Starting with the hazard itself, it is possible to determine the conditions
necessary for this hazard to exist. For these conditions to exist, a source
that creates that condition must exist and so forth. Using this reasoning, a
hierarchy of events can be drawn, which becomes the hazard tree. In a
hazard analysis an attempt is made, starting at the lowest level in the tree,
to see if it is possible to break the chain leading to the hazard by elimi-